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Editors’ Note

M

odern elections have found a new issue upon which
to engage voters. Over the past few years, electorates
around the globe are voting in response to environmental issues in general and climate change in particular. The
impact of these elections will have profound effects far into the
future, they will decide when and how we decide to cap carbon
emissions, how we will supply our future energy needs—wind,
hydro, nuclear—if we should pursue environmental restoration
projects, or provide greater protections for our coastal areas and
marine resources.

With an eye to the future, Sustainable Development Law &
Policy decided to focus on the direction domestic environmental policy is taking and should take. We asked all presidential
candidates for a brief statement stating their priorities and hopes
for the nation’s environmental policy if they were elected president. In this issue you will find Senator Edwards’ and Governor Romney’s responses, the only two candidates to reply to our
request. In addition, we have placed the link to each presidential
candidate’s website that states their environmental and/or energy
policy.
Australians recently voted for a new Prime Minister in an
election coined the “Climate Change Election.” Perhaps the
changing climate will similarly motivate Americans in 2008.
With less than a year until the United States decides who its next
president will be, the American electorate will soon show how
committed it is to supporting the environment and combating
climate change. We hope this issue of Sustainable Development
Law & Policy serves as a useful tool for those in the legal community, policy makers, and the public in general when making
their decisions for the future of this country and the world.

Marcel De Armas
Editor-in-Chief

Maria Vanko
Editor-in-Chief
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An Overview of This Issue:
Sustainable Directions for Domestic Environmental Law
by Senator Barbara Boxer*

O

ver the past six years the Environmental Protection
Agency, under the guise of the Bush Administration,
has rolled back countless environmental regulations
that protect the air we breathe, the water we drink, and ensure
the very health of our communities. Meanwhile, the rest of the
world is moving ahead to address the greatest challenge of our
generation—global warming.
Historically, our nation has swiftly responded to scientific
consensus to solve major environmental problems. When scientists told us that the reason the Cuyahoga River caught fire in
Ohio in l969 was because toxic pollution was accumulating there,
we didn’t walk away from the challenge or await further study:
we passed the Clean Water Act. When scientists told us why the
air had become so polluted we could see it and were choking on
it, we didn’t walk away from the challenge: we passed the Clean
Air Act in l970. When scientists told us that contaminated tap
water was causing widespread waterborne disease and exposing
people to cancer, we didn’t walk away from the challenge: we
passed the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974. In none of these
instances did the federal government ignore the challenge and in
every one of these cases we are a better nation for it.
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At the moment, there are numerous environmental challenges facing our nation and the entire world; yet none greater
than global warming. It is a challenge we should meet with hope
and not fear. It is a challenge that will make us stronger as a nation
if we meet it head-on. In order to meet the challenge of global
warming, we need to cap and eventually reduce our greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.
This will require action by all sectors of our economy.
We must become far more energy efficient and cleaner. It
is the federal government’s role to create incentives for new and
green technologies. Electricity providers must look to renewable energy sources like wind and solar power, or capture and
sequester their global warming emissions. Our national automobile fleet must become dramatically more efficient. Our industries and buildings must become state-of-the-art energy savers
through retrofitting existing stock and incorporating green design
in new construction.
America must lead the world in clean technology development and renewable energy. It is essential for our economy’s
ability to grow and remain internationally competitive. Other
countries should become dependent on our clean technologies. It
will be these technologies that will free us from our dependencies
on foreign energy sources and will enable other economies to
achieve development in a carbon-constrained world.
It is also the federal government’s role to lead the international community. We will soon become the only industrialized country not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. If we become
reengaged with the international community and take the lead
on climate change, other nations like India and China will follow. Combating climate change will also help avoid other environmental disasters like species extinction and prevent global
political instability from floods, diseases, mass migration, and
conflicts over water, food, and other natural resources. By facing
this challenge now, we can maximize our chances of avoiding
the most dangerous effects of climate change and capitalize on
the tremendous opportunities that lie ahead.
Our country’s response to global warming is not only a measurement of international leadership, but also a reflection of our
national character. From the National Environmental Policy Act
to the very idea of a “cap-and-trade” this country has been a pioneer in environmental policy. The time has come for the United
States to reclaim its position as the preeminent world leader in
environmental policy—and not just global warming.
Overview: continued on page 3

* Chairman, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
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Overview: continued from page 2
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy
examines critical domestic issues requiring the attention of environmental policymakers and this Congress. The issue examines
the impact a harmonized federal renewable portfolio standard
would have on the electricity sector. The issue also looks to the
role a renewable portfolio standard should play within the context of a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade regime. This issue also
explores the need to move the domestic and international climate discussion toward adaptation policies. Articles also look to

global environmental legal developments to highlight the United
States’ need to update our chemical management and oceans
governance structures. The federal Coastal Zone Management
Act is also explored within the context of California’s offshore
oil drilling battle with the federal government. The need to adequately fulfill the National Environmental Policy Act requirements to examine the impact of increases in oil and gas drilling,
or tar sands and oil shale development and other interesting topics are also explored in this issue.

Governor Romney’s Policy Statement
by Governor Mitt Romney

W

hile I believe that any effective CO2 emission reduction program should be global, I believe in a “no
regrets” approach to improve our energy efficiency,
reduce our CO2 emissions, and end our dependency on foreign
oil. America needs an energy plan that includes reducing our
consumption of oil; increasing our use of alternative sources of
energy like nuclear, ethanol, and biodiesel; and investing in the
necessary research and development programs for alternative
energy, energy efficiency, and low-carbon technologies. These
actions will enable us to heat our homes, drive our vehicles, and
run our businesses with a much smaller environmental footprint
than ever before.
I believe we must become energy independent. As I always
do when I look for solutions to America’s problems, I look to

America’s greatest source of strength—the American people.
We need to be fostering American ingenuity and innovation to
develop new technologies. The government can play an important role. It is imperative that we increase our energy research
funding. We need to initiate our generation’s equivalent of the
Manhattan Project to develop these new technologies. We must
create new economic sources of energy—clean energy, as well
as new energy-efficient technologies. We should be licensing
these technologies to other countries as well as employing them
here at home. The government should be working with industry
to accelerate the rate at which these technologies enter the market. These actions will enable us to heat our homes, drive our
vehicles, and run our businesses with a much smaller environmental footprint than ever before.

Republican Candidates’ Energy and Environment Statements
Rudy Giuliani:
No issue statement found on campaign website.
Mike Huckabee:
Energy:
http://www.mikehuckabee.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.View&Issue_id=21
Duncan Hunter:
No issue statement found on campaign website.
John McCain:
Environment: http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/65bd0fbe-737b-4851-a7e7-d9a37cb278db.htm
Mitt Romney:
Energy:
http://www.mittromney.com/Issue-Watch/Energy
See also Governor Romney’s statement above.
Ron Paul:
Environment: http://www.ronpaul2008.com/issues/environment/
Fred Thompson:
Energy:
http://www.fred08.com/Principles/PrinciplesSummary.aspx?View=OnTheIssues
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Achieving Energy Independence &
Stopping Global Warming Through a
New Energy Economy
by Senator John Edwards

G

lobal warming is a crisis. We now know that global
warming is happening and that human activity is to
blame. If we don’t change course, within decades we
could be living on a fundamentally different planet—one with
tens of millions of people facing starvation or forced to become
refugees.
For too long, many in Washington have turned a blind eye
to problems when the solutions were right in front of us. In part,
that’s because powerful special interests want to keep things the
way they are. Oil companies running gas stations don’t want to
carry alternative fuels. Utilities making money by selling more
power don’t want to use it more efficiently. Automakers squeezing profits out of high-polluting SUVs don’t see the need to
develop the cars of the future.
But this crisis is also an opportunity. With strong leadership, we can emerge from the crisis of global warming with a
new energy economy that embraces innovation and creates more
than 1 million jobs.
To achieve energy independence and halt global warming,
I will cap the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases starting in 2010 to reduce emissions by 20 percent by 2020
and by 80 percent by 2050. Because all nations must join the
effort, I will share clean energy technology with cooperating
nations and, if necessary, require climate-change commitments
in our trade deals.
To cut oil imports by 7.5 million barrels a day by 2025, I
will promote improvements in fuel economy, ethanol use, and
hybrid cars. I will raise fuel economy standards to 40 miles per
gallon by 2016 and will invest $1 billion a year in helping U.S.
automakers advance and apply the latest technology.

Renewable energy sources like wind, solar power, biomass and ethanol are cleaner and can be cheaper than traditional
sources of energy. I will require their use to generate 25 percent
of the nation’s electricity by 2025 and invest more resources in
researching and encouraging these clean forms of energy.
I will also open the electricity grid to competition. Thousands of smaller producers of electricity could spark innovation
and generate cleaner, cheaper, more reliable power. I will support local renewable power and require utilities to buy it from
homes and entrepreneurs.
Energy technology can create a nationwide economic boom,
including clean tech investments from Silicon Valley, jobs in
renewable energy in rural America, a revitalized manufacturing
base and “green-collar” jobs. I will create a $13 billion a year
New Energy Economy Fund to invest in renewable energy and
energy-efficient technology. The Fund will be financed by a capand-trade system that uses market forces to reduce pollution in a
cost-effective and flexible manner.
None of this will happen unless we demand it. The oil companies won’t do it. The utilities won’t do it. The mining companies won’t do it.
Our generation must do it—we can’t wait for someone else
to take responsibility. Our generation must be the one that says,
“We must halt global warming.” Our generation must be the
one that says “yes” to alternative, renewable fuels and ends our
dependence on foreign oil. If we don’t act now, it will be too
late. It won’t be easy, but it is time for Americans to be patriotic
about something other than war.

Democratic Candidates’ Environment, Climate, and Energy Statements
Joe Biden:
Energy:
Climate:

http://biden.senate.gov/documents/
BidenRecordEnergy.pdf
http://www.joebiden.com/issues?id=0011

Hillary Clinton:
Energy:
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/energy/
Christopher Dodd:
Energy:
http://chrisdodd.com/issues/energy_independence/
John Edwards:
Environment: http://johnedwards.com/issues/energy/
See also Senator Edwards’ statement above.
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Mike Gravel:
Climate:
http://www.gravel2008.us/issues.php
Dennis Kucinich:
Environment: http://www.dennis4president.com/go/issues/a-sustainable-future/
Barack Obama:
Energy:
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/energy/
Environment: http://www.barackobama.com/issues/environment/
Bill Richardson:
Energy:
http://www.richardsonforpresident.com/issues/energy
Environment: http://www.richardsonforpresident.com/issues/environment
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State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy:
Tripping the Horse with the Cart?
by Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper*

C

Introduction

onventional electricity generation is by far the largest
source of air pollutants that harm human health and contribute to global warming. For instance, emissions from
just nine conventional power plants in Illinois directly contributed to 300 premature deaths, 14,000 asthma attacks, and more
than 400 thousand daily incidents of upper respiratory symptoms
per year among the 33 million people living within 250 miles of
the plants.1 Moreover, fossil-fueled power plants in the United
States emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
in 2003, more than ten times the amount of CO2 compared to the
next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.2 Of all American
industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—
the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for
global warming.
For these and other sobering reasons, many state governments promote renewable energy technologies though policies
such as renewable portfolio
standards (“RPS”) and fees such
as a systems benefit charges
(“SBCs”). By these mechanisms, state regulators intend to
correct three major failures of
the existing “free” market for
electricity fuels. First, electricity
prices do not reflect the social
costs of generating power. Hidden costs, or negative externalities such as the need to secure
foreign imports of fuel, environmental damage from resource
extraction, air and water emissions, medical expenses associated
with air pollution, and the risk of climate change, are not typically reflected in the rates Americans pay for electricity.
Second, energy subsidies create an unfair market advantage
for conventional energy technologies. A majority of the federal
budget for energy research and development over the past fifty
years has gone to conventional fossil fuel and nuclear industries
and not toward renewable energy technologies. From 1948 to
1998, for instance, roughly eighty percent of U.S. Department of
Energy appropriations for research and development (“R&D”)
have gone to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.3 Even though
coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy industries are relatively
mature sectors, federal R&D expenditures continue to favor
these industries. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006, for example, the
federal government allotted $580 million in R&D funds to fossil
fuels and $221 million to the nuclear industry. The wind indus-

try, in contrast, received only $38.3 million.4
Third, renewable energy generation is subject to a free
rider problem. Since everyone benefits from the environmental
advantages of renewable energy, private companies that invest
millions of dollars in researching and developing clean energy
technologies are often unable to recover the full profit of their
investments. Inevitably, the market allows some consumers to
be free riders, benefiting from the investments of others without
paying for them.

State Government Mechanisms for
Promoting Renewable Energy
State policy interventions intend to stimulate a market for
renewable resources and spur additional research, development,
and implementation of renewable energy technologies. So far,
state governments in the United States have relied predominately on RPSs and SBCs to level the playing field by neutralizing a legacy of unequal federal subsidies and directly requiring
renewable energy. While state
policies are innovative and well
intentioned, the time has come
to shift to federal regulation and
intervention. Continued reliance
on state-based activity alone will
ironically promote more market
externalities and “free riding”
than harmonized federal action.

Energy subsidies create an
unfair market advantage
for conventional energy
technologies.

5

System Benefit Charges

Systems benefit charges
(also called public benefit funds,
system benefit funds, and clean energy funds) originated in the
1990s at a time when state policy makers were considering electric utility restructuring legislation. Afraid that gains made in
pursuing research, development, and implementation of environmentally-preferable renewable energy technologies would
end after markets were deregulated, advocates of the novel
* Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Asia and
Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University
of Singapore. He serves as a Senior Research Fellow for the Network for New
Energy Choices in New York and is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University in Blacksburg, VA. He can be reached at
bsovacool@nus.edu.sg. Christopher Cooper is the Executive Director of the Network for New Energy Choices, a national nonprofit organization committed to
reforming U.S. energy policy to expand the energy choices of American consumers
and promoting creative ideas for financing community-based energy projects and
advocates for progressive utility policy reform. He can be contacted at Chris@
NewEnergyChoices.org.
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technologies won concessions in some states for a new funding
mechanism for high-risk or long-term projects. A SBC places a
small tax on every kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity generated and utilizes those funds to pursue socially-beneficial energy
projects.5 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that
SBCs have been responsible for promoting 1,117 megawatts
(“MW”) of renewable energy capacity.6
SBCs were first implemented in Washington State in 1994
and were endorsed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1995 as a way to fund services that had previously been
included in customers’ bills from regulated utility companies.7 As
part of the negotiations for California’s restructuring law, environmental advocates won a provision for a public benefit fund
that would expend at least $872 million on energy-efficiency
work from 1998 to the end of 2001 and would allocate $540
million on renewable energy projects.8 To develop renewable
energy technologies and other programs expected to struggle
after deregulation, the California Energy Commission created its
Public Interest Energy Research program, which initially drew
about $62 million annually from the state’s SBC.9
By 2006, fifteen states created SBCs. The seventeen organizations that administer the funds, which are scheduled to total
$4 billion by 2017, collaborate through a nonprofit organization
called the Clean Energy States Alliance. The organization sponsors original research, collects information and analyses, and
seeks to expand the use of clean energy technologies with a special emphasis on solar, wind, and fuel cells. Moreover, the group
seeks to increase the efficiency of state research by eliminating
duplication of efforts and by providing forums for the states to
share knowledge and insights.10

Renewable Portfolio Standards
An RPS is a legislative mandate requiring electricity suppliers (often referred to as “load serving entities”) in a given
geographical area to employ renewable resources to produce a
certain percentage of power by a fixed date.
An RPS program transfers the risk of renewable energy
investments from regulators to investors.11 RPS uses the market as a mechanism to determine the efficacy of any given technology; as a result, higher costs, if they occur, are distributed
evenly throughout society to those that benefit from them, and
are blended with the lower costs of existing conventional generation. 12
Unlike instruments developed by public utility commissions
with long and complex procedures, often followed by litigation,
RPSs are bureaucratically simple.13 RPSs enable customers to
pay producers directly for renewable energy, obviating the need
for the administration of funds by government agencies. And,
unlike a one-time award for funds, no project is guaranteed a
place in the market.14
First implemented by Iowa and Minnesota in the 1980s,
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have already
passed RPS laws requiring utilities to use renewable resources
as a portion of their overall provision of electricity.15 Four other
states have nonbinding renewable energy goals.16 Five more
states—Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Utah—are
Fall 2007

considering mandating some form of RPS. Of the approximate
9,000 MW of wind energy in the United States, roughly fifty
percent, or 4,500 MW, have been promoted directly by RPS policies, whereas ten percent, or 900 MW, have been promoted by
SBCs from 2001 to 2006.17
Figure 1: Annual U.S. Wind Energy Development by State
Policy Mechanism, 2001 to 2006

The Case for Federal Intervention
There are three reasons, however, why continued reliance
on state-based efforts such as SBCs and RPSs will be insufficient to promote renewable energy technologies in the United
States on the scale needed to fight climate change.

Improving Reliability
First, federal intervention is needed to improve electricity reliability. Contrary to what some opponents of renewable
energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes
easier to manage the more they are deployed. Electrical and
power systems engineers have long held the principle that the
larger a system becomes, the less reserve capacity it needs.
Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated
by grid interconnection in exactly this manner. When a single
electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electricity than the system allocated for each consumer, the strain on the
system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing
from the grid that it is entirely likely another consumer will be
drawing less to make up the difference. This “averaging” works
in a similar fashion on the supply side of the grid. Individual
wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply.18 So
when the wind is not blowing through one wind farm, it is likely
blowing harder through another.
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals
that of a single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds
or thousands of turbines have even greater reliability because it
is unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time. Furthermore, when turbines do malfunction, they take far less time
to recover than massive conventional power plants or nuclear
reactors that have literally millions of individual components,
arranged in complex circuits prone to mechanical failure.19 Analysts already confirmed the benefit of wind power’s greater technical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006
study assessing the widespread use of wind power in Minnesota
6

concluded that “wind generation does make a calculable contribution to system reliability” by decreasing the risk of large,
unexpected outages.20
Improved reliability of supply is important, as blackouts and
brownouts exact a considerable toll on the American economy.
The U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) estimates that while
power interruptions often last only seconds or minutes, they cost
consumers an average of $150 to 400 billion every year.21 The
Electric Power Research Institute projects the annual costs of
poor power reliability at $119 billion, or forty-four percent of all
electricity sales in 1995.22
However, to capture such benefits, renewable energy technologies must be spatially deployed in every state and must have
national penetration rates above ten percent. Penetration rates of
renewable energy technologies nationwide are still low—around
three percent of overall installed electricity capacity in 2007.
Collective state efforts are expected to increase this amount to
only around four percent by 2015 and five percent by 2030, but
the environmental benefits of renewable energy only really start
to accrue at penetration rates well above this rate. Federal intervention in the form of a nation-wide SBC or RPS aiming for targets of ten to twenty percent by
2020 would expand the diversity
of technologies used to access
renewable resources.

Improving Energy
Security

A deliberate, aggressive,
well-coordinated assault
on the electric power grid
could devastate the
electricity sector.

Second, larger penetration
rates are needed to ensure energy
security. This is because the
geographical dispersion of generators not only improves their
overall reliability; it makes them
more secure—and thus resilient
to accidental power outages and
failure, or intentional attack and disruption. Notwithstanding
intense media focus on the security dangers from nuclear reactors and natural gas facilities, the nation’s power grid represents
an equally serious threat to energy security. The security issues
facing the modern electric utility grid are almost as serious as
they are invisible.
For example, in 1975 the New World Liberation Front
bombed assets of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company more
than ten times, and members of the Ku Klux Klan and San
Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack electricity infrastructure.23 Internationally, organized paramilitaries
such as the Farabundo-Marti National Liberation Front were
able to interrupt more than ninety percent of electric service in El
Salvador and even had manuals for attacking power systems.24
Some caution that all it would take to cause a “cascade of
power failures across the country,” costing billions of dollars in
direct and indirect damage, is a few motivated people with minivans and a couple of mortars and balloons, which they would
use to chaff substations and disrupt transmission lines.25 A deliberate, aggressive, well-coordinated assault on the electric power
7

grid could devastate the electricity sector. Replacement time
would be “on the order of Iraq,” not “on the order of a lineman
putting things up a pole.”26
Several recent trends in the electric utility industry have
increased the vulnerability of its infrastructure. To improve their
operational efficiency, many utilities and system operators have
increased their reliance on automation and computerization.
Low margins and various competitive priorities have encouraged industry consolidation, with fewer and bigger facilities and
intensive use of assets in one place. As the National Research
Council noted, “control is more centralized, spare parts inventories have been reduced, and subsystems are highly integrated
across the entire business.”27
Federal promotion of renewable energy on a national scale
can improve the security of the grid by decentralizing electricity generation. Even when renewable resources like wind and
solar are concentrated, the tendency for them to produce power
in incremental and modular amounts makes it much more difficult to disrupt large segments of generation. The International
Energy Agency has noted that centralized energy facilities create
significant targets for terrorism because attacking a few facilities
can cause large power outages.28
In contrast to the security risks
of large centralized generators,
decentralizing energy facilities
and providing power through
more modular and distributed
energy systems minimizes the
risk of accidents and grid failures, and does not require transporting or storing hazardous or
radioactive materials. Analysts
have tended to refer to renewable energy systems (and other
forms of distributed generation
such as fuel cells and small-scale cogeneration units) as “supple”
power technologies because they are modular suited to dispersed
siting.29 A national RPS or SBC promoting renewables could
greatly contribute to the overall security of the nation’s electric
infrastructure by forcing more technologies into the portfolio of
all American utilities.

Providing Climate Benefits
Third, and perhaps most important, federal intervention is
needed to fight climate change and minimize “free-riding” going
on in states that have chosen to rely on nuclear and fossil fuels
to generate electricity, instead of promoting renewable energy.
The DOE has already determined that only “the imposition of [a
national] RPS would lead to lower generation from natural gas
and coal facilities.”30 Examinations of fuel generation in several
states confirm this finding, as well as the tendency for a national
RPS to displace oil-fired generation, which is still a significant
source of electricity in Florida, New York, and Hawaii. Equally
important, but often overlooked, is how SBC- or RPS-induced
renewable generation would offset nuclear power in several
regions of the United States.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Researchers in North Carolina, for example, determined
that a state-wide RPS would displace facilities relying on
nuclear fuels and minimize the environmental impacts associated with the extraction of uranium used to fuel nuclear reactors.31 In Oregon, the Governor’s Renewable Energy Working
Group analyzed a twenty-five percent statewide RPS by 2025
and projected that every fifty MW of renewable energy would
displace approximately twenty MW of base-load resources,
including nuclear power.32 Environment Michigan estimates that
a twenty percent RPS by 2020 would displace the need for more
than 640 MW of power that would have otherwise come from
both nuclear and coal facilities.33
By offsetting the generation of conventional and nuclear
power plants, only large-scale renewable energy penetration
rates would avoid many of the environmental and social costs
associated with the mining, processing, transportation, combustion, and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels. By promoting technologies that displace conventional forms of electricity
generation, federal promotion of renewable energy would substantially decrease air pollution in the United States. A single one
MW wind turbine running at only thirty percent of capacity for
one year displaces more than 1,500 tons of carbon dioxide, 2.5
tons of sulfur dioxide 3.2 tons of
nitrous oxides, and 60 pounds of
toxic mercury emissions.34
One study assessing the
environmental potential of a 580
MW wind farm located on the
Altamont Pass near San Francisco, California, concluded that
the turbines displaced hundreds
of thousands of tons of air pollutants each year that would
have otherwise resulted from
fossil fuel combustion. 35 The study estimated that the wind farm
would displace more than twenty-four billion pounds of nitrous
oxides, sulfur dioxides, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide
over the course of its twenty-year lifetime—enough to cover
the entire city of Oakland, California in a pile of toxic pollution
forty-stories high.36
Renewable energy technologies possess an even greater ability to mitigate climate change. The International Atomic Energy
Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emissions are included, coal plants are around ten times more carbon
intensive than solar technologies and more than forty times more
carbon intensive than wind technologies. Natural gas fares little
better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and twenty times
as carbon intensive as wind.37 The Common Purpose Institute estimates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as
0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of generation. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned
Scientists, a twenty percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 434 million metric tons by 2020—a reduction of
fifteen percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent
to taking nearly seventy-one million automobiles off the road.38

Figure 2: Direct and Indirect Carbon Emissions
by Electricity Technology
(equivalent grams of CO2/kWh) 39

These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991
and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands
reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO2 between 4.4
million and 6.7 million tons. Renewable technologies were so
successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe
now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution
utilities in meeting industry CO2 reduction targets.”40

Conclusion
Given such obvious and
overwhelming advantages, it is
hard to believe that many utilities and policymakers diligently
oppose national promotion
on renewable energy, repeating
myths that have long since been
debunked. Largely, the remaining objections to federal intervention constitute a diminishing
series of canards that mischaracterize a national SBC or RPS as an unnecessary federal intervention in a relatively free market. Forgetting that a majority of
states are well on their way to imposing their own clunky, overlapping, inconsistent, competing, and sometimes irrational mess
of mandates, opponents churn out four war-torn myths every
time the issue is considered:
The first criticism is that a national SBC or RPS would create “winners and losers.” In reality, all states have renewable
resources they can affordably develop. However, under the
current system of state mandates, some states are “losers” by
subsidizing the cheap, polluting electricity in other states. Other
states are victims to inconsistencies between state mandates that
produce perverse predatory trade-offs and require them to export
their cheap in-state renewable electricity in exchange for more
expensive electricity or renewable energy credits. A national
mandate would level the playing field by creating consistent,
uniform rules and by allowing utilities to purchase renewable
energy credits or develop renewable resources anywhere they
are cost competitive.
The second criticism is that a national mandate would
increase electricity rates. However, in most states, renewable

An RPS program transfers
the risk of renewable
energy investments from
regulators to investors.
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energy mandates have not significantly increased rates and a
consensus of economic models predict that a national policy
would generate substantial consumer savings over the existing
patchwork of state programs. By expanding the amount of
energy that would offset gas-fired generation, a federal intervention would reduce demand on a strained and volatile natural
gas market. Renewable energy units with markedly faster leadtimes than conventional and nuclear reactors speeds the cost
recovery of critical transmission investments and reduces the
rate increases needed to pay for new transmission.
Another common criticism is that a federal mandate would
harm the utilities sector in the form of future profits they will
not be able to recover from consumers through higher electricity
rates. For policymakers, balancing utility profits with electricity prices is one of the hard decisions we elect them to make.
However, elected officials should consider that utility claims of
lost profit are short-sited and strategically unsound. In reality, a
more predictable regulatory environment decreases utility litigation and compliance costs relative to a growing tangle of vague
and unstable state mandates. Expanding the universe of eligible
renewable resources and establishing clear, uniform trading rules
creates far more flexibility for regulated utilities and rewards
utility investments on the basis of smart market strategy. By
promoting a robust domestic renewable energy manufacturing
sector, a national mandate reduces the costs utilities pay in unfavorable exchange rates for foreign parts and labor and redirects
those investments to the U.S. labor market.
A final criticism is that a national RPS or SBC would promote only least-cost options such as wind turbines and landfill gas generators (and not solar photovoltaic, solar thermal,

small-scale hydroelectric, and geothermal plants). Existing state
programs, however, reveal that mandates with broad qualifying resource eligibility actually have led to the development of
many different renewable resources. Utilities have already demonstrated that they can meet state requirements by deploying a
diverse portfolio of renewable resources that best match their
service areas. By geographically and monetarily expanding the
market for renewable resources, a national RPS is likely to further diversify the deployment of renewable energy technologies.
In Nevada, geothermal energy may be cheaper to develop than
wind. In the Pacific Northwest, incremental hydroelectric power
may be cheaper than solar. In the Southeast, biomass may be the
most affordable. A national RPS mandate with a fuel-based definition of eligible renewable resources ensures that free market
principles, rather than regulatory set-asides or political patronage, determine which technologies will be most cost competitive
in certain areas of the country. An added bonus is that a national
RPS decreases compliance costs for regulated utilities, since a
technology-neutral mandate allows utilities to meet RPS obligations using the technology that is most cost competitive for the
fuels available.
Ultimately, by establishing a consistent, national mandate
and uniform trading rules, a national SBC or RPS can create a
more just and predictable regulatory environment for utilities
while jump-starting a robust national renewable energy technology sector. By offsetting electricity that utilities would otherwise generate with conventional and nuclear power, a federal
action would decrease electricity prices for American consumers
while protecting human health and the environment at a scale
and magnitude not possible with state programs.

Endnotes: State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy
1
Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Impact of Pollution on Public
Health (Jan. 3, 2001), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/
press01032001.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).

Rodney Sobin, Energy Myth Seven: Renewable Energy Systems Could Never
Meet Growing Electricity Demand in America, in Energy and American Society—Thirteen Myths 171, 171-99 (B.K. Sovacool & M.A. Brown eds., 2007).
2

3
Navin Nayak, Redirecting America’s Energy: The Economic and Consumer
Benefits of Clean Energy Policies 11 (U.S. PIRG Education Fund, ed., 2005),
available at http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/LQ/zu/LQzu1uCusnY9a02cMKw
V0Q/redirectingamericasenergy.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).

C. Levesque, RenewableEnergyAccess.com, What Is the Percentage of Federal Subsidies Allotted for Wind Power? (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.renewableenergyaccess.com/rea/news/story?id=48070 (last visited Oct.
17, 2007).

4

Mark Bolinger, Ryan Wiser & Garrett Fitzgerald, An Overview of Investments
by State Renewable Energy Funds in Large-Scale Renewable Generation Projects, The Elec. J., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 78, 78-84; Brent Haddad & Paul Jefferiss,
Forging Consensus on National Renewables Policy: The Renewables Portfolio
Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust Fund, The Elec. J., Mar. 1999,
at 68, 70.

5

Ryan H. Wiser, State Policy Update: A Review of Effective Wind Power
Incentives slide 5, 24 (Presentation to the Midwestern Wind Policy Institute

6

9

June 15, 2007) http://www.ncsl.org/print/energy/SPRWiserWind07.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
For example Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, DSM
Tariffs UE-941375 and UE-941377, Olympia, WA, 1994, and FERC, “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and
RM94-7-001, Washington, DC, 1995, available at http://dsd.lbl.gov/~johnston/
EDM/RM95-8.00.FERC.NOPRA.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).

7

8

See Assemb. B. 1890, 1995–1996 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) art. 7.

California Energy Commission, PIER Program (Public Interest Energy Program) http://www.energy.ca.gov/pier/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).

9

Clean Energy States Alliance, Home, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/
index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).

10

Jacob Lemming, Financial Risk for Green Electricity Investors and Producers in a Tradable Green Certificate Market, 31 Energy Pol’y 21, 24 (2003).

11

12
Mark Jaccard, Renewable Portfolio Standard, 5 Encyclopedia of Energy 413,
413-21 (2004).

Endnotes: State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy
continued on page 78

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

The Truth About Wind Turbines and
Avian Mortality
by Michael Distefano*

Courtesy of Kevin Dooley

W

ind turbines are often criticized for posing a significant risk to surrounding bird life. As certain numbers
indicate, this argument has some merit. A 2001 study
estimated that 33,000 birds are killed in the United States each
year by wind turbines.1 More troubling is the fact that of those
33,000, an estimated 28,500 are protected species.2 Birds may
collide with the structure itself, be struck by a spinning blade,
or, if flying close enough, be pulled into the turbine’s wake.3
Though these numbers seem troublesome at first glance, they are
an inaccurate depiction of modern wind turbine sites nor do they
constitute a valid reason to discourage wind turbine construction.
The most often criticized wind farm is California’s Altamont
Pass wind power site. Figures suggest that since its construction
in the early 1980s, the 7,000 turbine site has been responsible
for killing 22,000 birds, including 400 golden eagles.4 Altamont
Pass represents an older generation of wind sites and by examining the factors that set it apart from modern sites, one can understand the causes of avian mortality.
The first factor is the site’s location. Had an adequate environmental impact assessment taken place at Altamont Pass, it
would have shown that it is an important migration route, as
well as a wintering place for many species of raptors.5 Its craggy
landscape and various canyons make it an ideal setting for birds
of prey, many of which are listed on the endangered species list.6
Properly situating turbine sites in areas with low bird populations would drastically reduce collision rates simply by placing
the turbines where there are less
birds to fly into them. Today it
is common practice to study bird
traffic at proposed sites before
construction begins. If the studies find that the proposed site
is heavily trafficked, operation
schedules can then take into
account peak migratory periods.
The second factor is technology. The turbine designs at
Altamont are considerably outdated. It takes fifteen Altamont
turbines to produce the same energy as one modern, larger turbine.7 Newer turbines, with rotor diameters in excess of one hundred meters, sweep a larger patch of sky and therefore need not
spin as fast as small turbines.8 The slower the rotation speed,
the easier it is for flying birds to dodge the blades. Though more
costly, large turbines reduce bird fatalities and generate energy
more efficiently. Fortunately, there are plans to replace all of the

Wind farm in San Gorgonio, California

Altamont turbines with larger, more efficient units within the
coming decade.9
To put these factors in perspective, consider the Maple Ridge
Wind Farm in upstate New York. In the last year or so 195 turbines have come online and collectively they produce 320 megawatts of electricity per year.10 By contrast, the Altamont Pass
wind farm generates approximately 600 megawatts per year
but employs 7,000 turbines to
do so.11 The Maple Ridge Wind
Farm enjoys an efficiency rate
almost twenty times that of the
Altamont Pass. Because fewer
turbines equal reduced chances
of collision, every gain in efficiency reduces the occurrence of
avian mortality.
Concerns have been raised with the possible increase in
avian mortality, if wind energy were to experience a sudden
boom and turbines increased by the thousands However, it is
not clear that an increase in wind energy will cause an avian
mortality incidence swell. In absolute numbers bird fatalities

Is not clear that an
increase in wind energy
will cause an avian
mortality incidence swell.

Fall 2007

* Michael Distefano is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University,
Washington College of Law.

10

would undoubtedly rise. But bird fatalities per turbine drop
the more we learn about turbine technology and operation. As
long as wind turbines can produce a substantial portion of our
energy without posing an unnecessarily large risk to birds, their
use is warranted. Our measure of success must be the next best
alternative. Conventional energy
resources such as coal and petroleum also pose a substantial danger to birds. Acid rain has done
considerable damage to avian
habitats and climate change has
disrupted migratory patterns and
synchrony with food sources.12
Environmental catastrophes like
the Exxon Valdez, though rare,
continue to pose threats not just
to individual birds, but entire
ecosystems. There is no question that the use and extraction of
coal and other fossil fuels has had and will continue to have a
tremendous negative effect on birdlife.13
The Altamont Pass has been a learning experience not only
for the California Energy Commission but for the renewable
energy community as a whole. By improving wind turbine tech-

nology and properly choosing and operating turbine sites, the
incidence of avian mortality can be reduced. Even concerned
organizations, such as the American Bird Conservancy and
Sierra Club, have pledged their support in favor of wind energy
as long as proper attention is given to its location, design, and
operation.14
Wind farms are, by their
very nature, large industrial
projects. It would be impossible
to completely mitigate their
impacts on wildlife and habitats
but with careful attention those
impacts can be reduced. Wind
energy should be viewed within
its larger context—that of the
urgent need for diversified and
renewable energy resources. As
the United States and other countries begin to explore energy
alternatives, wind’s role should not be sidelined because of this
unfortunate consequence. Wind turbines will always pose a
degree of danger to birdlife but the value to be gained from their
responsible use is undeniable.

The most often criticized
wind farm is California’s
Altamont Pass wind
power site.
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Translating State Experience into
Federal Climate Policy
by Jennifer M. Rohleder*

T

he debate over U.S. federal climate change policy has
never been stronger. While a federal climate policy is
being formulated, the states are developing climate experience and expertise that the federal government can leverage.
This trend begs the question of whether state policies should be
used as a template for federal climate policy.
One area where states have developed expertise is in the
registration and tracking of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.
Even though tracking GHG emissions has recently become a
mainstream federal issue, Wisconsin has long been a leader in
this area. Since 1993, Wisconsin has required any facility that
emits more than 100,000 tons
of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) to
report its emission levels to the
state Department of Natural
Resources. It is the only state
with such a requirement.1 Additionally, dozens of sources that
fall well below the threshold
voluntarily report their emissions, providing the state with
a detailed, multi-year profile of
its major CO2 sources. The profile includes most major electric
utilities in the state, a wide range
of large industries, and a mixture of smaller sources.2
Moreover, several states have developed “carbon adders”
to compare investment options with respect to the possible
future costs of mitigating GHG emissions.3 A carbon adder is an
expected future cost of CO2 equivalent assumed during investment comparisons. Due to the highly uncertain and controversial
nature of future damages of climate change, a carbon adder estimates only the future compliance costs of carbon restraint rather
than the economic impacts of future climate change.4
Of the states with carbon adders, Oregon’s is the most
broadly applied. The Oregon Public Utility Commission
(“PUC”) requires all regulated utilities to include analysis on
a range of carbon costs in their integrated resource planning
process since 1993.5 Similarly, the California PUC requires the
state’s investor-owned utilities to include a carbon adder in their
resource plans.6 Colorado’s carbon adder only applies to one
utility because the carbon adder resulted from a litigation settlement agreement with environmental groups.7
States have often led in policy development, which can
influence federal action. States are often better positioned to
reach consensus and act more quickly than the federal gov-

ernment. The political interests of most states are relatively
cohesive when compared to the national policy-making process. State government units are smaller and closer to affected
constituencies, thus states are better able implement policy
responses more quickly.
Policy diffusion from the state to the federal level is known
as vertical diffusion.8 Expanding effective state-level energy and
climate policies to the national level seems to be a logical and
efficient method of developing federal climate policy. The question is: how do we translate state experience into federal policy?
The World Resources Institute conducted a study on how state
policies influence federal regulations. The study identified and
evaluated several factors that
contributed to successful vertical diffusion, the most important
of which, particularly for environmental/energy issues, was
state officials championing the
cutting-edge policies their states
have implemented in the federal
policy debate.9 The study concluded that states can play a significant role in the development
of a national policy. However,
no single factor can guarantee vertical diffusion although certain
factors, such as the power of example and the extent of horizontal policy diffusion (from state to state) are cited strong factors
informing federal policy.
States are considered the laboratories of democracy, testing
new ideas and innovative policies that can be used by national
policy-makers. Vertical diffusion is only effective if the federal
policymakers learn from the experiences of the states and pull
the best features together into an overarching national policy.
Unfortunately for states, as climate policy discussions expand to
the national level states risk losing their leadership status with
respect to the policy agenda. In addition, a national discussion
invites broader interests to the negotiating table. Further complicating vertical diffusion is the fact that states can only maintain
their role as policy incubators and innovators so long as federal
policy does not preempt state actions.
Endnotes: Translating State Experience Into Federal Climate Policy
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The Role of Renewable Portfolio
Standards in the Context of a National
Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program
by Neal J. Cabral*
Introduction

Reasons for Enacting an RPS

As the Senate prepares to take up a measure, passed by
the House of Representatives, for a national renewable energy
portfolio standard (“RPS”),1 and continues serious deliberations
about a mandatory greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction program, it is an appropriate time to examine what role a national
RPS would have within a mandatory GHG reduction program.
Because Congress seems to prefer a broad cap-and-trade program as the best least-cost vehicle with which to implement a
mandatory carbon reduction program, tension exists between
a market-oriented cap-and-trade program and a command and
control RPS mandate. This debate does not take place within a
vacuum, as almost half the states have adopted an RPS or similar
renewable energy targets.2 A national RPS calls into question the
role such state RPS programs would have both within a national
RPS and within the context of
a national carbon cap-and-trade
program.
Three primary bases for tension exist between an RPS and
a cap-and-trade program. First,
renewables, as imposed through
an RPS, are typically not the
least-cost compliant solution
to carbon reductions, particularly in the earlier stages of any
carbon cap-and-trade program
where the required reductions are expected to be relatively modest. Second, once a carbon cap-and-trade program is enacted, the
purpose of an RPS program becomes more uncertain because
renewable power purchased pursuant to an RPS program will
no longer provide any additional carbon reductions beyond
those required by the cap. Third, it is difficult to integrate RPS
requirements into a carbon cap-and-trade program in a way that
produces relatively fair results with respect to the entities that
purchase the renewables and, therefore, bear their costs.
Taken together, these three tensions between an RPS program and a least-cost carbon cap-and-trade policy tend to weaken
the current standard rationales for enacting RPS programs. In
order to properly sort out these issues and develop a coordinated
and sound national carbon policy that includes a renewables
component, legislators must evaluate and agree on the specific
purposes for enacting an RPS program in the context of an
expected carbon cap-and-trade program. They must also structure both programs to meet the defined objectives of the RPS.

An RPS requires that electric generators or suppliers source
a defined percentage of their power from renewable energy
facilities.3 Qualifying renewables vary by program, but typically include wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, and
sometimes hydropower.4 Although renewable energy is a term
intended to describe energy sources that are considered renewable because they are powered by energy coming from an inexhaustible source, or from sources that regenerate fast enough
that they will not be depleted, RPS can also include sources that
do not fit that description. However, all qualifying RPS sources
currently under the various state standards and proposed federal
standard are also at least low-carbon or carbon-neutral sources
of power, and it is this defining attribute that, from a policy perspective, is probably the most important aspect of renewables.
That RPS mandates are primarily carbon reduction mandates seems relatively clear.
Although RPS requirements are
almost never enacted primarily as specific carbon reduction programs, probably due to
political concerns, this seems to
be their primary perceived benefit. In other words, while states
and Congress apparently count
RPS programs as an important
contributor to GHG reductions, they rarely discuss any specific
carbon-based programmatic aspects of an RPS, such as explaining how the RPS would fit within specifically adopted carbon
reduction goals.
Instead, proponents often tout renewables as a sound policy measure because, in addition to being green from a general emissions perspective, they also provide other ancillary
benefits. For example, renewables are said broadly to promote
energy security. While renewables do promote certain aspects
of energy security through supply diversity, they do not tend
to reduce fuel imports since the power sector generally imports
only a very small amount of fuel from outside North America.
Studies on whether renewables contribute importantly to energy
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price stability also conflict. 5 In general, the International Energy
Agency has concluded that while “environmental objectives will
be uppermost,” RPS can provide some energy security enhancements.6
However, these ancillary reasons for promoting an RPS do
not appear themselves to be sufficiently compelling to support
national RPS legislation. Instead, the carbon reduction element
of RPS requirements appears to be the driving force. That conclusion seems obvious when one considers whether states would
ever adopt RPS programs if qualifying emission sources met all
of the non-carbon benefits that RPS advocates purport renewables provide, but were in fact carbon-based sources of power.
In such a case, little advocacy for RPS programs would exist
at all, and few would be adopted. We can see this quite readily
when we consider coal-to-liquids plants. In fact, such plants
do rather efficiently reduce dependence on foreign energy
supplies such as oil for mobile sources, diversify domestic
energy facilities, and promote new technological developments,
but they hardly receive support, and are instead typically
opposed, because the process is very carbon-intensive.
If the policy support for an RPS primarily tends to be based
on the carbon reduction component, it makes sense from a policy
perspective to evaluate the efficacy and role of an RPS requirement within a larger national carbon reduction strategy. Based
on congressional deliberations to date and proposed legislation,7
it seems clear that Congress’ current preference to address carbon nationally is through a broad cap-and-trade program. Hence,
an evaluation of the efficacy and role of an RPS program should
include an evaluation of how an RPS fits within a national GHG
cap-and-trade program.

Instead, the regulated community is free to determine what steps
should be taken to meet the overall cap. Consequently, then, it
can develop and pursue the least-cost solutions.
The sulfur dioxide emissions trading approach established
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments9 produced vast
compliance cost savings primarily because the U.S. power
industry figured out how to burn low-sulfur coal in units not
designed for such coal, and thereby avoided the costs associated
with the assumed need to widely employ more expensive scrubbing control technology.10 In other words, the market figured
out a method of compliance that was not anticipated when the
requirements were adopted. This method likely would have been
unavailable had a command-and control-mandate based on the
performance of scrubber technology been adopted.
Notably, the least-cost result expected under a cap-and-trade
program is not an end in itself, but rather allows policy makers to
set more ambitious and more certain emissions reduction targets
than they might otherwise be able to obtain. EPA observed:
[T]he cost-minimizing feature of cap and trade has
long-term environmental benefits. Driving down the
cost of reducing a unit of pollution means that policymakers and regulating authorities can set targets that
reduce more pollution at the same cost to society. This
system makes it economically and politically feasible
to achieve greater environmental improvement.11
Given Congress’ concern about the overall impact of any
national carbon reduction strategy on the health of the U.S.
economy, the costs of any specific carbon reduction program
become an important political question.

RPS Under a Cap-and-Trade Program

A national RPS program, as a command and control mandate, could conflict with a market-based cap-and-trade program.
That conflict is primarily relevant if a known cost discrepancy
actually exists between renewables as a carbon compliance
option and other available methods of carbon reduction. The conflict emerges clearly in the case of an RPS because renewables
in fact cost more in the aggregate than other carbon reduction
options that might be employed, at least until the cap tightens
over time.
The relative cost-effectiveness of a national RPS as a carbon reduction strategy has been evaluated a number of times.
Most notably, the 2002 Parer Report to the Council of Australian Governments on national energy reform concluded that
Australia’s national RPS program should be abolished and
replaced with a national cap-and-trade policy for carbon because
the RPS proved a cost-ineffective method of obtaining carbon
reductions when compared with a cap-and-trade program.12 Subsequent analyses of the Australian RPS program concluded that:
(1) the dollar per ton cost of carbon reductions associated with a
ten percent RPS standard would support four times the amount
of carbon reductions if imposed instead as a carbon reduction
requirement under a cap-and-trade program; and (2) an amount
of carbon reductions equivalent to what a ten percent RPS standard would obtain could be achieved through a cap-and-trade
program at a third of the price.13

Because RPS programs seem largely intended to reduce
carbon emissions, despite the fact that they do not actually target carbon emissions, but rather fuel choice, their approach is
a potentially inefficient command-and-control mandate at odds
with a market-based cap-and-trade program. Market-based capand-trade programs hold, as their fundamental premise, that
allowing the regulated community to determine its own solutions
to meet a mandatory emissions cap is far more cost-effective and
more certain than a one-size fits all series of command-and-control mandates, which instead set specific performance or technology standards.8 As a consequence, cap-and-trade programs
are expected to provide least-cost solutions to emission reduction goals.

Benefits of a Cap-and-Trade Program
Cap-and-trade programs have two fundamental benefits as
compared with command-and-control emission reduction programs. First, by allowing trading, the program does not decide
who has to make reductions. This allows sources to take emissions reduction steps when the costs are favorable to the source
and to forgo that option and instead purchase emissions allowances or credits when the costs are unfavorable to a source.
Second, a cap-and-trade program does not decide what those
reductions must be or how the source achieves the reduction.
Fall 2007
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Similar studies have been performed for a U.S. national
RPS, and the conclusions are the same. One unpublished study
concludes that the carbon reductions associated with an RPS
that rises to ten percent cost more than four times as much as
would be the case if a cap-and-trade program were placed on the
power generation sector.14 Another study concluded that an RPS
is “less cost-effective as a mechanism for reducing carbon emissions from electricity generators than a policy designed specifically to limit carbon emissions.”15
As these cost studies make clear, a carbon-cap-and-trade
program is generally insufficient to sustain widespread penetration of renewables at higher RPS levels simply as a result of
power price increases resulting from the cap. If that were true,
then renewables would be the compliance option of choice in
the economic modeling described above. Instead, it is generally
energy efficiency and conservation measures, which often have
a positive payback over time and thus cost nothing, that tend to
replace renewables as a more cost-effective compliance option.
However, some renewable projects remain cost-effective, and
are undertaken even under a cap-and-trade program, where
the cost of carbon raises power prices. All of these results can
change when the stringency of the cap is increased, or if the capand-trade program provides specific incentives to renewables
through a favorable allowance
allocation.
In sum, an RPS appears to
be, at bottom, largely intended
as a carbon reduction policy and
should be explicitly treated as
such, including open discussion
of how it fits into any national
carbon policy, such as a capand-trade program; and an RPS
mandate is a more expensive and less-cost effective method of
carbon reduction than simply adopting a cap-and-trade program
with no such command and control mandates. Because Congress
has expressed great concern over the cost and broad economic
impact of a mandatory carbon program, and intends to seek least
cost solutions where available, the higher cost of an RPS versus alternatives to produce equivalent carbon reductions would
seem to argue for a careful assessment of the specific goals and
benefits of an RPS program in light of an expected mandatory
carbon cap-and-trade requirement.
In addition, maintaining an RPS as a requirement independent of a cap-and-trade program does not provide more or additional carbon reductions. This is due to the fact that the carbon
reductions from the RPS program are simply factored into the
reductions needed to meet the cap, and therefore become a part
of the compliance portfolio. As carbon reductions from renewables occur, alternative reductions that would otherwise have
occurred to meet the cap are forgone. In general, most renewable energy produces carbon reductions because a power generator somewhere reduces its level of fossil fuel consumption,
often natural gas, in an amount equal to the amount of renewable
power that is added to the grid. The fossil fuel power genera-

tor that reduces its output is now left with allowances to sell or
use itself under the cap. This results in an increase in carbon
emissions somewhere that equals the carbon reductions caused,
and emission allowances “freed up,” by the use of renewable
power. Thus, overall emissions remain equal to the level permitted under the cap.

Impacts of an RPS Under a Cap-and-Trade Program
While RPS requirements do not provide additional reductions under a cap-and-trade program, they do define renewable
power as a specific method of obtaining part of the reductions
that will be achieved under the cap. This is true because a certain percentage of renewable power must be purchased under the
RPS without regard for the cap. Additionally, the cost-ineffectiveness of an RPS is confined to, and incurred by, entities that
must comply with the RPS mandate, and this occurs outside the
cap. Thus, the cost of compliance within the cap itself is lowered, although the overall cost to meet the cap is higher when
factoring in RPS costs.
In this light, RPS programs lose much of their stated policy support because, upon implementation of a cap, they are
no longer a carbon reduction policy. Instead, an RPS becomes
a mandate that a certain amount of reductions to be achieved
under a carbon cap must come
from renewable power. Thus,
the question for policy makers
to debate is whether renewables,
despite their cost, are sufficiently
important to an overall national
carbon reduction strategy so
that they should be mandated
as a carbon compliance mechanism? Despite the importance of
these issues, virtually no serious
debate about them has taken place in the United States. Instead,
the benefits of renewables as part of national carbon policy are
largely assumed, and their drawbacks ignored.

RPS obligations often
fall on the company that
distributes power.
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Policy Considerations supporting an RPS
While good public policy requires a careful assessment of
both the benefits and drawbacks of an RPS within the context
of an expected national carbon reduction mandate, the Australian experience tells us this consideration is also important as a
practical matter. After the issuance of the Parer Report, recommending that that the Australian RPS be abolished and replaced
with a more cost-effective cap-and-trade program, investment
in renewables slowed due to the obvious regulatory uncertainty.
That uncertainty remained unresolved for another two years as
Australia reviewed the issues and decided to recommit to the
RPS, albeit with some adjustments. Therefore, in order to provide long term certainty in renewables markets, the fact that an
RPS requirement is not a least-cost solution to carbon reduction and does not provide any additional reductions beyond what
a cap would require should be recognized and accepted after
debate, so as not to cause surprises and associated uncertainty
later.
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Notably, the Australian evaluation of whether to continue
with an RPS or replace it with a carbon cap-and-trade program
provides some insight into specific policies that would support
continuation of the renewables mandate. The primary reasons
articulated for continuing the RPS in Australia were based on the
expectations that renewables would become a more cost-effective carbon reduction option as the cap tightened over time and
as the costs of renewables decreased through continued buildout, and, perhaps more importantly, that renewables presented
an attractive hedge against future technology or other failure for
other carbon reduction measures.16 Similarly, the United States
could also conclude that renewables do promote greater future
compliance certainty and provide an expectation of lower relative costs over time, and that those are sufficient reasons to support continued investment in renewables now so as to preserve
these future benefits.
These benefits, rarely articulated forcefully in the limited
U.S. debate over the role of renewables in a carbon cap-andtrade program, do provide powerful policy arguments to support
continuation of renewables programs. In essence, the primary
attraction of renewables is that the technology is well understood, is fairly readily deployed, and can provide relatively large
reductions, or avoided emissions, on a project basis. Indeed, it
is these aspects of renewables that may make them attractive to
industry. Despite the cost issue, industry has not yet objected to
renewable mandates on any broad or sustained basis as a costineffective method of carbon reduction, however industry has
frequently raised other objections. This may simply reflect the
fact that while the attributes of familiarity and certainty provide tangible benefits, they are not recognized in economic cost
models. Further, as one compares a suite of specific and discrete
renewables projects with a suite of ubiquitous energy efficiency
projects that must be undertaken by third parties, namely power
company customers, ease of implementation for renewables
may prove to be an important factor in tacit acceptance of RPS
programs.
Another benefit of an explicit legislative assessment of
whether to promote higher-cost renewables requirements when
a national carbon trading program is expected to follow is that
specific policy reasons to adopt the higher cost alternative can be
articulated, and the RPS program tailored to promote the identified objectives. For example, if one of the reasons advanced
for an RPS is to make the United States a technology leader
in renewables, then Congress should evaluate whether renewables research and development programs would help promote
that objective. Similarly, if one of the articulated reasons for
employing an RPS mandate is to help the renewables industry
achieve critical economies of scale and so reduce the cost of
renewables, then the RPS should be sized to specifically promote that objective, and no more.
Perhaps most importantly, if an RPS is to be adopted, legislation should provide a comprehensive package that also
removes obstacles to broad renewables penetration and ensures
the renewables target can be met. It is no secret that renewables,
as intermittent sources often concentrated in specific geographic
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regions of the country favorable to the type of generation at
issue, require important and large-scale changes to the existing
transmission and distribution grids in order to achieve significant levels of penetration. The Electric Power Research Institute recently published a paper that specifies precisely what sorts
of large-scale grid and other technology improvements would
be necessary to accommodate significant penetration of renewables.17 It is well known that grid improvements are difficult to
make, take years to permit, and often are not favored investments by power companies. In addition, newer and better power
storage technologies will be needed to accommodate large-scale
renewables penetration.18 Hence, legislative packages seeking to
address the research, permitting and financing issues associated
with such improvements would seem to be a critical aspect of
any sensible and realistic RPS objectives.

Promoting Renewables Under a
Cap and Trade Program
If it is decided as a policy matter that renewables should
be promoted as part of a national cap and trade program, there
are a variety of ways to do this. This Article has focused on an
RPS because Congress is currently considering such a mandate,
although other options to promote defined renewables goals are
also available. An RPS program does have the benefit of providing certainty that a minimum amount of renewable power will
be produced. However, that approach does limit the extent of
renewables penetration to the amount of the RPS, at least until the
time that renewables become competitive as a power source due
to a rise in power prices as a result of a tightening carbon cap.
However, a certain inequity exists associated with RPS
mandates, in that there is often a disconnect between the renewable purchases and the actual carbon reduction, or carbon avoidance. The power company purchasing the renewable power to
meet RPS requirements has paid for the carbon reduction in the
form of the cost difference between otherwise available fossil
power and the renewable power. However, that company often
cannot use the carbon reduction associated with the renewable
power purchase for compliance under a carbon cap because the
power plant that reduces its load to accommodate the renewable power is often a different company than the renewable
power purchaser. Instead, it is either the power generator, which
reduces its load that obtains the carbon benefit even though it did
not pay for the carbon reduction, or the entire carbon market in
general, which obtains a benefit because of lowered demand for
allowances and greater availability of lower cost carbon reductions, which are not used in lieu of higher cost renewable power
reductions (i.e., some of the costs of compliance with the cap are
transferred to the RPS program).19
The reason for this inequity is twofold. First, RPS obligations often fall on the company that distributes power, and that
company may not own any generating facilities. Second, and
more importantly, RPS mandates can typically be met by purchasing renewable energy credits. Use of such credits allows
renewable power sources to situate geographically at the leastcost sites for the power produced, and renewable power purchasers, located far away from renewable resources, to readily and
16

cost-effectively buy renewable power. The consequence of this
is that companies obligated to comply with RPS requirements
can suffer a double hit, in the form of mandatory purchases of
often higher cost renewable power and the general inability to
take carbon credit for those purchases under a carbon cap. If
Congress elects to pass an RPS and/or to allow states to maintain
RPS requirements after implementation of a carbon cap-andtrade program, careful thought need be given to identifying and
accommodating, as best as possible, the impacts an RPS could
have on cap equities.
Instead of an RPS, renewable incentives could be added
in the cap-and-trade program itself by allocating allowances to
renewable plants through a renewables set-aside, by allocating
allowances to the power sector based on power output and not
emissions, or by directing a portion of revenues from any allowance auction to renewables. Each of these mechanisms has individual benefits and complications.
The allowance approach has some appeal in that it provides
some cost limits on what renewable power will be sold, thus
renewable power is transformed from a power purchase obligation under an RPS to subsidized power that will be bought if
the subsidized price is competitive. However, this approach also
does not guarantee that a specific amount of renewable power
will be produced or that the renewable policy objectives will be
met. Other possibilities abound. For example, in some European
countries, renewables are promoted outside of the carbon cap by
feed-in tariffs or other mechanisms providing price supports.20
These price supports begin to decline over time to reflect the
expectation that renewable costs should decrease as market pen-

etration increases. Whatever solution is decided upon, experience has shown that renewable investment is very sensitive to
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, care must be taken to ensure
that regulatory support for renewables is not attenuated by the
form of the mechanism selected to support it.
It is also important to consider the role and impact of existing state RPS standards, which present their own complexities
and may have less well-defined roles once a carbon cap is put in
place. Thorough discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of
this Article. However, it should be noted that state RPS programs
may also warrant reevaluation and refocus once a national carbon cap is adopted because these programs also will not produce
any carbon reductions beyond the level of the national cap.

Conclusion
It seems premature for Congress to pass a national RPS
in the face of an expected least-cost national carbon cap-andtrade program without first evaluating the costs and benefits of
renewables, and assessing what role renewables should play in
a national carbon strategy. Renewables are expected to play an
important role in any national carbon strategy, and good policy
reasons exist to support that conclusion. However, the debate
over that issue should be open and clear, and should fully recognize the costs and other issues associated with reliance on renewables as a carbon compliance mandate, to ensure that specific
policy objectives for renewables can be identified and agreed
upon, legislation adopted to address those goals, and renewables
markets provided with certainty.
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Nuclear Power: Renaissance or Relapse?
by J.C. Sylvan*

T

hirty years of cost overruns,1 power outages,2 gaps in
oversight,3 security lapses,4 a number of high-profile accidents, and unaddressed concerns about the temporary and
permanent storage of radioactive waste,5 make nuclear power the
bête noire of the U.S. energy sector. But growing popular concern about the threats posed by global climate change and the
emerging support for a carbon tax or a cap on greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions is changing the cost-benefit analysis traditionally applied to nuclear power.6 Proponents are heralding the
return of nuclear power as a “new day for energy in America.”7
The latest evidence of a nuclear renaissance comes with the
recent license application by NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”) to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) to build and operate
two new reactors at its facility in Bay City, Texas—the first application filed with the NRC in thirty years, and the first of twentyone such applications the NRC anticipates receiving over the
next eighteen months.8 One of the principal arguments for this
expansion is that by replacing coal and gas-fired electricity generation capacity nuclear reactors could slow the overall growth
of GHG emissions.9 Nonetheless, nuclear power has financial
and legal hurdles to clear before it can assume a role as a credible program to combat global warming.
Nuclear plants are economical to fuel and operate but prohibitively expensive to build. Thus, renewed investment in
commercial nuclear power will only come when “the cost of
producing electricity using nuclear apower will be lower than
the risk-adjusted costs associated with alternative electric generation technologies.”10 Moderate reductions in construction cost,
construction time, operation costs, and capital costs could, theoretically, make nuclear competitive with coal and natural gas.11
Nuclear electricity generation could also become more competitive if the externalities associated with carbon-emitting fuels are
internalized through either a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade system,
or a tax credit for carbon-free electricity generation.12 Also, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for a clean-energy loan program that would guarantee up to eighty percent of total project
cost of innovative technologies—including nuclear power—that
avoid “anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”13 Leaving aside the question of health and human safety, the competitiveness of nuclear power may ultimately depend on whether the
federal government imposes additional costs on coal and natural
gas—a notion with considerable political momentum.
Moving forward, the salient issue will not be financing, but
safety. Due to the magnitude of the harm presented by nuclear
materials, the frequency with which that harm can occur, and
the limited prospects for mitigating it, a dramatic expansion of
the nuclear power industry would pose considerable risks to the
health and human safety of the American public.14 At its current
level of operation, commercial U.S. reactors will discharge at
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least 105,000 metric tons of spent fuel by 2035.15 So far only two
countries have identified specific sites to deposit this waste—the
United States (Yucca Mountain) and Finland (Olkiluoto). Neither facility will be ready to receive material for at least another
decade.16 Since 1998, utilities have brought dozens of breachof-contract suits against the U.S. government because the NRC
has failed to honor its Standard Contract commitments to remove
waste from temporary on-site storage facilities pursuant to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act;17 the NRC has argued that it cannot
be obligated to remove waste before it has a place to store it
permanently.18 No doubt methods will be developed to reduce
the volume of waste and to improve the overall safety of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Alternative disposal techniques, such as deep
bore geologic disposal, might also be viable. Until then, waste
disposal will remain an open question and a potential hazard.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety belongs to the
NRC.19 Unfortunately, the NRC’s decisions to outsource security
functions to private contractors, to rely on voluntary reporting
standards, and to enforce its regulations selectively have shaken
public confidence.20 Nonetheless, when it comes to forcing higher
safety standards, the states’ hands are tied.21 State authority to
regulate the safety of radiological materials either under state
or federal statutes is pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act.22
Private citizens can bring suits under the Price-Anderson Act,
but such suits have little effect in forcing higher safety standards
when operators are held to a federally determined standard of
care (not strict liability) and citizens are barred from seeking
punitive damages.23 Moreover, new standing requirements for
challenging plant licensing will make it more difficult for private
citizens’ groups to challenge the construction of new plants.24
Absent changes in federal law, the effectiveness of safety standards for the operation of plants and the disposal of waste will
depend primarily on the NRC’s careful stewardship.
The nuclear industry is asking environmentalists to pick their
poison—global warming or nuclear power—and some are cautiously opting for the latter.25 Climate change has given nuclear
power a second hearing. Rigorous safety standards, a plan for
their robust enforcement, and a fail-safe scheme for permanent
waste storage have the potential to create broad public support
for nuclear power;26 a single accident, on the other hand, could
erase that support overnight.27 By taking the lead and insisting
on stricter safety standards and a plan for permanent storage
of reactor waste materials, the industry could prevent a nuclear
renaissance from becoming what the public will view pessimistically as a “relapse” for nuclear power in the United States.
Endnotes: Nuclear Power continued on page 78
* J.C. Sylvan is a J.D. candidate, December 2007, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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The Next Level of Environmental Protection:
Business Strategies and Government Policies Converging
on Sustainability
by Dr. Alan D. Hecht*

T

Introduction

he ability to understand current risks and pressures and
predict new ones is a prerequisite for developing successful sustainable business strategies and supportive government policies. Today, the future business-government landscape
seems clearer than at any time in the past: a good opportunity for
business and government to shape the future, rather than react
to it. Climate change is only one of many pressures that affect
overall business strategies and public policies. The following
discussion highlights a broad range of social and environmental
goals, including biomass and clean energy, access to safe water
and sanitation, protection from chemical toxics, and protection
of ecosystem services.
Sustainable development fosters policies that integrate
environmental, economic, and social values in decision-making.
From a business perspective, sustainable development favors an
approach based on capturing system dynamics, building resilient
and adaptive systems, anticipating and managing variability and
risk, and making a profit.1 Sustainable development reflects not
the trade-off between business and the environment, but the synergy between them.
As discussed in this Article, the movement toward sustainable development is inevitable and has important implications
for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) research,
regulations, and policies that together suggest that the next level
of environmental protection will arise not only from disincentives to pollute, but also from the positive economic benefits of
sustainability.

Modeling Interactions Among Society,
Business, and Government
A schematic representation of the factors contributing to
the convergence of business strategies and government policies
toward sustainability appears in Figure 1. The figure’s three columns depict how social and environmental pressures are affecting four groups of stakeholders and policy makers, shaping
business strategies and government policies. Each element in
Figure 1 is part of a dynamic system with positive and negative
feedback loops. In a systems analysis, lines would connect each
of the elements, displaying complex feedback among them. This
system would have lags and leads as each set of decision makers
responds to the others, and would contain non-linear feedback as
critical thresholds are reached.
Although my discussion proceeds from left to right in Figure 1, I recognize that current business strategies and public pol19

icies are themselves affecting social and environmental factors,
thus creating a closed loop for the whole system. For example,
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—a
result of current business and government policies—are affecting insurance practices, corporate strategies, and government
policies. Investors and financial managers reacting to climate
risks are encouraging companies to reduce their carbon footprint. Government feedback is both positive, e.g., in setting targets for emission reduction or GHG intensity, and negative, e.g.,
in resisting certain business and/or international pressures.
Figure 1: Convergence of Sustainable Business Strategies
and Government Policies
Risk Management/
Insurers

Global Trends/
Social Pressures

Regulations/
Regulators

Business
Strategy

Sustainable
Development

Finance/
Investors
UN/Global
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Social and Environmental Pressures
Concern for social and environmental well-being affects
business strategy and government policies. Table 1 presents
current United Nations (“UN”) statistics on distressing social
conditions that especially affect the inhabitants of developing
countries. The UN Millennium Development Goals2 aim to
reverse many of the undesirable trends, but progress to date has
been uneven.3
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Terry Davies, Edward Fallon, Marcus Peacock, and John Wise for their helpful
reviews and comments. Opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect official EPA policies.
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Table 1: State of the World’s Population4
• World population growing by approximately 80 million
people per year (9 billion projected total by 2050)
• 2.9 billion living in urban environment (5 billion estimated
by 2030)
• 972 million living on less than $1 per day
• 2.6 billion without access to proper sanitation
• 1.1 billion without access to safe drinking water
• 924 million “slum dwellers” (expected to grow by 27 million per year to 2020)
• 829 million chronically undernourished, including 180 million children
• 790 million lacking health services
• 39 million adults and children living with HIV-AIDS
Michael Porter and Mark Kramer call the impact of these
external social conditions on business “outside-in linkages.”5
The social distress of the world’s less fortunate people affects
not only the stability of nations but business operations, with
the result that a company like Unilever, which operates in many
developing nations, must find ways to address these issues in
order to maintain its “license to operate.”6
Such social conditions can also shape future business opportunities. Many social stressors affect those at the “bottom of
the economic pyramid”—the four billion people in developing
countries with annual income less than three thousand dollars
in local purchasing power.7 While their individual daily income
is very low, these four billion people have aggregate purchasing
power of $5 trillion.8 Firms that want to capture this emerging
market must adopt socially relevant business strategies.9
The health of the environment also affects the behavior of
business and government. The need for access to clean water
and sanitation and the danger of ecosystem destruction are also
powerful drivers. Fifteen of the twenty-four ecosystem services
examined by the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are
being degraded or used unsustainably.10 While the full costs of
the loss and degradation of these ecosystem services are difficult
to measure, the available evidence demonstrates that the costs
are substantial and growing.11 Many of the losses in ecosystem
services are a consequence of actions taken to increase the supply of other services, especially food production.12 These tradeoffs often shift the costs of ecosystem degradation from one
group of people to another; the greatest costs may be borne by
future generations.13
Climate change caused by rising concentrations of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere can significantly affect all aspects
of human life. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) report makes clear that climate change is
largely a result of human activity and that it is likely to have significant social, economic, and security implications.14 Additionally, a recent study, National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change, discusses how climate change might act as a threat multiplier in already fragile regions, exacerbating conditions that
lead to failed states—the breeding grounds for extremism and
terrorism.15 Such potential threats are driving U.S. lawmakers to
consider mandating a national intelligence analysis of security
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implications of climate change.16
Today, the impact of social conditions and environmental
pressures manifests in real time. As Internet access grows, so
does the public’s ability to access data and respond to it. Public
involvement shapes government policies and business practices,
making the public one of the important decision makers shown
in Figure 1.
If the statistics in Table 1 are not enough of a wake-up call
to business and government, then the combined impact of future
population growth, urban development, and increased use of
materials and energy should be. Over the next fifty years, the
world’s population is expected to increase by fifty percent and
global economic activity is projected to increase by five hundred percent, while global energy consumption and manufacturing activity are likely to increase at least threefold.17 All of us
must learn how to deal with the consequences of this growth and
development.

Risk Managers and Insurers
The insurance industry may have a significant impact in
implementing sustainable development due to its size, the extent
of its reach into the community, and the significant role it plays
in the economy.18 Importantly, unsustainable development is
costly and risk managers are paid for avoiding problems. Floods,
droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados are the expected
sources of most insurance losses. Changes in the frequency of
such events are critical in anticipating risk. As such, techniques
to evaluate and understand future risk are essential. Aiming
to describe the new risk landscape, insurers such as Swiss Re
have an extensive research program on the early detection and
assessment of environmental and health risks.19 Other insurers
have also been leaders in the study of natural catastrophes. For
example, Munich Re publishes an annual review of disasters and
catastrophes,20 and has set up a foundation dedicated to sharing
knowledge connected to the subject of risk.21
Munich Re, Swiss Re, and other major insurance and reinsurance firms are bringing new attention to issues of environmental sustainability. In reacting to expected pressures from
climate change, these firms are adjusting their rate structures
and calling for government action. Additionally, the insurance
industry now offers businesses that are committed to sustainable business practices options to reduce their insurance costs.22
Innovative green insurance programs could offer significantly
reduced insurance premiums for qualifying companies based on
factors such as risk profile, commitment to sustainability, and
business needs.
However, while the insurance industry is an important contributor, it cannot address the challenges of climate change on
its own. The solution will require concerted effort by all stakeholders. Current and future risk goes well beyond just climate
change. In the following sections, I will discuss chemicals and
human health. In this area, risk managers are getting help from
advances in science and technology that improve our ability to
detect risks from new chemicals.23 Businesses have learned that,
if not handled properly, the combination of increased scientific
understanding of the health effects of chemicals with public
20

access to information can seriously threaten any business.

Regulators
Environment regulators and business standards are affecting how businesses and society think about sustainability. How
are all these players interacting with and responding to social
and environmental pressures, and advancing sustainability?

EPA and State Regulations
In the 1960s, social unrest and environmental neglect compelled the Nixon administration—acting more out of political
defensiveness than environmental enlightenment—to create the
EPA.24 From the 1970s to the 1990s, U.S. environmental legislation grew rapidly, with strong enforcement measures aimed
at limiting known pollutants. Today, social and environmental
pressures require EPA to address more than just enforcement.
EPA now confronts a suite of issues related to economic
growth, demographics and aging, urban development and redevelopment, energy and materials use, non-point sources of
pollution, ecosystem destruction, and new chemical and biological risks. In today’s world, while regulating dangerous pollution and toxics certainly remains a necessary and vital task,
eliminating the use of noxious
materials altogether is a better, more sustainable alternative. It is therefore unsurprising
that as pressures grow and new
risks arise, EPA programs have
moved toward life cycle analysis, green chemistry, green
design, green engineering, smart
growth, and industrial ecology.
EPA’s changes parallel a new
management approach by many
businesses that is more systemoriented and gives more attention to what goes into a product rather than simply what the
production process emits.25
In the area of waste management, there is a similar shift in
thinking from managing waste to managing materials. This new
attitude reflects the belief of many EPA programs “that developing new approaches for conserving resources, reducing the
amount of toxic materials in society and the toxicity of materials
that remain, and managing wastes properly can and should be
an important part of responding to [the] challenge of making a
more sustainable world.”26
This kind of environmental management calls for the active
participation of all stakeholders. In recognition of this need, EPA
has begun to promulgate a vision of stewardship and sustainability, recognizing that a sustainable future “cannot be accomplished by government [and regulations] alone; rather it requires
the active engagement of all people. To this end, [EPA has] a
vision of environmental stewardship—where all parts of society
actively take responsibility to improve environmental quality
and achieve sustainable results.”27
Sustainability has become a clear part of federal policy,

at least in the management of government buildings and other
facilities. In January 2007, President Bush signed Executive
Order 13423, entitled “Strengthening Federal Environmental,
Energy, and Transportation Management,” that sets goals in the
areas of energy efficiency, acquisitions, renewable energy, toxics
reductions, recycling, sustainable buildings, electronics stewardship, vehicle fleets, and water conservation.28 Executive Order
13423 explicitly directs heads of federal agencies to implement
sustainable practices in these areas, and specifies that “sustainable” means “creat[ing] and maintain[ing] conditions, under
which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony, that
permit fulfilling the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.”29 A next step is to
ensure that sustainability practices are part of agencies’ external
programs and policies, so that this concept extends to all federal
policies and programs.
Individual states have demonstrated leadership on many
environmental and development issues, going well beyond federal policies. Acting through laws, policies, and voting initiatives,
states are working with business communities to find sustainable solutions. State-EPA partnerships in this area are important; EPA has worked closely
with the Environmental Council
of the States (“ECOS”), a nonpartisan association of state and
territorial environmental agency
leaders,30 to advance sustainable
practices. With EPA support,
ECOS has created a searchable
database of regulatory and nonregulatory programs, including
projects on energy efficiency,
smart growth, pollution prevention, multimedia permitting and
inspections, consolidated reporting, small business assistance, and eco-efficiency.31
In response to the social and environmental pressures shown
in Figure 1, regulators experience both positive and negative
feedback. Conflicts between state and federal policies can result
from different reactions to given pressures. This kind of conflict
led to the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case concerning whether
the Clean Air Act gives EPA the authority to regulate carbon
dioxide gas as a pollutant.32 The several states that filed the lawsuit argued that EPA has such authority, while EPA opposed this
interpretation. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of
the states, EPA faces three options: (1) to make an affirmative
judgment that GHGs do cause or contribute to climate change,
and “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare;” (2) to make a judgment that GHGs do not have this
effect; or (3) to provide “some reasonable explanation as to why
it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to make that determination.”33
On this issue, states and cities are aggressively implementing low-impact development and carbon-reduction policies. The
U.S. Council of Mayors adopted a resolution on climate change

Sustainable development
fosters policies that
integrate environmental,
economic, and social
values in decision-making.
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calling for “the federal government and state governments to
enact policies and programs to meet or beat the target of reducing global warming pollution levels to 7 percent below 1990
levels by 2012.”34 As of June 21, 2007, 504 mayors representing over sixty-two million Americans had endorsed this Climate
Protection Agreement.35

U.S. Accounting and Corporate Reporting
Environmental regulators are not alone in responding to
growing social pressures on business. Disclosure requirements
for public corporations have been strengthened significantly in
recent years. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) Act of
2002, enacted in response to the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals and administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, protects shareholders and the general public from
accounting errors and certain fraudulent business practices.36
Other pressure points promoting transparency in business
operations come from the Financial Accounts Standards Board
(“FASB”). In March 2005, FASB issued a new interpretation
(known as “FIN 47”)37 of its Accounting for Asset Retirement
Obligations (“ARO”) standards38 that has prodded firms that
had been slow to record obligations for the anticipated expenses
needed to retire physical assets in an environmentally safe and
sound manner.
These accounting procedures require firms to identify assets
such as building sites, mines, chemical plants, and nuclear power
facilities that may cause long-term environmental damage and
that the firms may be legally required to restore to their original
conditions. Firms are now clearly required to recognize those
future obligations as they purchase, construct, and use their
physical assets. The FASB accounting procedures also require
that firms estimate the potential risk and liability of operating
facilities that produce environmentally dangerous products.
Such life cycle analysis reinforces the movement toward more
sustainable management practices, and should help to prevent
future contamination, brownfield development, and legal disputes over toxic substances like asbestos.

International: Global Reporting Initiative
and the European Union
Additionally, reporting initiatives are growing globally, the
broadest of which is the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”).39
Initially convened in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”), a non-profit coalition
of investor, environmental, religious, labor, and social justice
groups, the GRI aimed at extending sustainability reporting to
the breadth and rigor of financial reporting.40 Today, more than
one thousand organizations in sixty countries are using the GRI
framework.41
Reporting similar to the reporting required under the SOX
Act of 2002 is required under the EU Directive on Accounts
Modernization, which requires companies to report on environmental and social impacts of their operations.42 The 2004 EU
Transparency Directive “requires companies seeking a stock
market listing to disclose risks associated with their capital
assets.”43 The 2004 Environmental Liability Directive estabFall 2007

lished “a framework for national-level statutes that impose . . .
cleanup responsibilities for contaminated” sites.44
Responding to growing trends in waste management and
toxic chemicals, the EU has enacted several directives with
important global environmental implications—including directives for the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (“RoHS”),45
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE”),46 and
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals
(“REACH”).47 These directives regulate products (input) rather
than outputs, manage materials rather than waste, promote use of
life cycle assessment and “cradle-to-grave” management, apply
green engineering and green chemistry principles, shift the burden of proof to industry, and measure and manage future financial risk and liabilities. Combined with pressures from insurers,
risk managers, and ARO accounting, these directives advance
the movement to sustainability.

Financial Managers and Investors
Environmental and social pressures are pushing bankers,
pension fund mangers, and individual investors toward more
sustainable and socially responsible investing. The Equator
Principles require banks to assess the social and environmental impacts of projects that they finance.48 Influenced by actions
and pressures from groups like the activist Rainforest Action
Network, Citigroup has gone beyond the Equator Principles by
committing to refuse funding for projects that could result in
illegal logging, other environmental damage, or harm to indigenous people.49 Such actions demonstrate the potential power of
social pressures on business—a key element of the social license
to operate.
Research on how Wall Street investors and managers are
incorporating environmental and social trends into their investment decisions is showing mixed results, with U.S. investors
apparently lagging behind those in Europe and Asia. Senior
environmental officials at leading U.S. companies have told
EPA staff that they are not getting traction with the investment
community. While some capital market transactions, particularly those in which climate change is an issue, take the quality of corporate environmental management into account, such
transactions do not constitute a widespread trend.
However, EPA’s assessment of links between environmental performance and fiscal incentives suggest that some progress
is occurring: (1) “both investment firms and the companies they
invest in are showing greater interest in environmental issues
and performance;” and (2) “institutional investors are becoming
more active in shaping the direction and practices of the companies they invest in.”50
Some of the resistance on Wall Street may reflect the old
adage that “the business of business is business.” Change in this
perspective is evident from the growth of socially responsible
mutual funds and from the evolution of the definition of “fiduciary responsibility” to include environmental risk and performance.51
The 2007 publication of the Fiduciary Guide to Toxic
Chemical Risk (co-sponsored by the Investor Environmental
Health Network, which represents twenty investment organiza22

tions managing $22 billion in assets) demonstrates the shift in
defining corporate responsibilities.52 This guide responds to the
growing number of reports about chemicals, foods, and other
products that reflect a “growing . . . concern about the impact on
human health of relatively small amounts of chemicals in everyday products,”53 and notes that some of the largest law firms in
the world have “definitively concluded that considering environmental, social and governance issues is at the core of fiduciary
Duty of Prudence”54 and that “fiduciaries have an affirmative
duty to consider toxic chemical issues that impact corporate risk,
return and shareholder values.”55 The guide provides “a comprehensive set of immediate action steps that can be taken to translate the long-term threats and opportunities associated with toxic
chemical issues into prudent portfolio stewardship.”56
If Figure 1 captured all the positive and negative feedbacks
in the system, this new interpretation of fiduciary responsibility would be seen as a positive feedback of the changing risk
landscape.57

UN and Global Society
Since 1972, the UN has been at the center of championing
environmental and social issues by collecting data, encouraging
national reporting, organizing
world conferences and summits, and fostering international
agreements. The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 launched Agenda
21, an aggressive international
agenda for sustainable development.58 A series of UN conferences followed, each focused on
different development and social
issues. The goal of sustainable development was further
advanced in September 2000, when 189 countries adopted the
Millennium Development Goals.59 Among these goals was the
determination: to “[i]ntegrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the
loss of environmental resources.”60 Two years later at the UNsponsored International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, world leaders agreed on a new
approach to development assistance based on shared responsibilities.61 In September 2002, the World Summit for Sustainable
Development (“WSSD”) in Johannesburg, South Africa adopted
the “Johannesburg Plan of Action,”62 an implementation plan
emphasizing basic human needs such as health and access to
clean water, as well as agriculture, energy, and biodiversity.63
These UN-rooted activities have focused global attention on
a suite of social and environmental issues that are increasingly
affecting business strategies and government policies. Interaction among the business sector, government, and civil society
has led to the emergence of partnerships within the UN system.
These partnerships break with traditional UN approaches by
establishing agreements among a modest number of relevant
stakeholders aiming to address a concrete problem with a specific timetable and targets.64 When the U.S. first proposed the

concept of global partnerships at the WSSD, initial reaction was
skeptical, but the number of partnerships has been growing. The
UN’s database on partnerships lists over 325 projects,65 the largest number being water-related.66 The Coca-Cola Company and
many other businesses are collaborating with governments, nongovernment organizations (“NGOs”), and stakeholders.67
While UN conferences may not lead to concrete and binding actions, they have elevated public debate on strategic issues
and exerted significant pressure for member governments to take
action. Concurrent with the growth of UN activities has been the
increase in NGOs focusing on environmental and social issues.
Today, these organizations are key partners with government
and business in efforts to bring clean water, sanitation, clean
energy, and medical care to billions of people around the world.
NGOs also are exerting considerable pressure on business by
using modern satellite and Internet technology. For example, the
non-profit group Global Forest Watch uses satellite tracking to
monitor logging activities around the world,68 often spotting illegal logging in real time. Such capabilities can help governments
struggling to control illegal logging, independent certifiers, such
as the Forest Stewardship Council,69 and multinational wood and
product manufacturers, like IKEA, who are committed to using
only legally and sustainably
harvested products.70

Today, social and environmental pressures require
EPA to address more than
just enforcement.
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Convergence of Business and Government
Policies: Next Steps

Clear evidence demonstrates a convergence toward
sustainability taking place
among major companies in
the world today.71 After interviewing dozens of business
leaders for their influential book, Green to Gold: How Smart
Companies Use Environmental Strategy to Innovate, Create
Value, and Build Competitive Advantage, Daniel C. Esty and
Andrew S. Winston concluded that smart companies—whom
they call “WaveRiders”—were able to respond to the environmental and social pressures shown in Figure 1 by developing a
forward-looking and profitable business strategy.72 These innovative companies consistently behave in recognizable patterns:
(1) anticipating environmental issues and addressing them; (2)
staying ahead of new regulatory requirements; (3) managing
government mandates to gain advantage in the marketplace; (4)
designing innovative or greener products; (5) pushing suppliers
to be better environmental stewards; (6) setting metrics and collecting data to track progress; and (7) partnering with NGOs and
other stakeholders.73
The business transition that Esty and Winston describe in
Green to Gold heralds a new era of sustainable business practices. There is a comparable transition underway in U.S. government policy, but at a much slower pace. The government still
does not have a sustainability strategy. Nevertheless, several
positive steps can be identified that build on current activities
and form the basis for a longer-term strategy. Just as progresSustainable Development Law & Policy

sive businesses are responding to external pressures, EPA can
develop and promote a strategy for achieving the next level of
environmental protection in the U.S. by taking specific actions:
(1) anticipating and responding to future problems; (2) partnering with business; (3) advancing sustainability science and technology; and (4) measuring results and affecting change.

Anticipating and Responding to Future Problems
No one can predict the future, but considering social and
environmental stressors clearly operating in today’s world and
the trends recognizable in the business strategies described in
this Article, the argument for an EPA role in advancing sustainability is a strong one. However, if a “sustainability train”
is indeed coming, then EPA, as a regulatory agency with historic roots deep in controlling pollution, needs to reflect on
and plan how it can foster sustainability. How does an agency
organized by offices for specific media (air, water, toxics, and
waste) develop an integrated systems approach to environmental
protection? Moreover, how does a federal agency without a specific mandate for sustainability advance and achieve sustainable
development?74
EPA’s first step must be a clear strategic plan that coherently connects the dots among existing policies and programs
that affect sustainability. For example, many EPA programs—
including building design and energy efficiency, urban development and revitalization, green buildings and smart growth,
sustainable management of urban systems, sustainable water
infrastructure, and improving air quality—cut across EPA’s
strategic goals and program offices to advance urban sustainability and the built environment.
All of these EPA programs emphasize the goal of sustainable development. Even if the term is not always explicitly used,
the concept is clear. These programs and many others have contributed significantly in their own areas of responsibility. Viewed
in an integrated manner, these programs together constitute a
strategy for urban sustainability. The environmental results of
these programs would benefit by better integration among them
and a clearer focus on achieving sustainable outcomes.75

Partnering with Business
Achieving sustainability has become a mainstream goal for
private firms large and small that have responded to simple but
forward-thinking questions: Why aim merely to reduce toxic
waste when we can eliminate it with new chemicals and processes? Why handle and dispose of growing amounts of waste
when we can more efficiently manage materials that eliminate,
reduce, or recycle waste? What will be EPA’s role in the new era
of businesses managing for sustainability?
In working with the regulated community, EPA has followed
the four broad approaches highlighted in a 2005 Government
Accountability Office report on corporate social responsibility: (1) Endorsing, which encompasses policies that encourage
or reward sustainable behavior, such as EPA’s Energy Star and
Design for the Environment programs; (2) Facilitating, which
involves providing information, funding, or other incentives to
advance sustainable practices, such as EPA programs for conFall 2007

sumer information, energy and water use, Performance Track,
and its new stewardship initiative; (3) Partnering, which relies
on voluntary and collaborative programs like Climate Protection
Partnerships; and (4) Mandating, which requires adherence to
legislation and executive orders.76
Over the next decade, EPA needs to assess how it can best
implement each of these approaches. The agency has already
made cooperative problem solving and partnerships with business a priority. It will need to explore how best to partner and
collaborate with business on many emerging issues and new
regulatory concerns: product design, materials use, new technologies, corporate social responsibility, and environmental ethics. This has led EPA to focus on how to help decision makers
(including businesses, citizens, and all levels of government and
businesses) make more informed and sustainable decisions.
One key barrier to EPA’s contribution to sustainable management—the mindset that federal action in the realm of the
environment must be restricted to roles explicitly specified in
existing regulations—must be recognized and overcome. This
mentality reflects in part past history and outmoded business
attitudes that burdensome federal regulations unnecessarily curtail economic growth. Such views are changing in some business quarters—such as among companies seeking federal action
to limit carbon emissions77—but the current debate on climate
change and nanotechnology shows that business resistance to
controls by agencies like EPA is still deeply embedded. Central to this debate over government’s role—and to long-term
sustainability—is the growing recognition on nearly all sides
that reliance on regulations alone is not the most effective route
to advance sustainable outcomes. Regulatory agencies like EPA
need to follow a broader mandate to undertake core research to
achieve better understanding of interactions among the economy, society, and the environment and to develop tools, models, and approaches that inform public debate and help business
make better decisions. Regulatory agencies and industry must
work together with evolving mindsets that reflect current risks
and challenges for environmental protection.
The successes of the many companies pursuing the goal of
sustainability come from the realization that protecting the environment makes good business sense. If the number of articles on
green business and of actual changes by management in manufacturing design are reliable measures, then we are approaching
the green “tipping point.” Many EPA programs have anticipated
and contributed to advancing sustainability concepts, e.g., several prominent EPA programs that relate to business in non-regulatory ways, emphasizing business practices ranging from raw
materials and manufacturing to waste and recycling.78
The key goal of these programs is to shape a new way of
manufacturing and doing business that goes beyond controlling
pollution to actually changing the strategic thinking of companies. Collectively, these programs demonstrate that the next
level of environmental protection will arise not only from disincentives to pollute, but also from the positive vision of sustainability that is acceptable to business operation.
Partnerships between EPA and industry on sustainabil24

ity objectives can provide benefits to both sides. While EPA
advances its sustainability goals, access to EPA’s reputation and
technical skills can be of considerable value to many companies.
A prime example is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. In response to social
and environmental pressures, the giant retailer has established a
set of “Sustainability 360” objectives, and is working with EPA
to pursue those goals and to address issues of product design and
energy and materials use.79

Sustainability Science and Technology
Science and technology drive change and are critical elements of any sustainability strategy. The science of sustainability aims to go beyond the science needed for setting regulatory
policies. Sustainability science anticipates problems, promotes
innovation, and aids decision-making. A National Academy of
Engineering report has suggested that the path to sustainability
“involves the smart design of products, processes, systems, and
organizations, and the implementation of smart management
strategies that effectively harness technology and ideas to avoid
environmental problems before they arise.”80
Good science is not something anyone would argue against;
but it is the science for decision-making part that goes the vital
next step. EPA today has a strong scientific foundation in systems research, risk assessment, and life cycle and materials flow
analysis, and is working at the frontiers of research in computational toxicology, genomics, ecoinformatics, and nanotechnology. EPA clearly needs to expand these efforts in line with the
priorities of a sustainability research strategy.81

Measuring Results–Affecting Change
EPA is currently measuring environmental quality through
a set of environmental indicators, which EPA’s Draft Report on
the Environment 2003 defines as measures that “help measure
over time the state of air, water, and land resources, pressures
on those resources, and resulting effects on ecological condition
and human health.”82 Looking ahead, EPA needs to develop a
set of sustainability indicators for policy and public use that will
affect strategic planning and inform decision makers inside and
outside of government. The proposed EPA budget highlights
this challenge: “In FY 2008 EPA’s Sustainability research program will embark on a new effort that is aimed at creating a suite
of science-based sustainability metrics that are readily under-

stood by the public.”83 These measures must become not just a
report on the environment but a step in active engagement with
all stakeholders. EPA needs greater engagement with a variety
of stakeholders to help everyone better understand why measuring something like nitrate levels in surface water is important for
everyday life and for sustainable practices.
Developing sustainability indicators will fulfill several valuable roles. It will: (1) assist decision makers in understanding the
practical meaning of achieving a sustainable way of life; (2) provide guidance for decision makers in designing and implementing policies and practices to advance sustainability; (3) enable
decision makers to see the interconnections among issues so they
can understand systems and make better-informed decisions; (4)
promote cross-media policies and strategies within EPA; (5)
serve as a framework and focus for constructive dialogue and
collaboration among business, government, and NGOs; and (6)
provide ongoing access to the data and information that support
decision making for sustainability.

Conclusion
Connecting the dots on the political, government, and business landscapes reveals a convergence of business strategies and
government policies toward a more sustainable management of
natural resources. It is more obvious now than ever before that
the well-being of those both at the top and at the bottom of the
economic pyramid cannot continue without sustaining our natural resource base. The next level of environmental protection
will be created not only by disincentives to pollute, but also by
the positive vision of sustainability that achieves acceptance by
and motivates business leaders. This convergence towards sustainability is inevitable and its acceleration through concerted
efforts by business, government, and the public will benefit all.
History has shown that EPA’s air, water, and land programs
have made significant contributions in the agency’s areas of
responsibility. The environmental results from these programs
could significantly improve with greater integration among them
and with a clearer focus on achieving sustainable outcomes. So
much more is possible to advance environmental sustainability
with a strong research focus and a clearer political and policy
roadmap. In this way, EPA cannot simply respond to change but
can help to create the future.
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Doing More with Less: Incorporating Energy
Efficiency into a National Renewable Energy Standard
by Rachel Kirby*

I

n the absence of an effective national policy to combat climate change, states have enacted renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) to require a percentage of supplied power
with renewable resources which, among other things, reduces
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.1 As Congress considers a
national RPS, it must be aware of the role of energy efficiency.
Renewable energy production may not be sufficient to meet new
demand for electricity. However, if electricity demand stabilizes
because of greater efficiency, renewables can replace conventional sources and reduce U.S. GHG emissions.2 A standard
that requires renewable resources alongside greater efficiency is
more effective and economically efficient than a renewable standard alone.3
Energy efficiency can
reduce GHG emissions while
renewable technologies become
cost-effective. Renewable
sources alone could result in a
22 percent drop in conventional
electricity generation and combining renewables with efficiency increases could result in
a 44 percent reduction in conventional generation by 20204
and cut GHG emissions in half.5
While a renewable energy standard initially increases energy costs, it reduces consumer costs
when combined with an efficiency standard.6 Additionally, lower
demand reduces conventional fuel costs, potentially offsetting a
future tax on GHG emissions.7
Of states with renewable energy requirements, fifteen have
created or are considering energy efficiency targets.8 Each state
has different standards of renewable energy, and different targets.9 Among those states, Texas established a requirement that
utilities offset ten percent of demand growth with increased
energy efficiency. The state’s utilities are currently exceeding that target.10 Connecticut, Nevada, and Pennsylvania have
adopted legislation requiring the use of “white tags,” which represent one mega-watt-hour (MWh) of energy conserved, and can
be traded on a market like GHG emissions or renewable energy
credits.11
GHG emissions are much more than a state problem and
a national policy is necessary to bring about national reductions in emissions. A federal policy on renewable energy and
efficiency would provide regulatory clarity and direct innovation.12 However, a federal law should not adopt a weak national
standard that would preempt stricter state standards.13 An effec-

tive national energy policy needs to include elements such as
improved appliance efficiency standards, building efficiency
standards, decoupling utilities’ profits from electricity sales,
promotion of combined heat and power systems, and a public
benefits charge to fund efficiency programs.
Appliance efficiency standards eliminate the least efficient
portion of the market. In the United States, homes and commercial buildings are responsible for over two-thirds of electricity use14 and large savings are possible. Because builders and
designers are not ultimately responsible for future energy costs,
they have little incentive for more efficient designs.15 Regulations mandating building efficiency standards will increase efficiency and educate consumers in
possible energy savings.16
Decoupling utility profits from sales eliminates the
incentive to sell more energy.17
Combined heat and power systems increase the efficiency of
fossil fuels by converting waste
heat produced by electricity
generation into usable energy,
increasing the efficiency from
about thirty to ninety percent of
the fuel’s potential energy.18 A
public benefits charge provides
funding for state or federal agencies to implement and monitor
efficiency programs.19
The next administration should assume global leadership by
aggressively supporting innovative solutions to climate change.
While renewable energy sources are a vital and effective tool
in the effort to reduce GHG emissions, energy efficiency is a
source of immediate and extensive benefits. The next national
energy policy must require both renewable energy sources and
greatly increased energy efficiency.

Energy efficiency can
reduce GHG emissions
while renewable
technologies become
cost-effective.
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The States and the World:
Twin Levers for Reform of U.S. Federal Law on Toxic Chemicals
by Daryl W. Ditz*

A

Introduction

t the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, toxic chemicals were recognized as a serious threat to sustainable
development.1 Governments and civil society responded
with an array of international treaties, regional agreements, and
diverse national efforts to reduce the impacts on human health
and the global environment from dangerous substances. For
many years the United States played an important role in furthering these international efforts. Yet in one important respect,
the United States still lags behind. After three decades of experience with the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”),
the United States lacks effective national legislation to manage
industrial chemicals within its own borders. This Article examines the unfortunate stagnation of U.S. chemical policy and the
resulting response by many state
governments that are acting to
protect their citizens from the
pervasive dangers of industrial
chemicals. 2 This bottom-up
pressure, combined with accelerating international progress,
sets the stage for a long overdue
overhaul of U.S. federal policy
on chemicals.
The rise of state activism
on toxic chemicals reflects the
convergence of three powerful
forces. First, scientific evidence
is rapidly accumulating that hundreds to thousands of chemicals
once deemed safe actually threaten public health. This includes
new research examining the subtle biological and ecological
consequences of chemicals at low concentrations, as well as
a growing awareness of chemical exposures in industrialized
countries and in regions far removed from polluting sources.
Second, these state actions are a direct reaction to profound legal
and political obstacles preventing an effective federal response.
Third, these state actions are often inspired and bolstered by parallel international developments, including regulatory actions by
other countries, multilateral treaties and other agreements, and
corresponding shifts in global markets. Taken together, efforts
by the states are driving the eventual reform of U.S. federal policy on chemicals and making an important contribution to sustainable development.
Before examining the nature of these state actions and their
relationship to U.S. federal law, it is important to clarify the scope
of chemicals policy. In contrast with environmental laws on air
pollution, water pollution, and hazardous wastes that preceded

or followed enactment of TSCA in 1976, chemical policy aims
to influence the basic ingredients of our industrial economy. At
least in intent, chemical policy shares a common outlook with
laws governing the pre-market approval of new medicines.
While pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals are
explicitly exempted from TSCA, so-called “industrial” chemicals are not confined to industrial uses alone. Indeed, the tens of
thousands of chemicals under the purview of TSCA are routine
constituents of myriad commercial and consumer products from
household cleaners to computers, from cosmetics to construction materials. The authority for implementing TSCA rests with
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and is not
delegable to the states.3 Generally speaking, states are authorized
under TSCA Section 18 to prohibit uses of chemicals that EPA
has not regulated.4

The Failings of TSCA
TSCA was launched in
1976 with great expectations.
EPA Administrator Russell
Train noted that the aim of the
new law was “to give public
health far more of the weight
that it deserves in the decisions
by which chemicals are commercially made and marketed,
by which they enter and spread
throughout the human environment.”5
Over the years, however, it has become clear the TSCA
itself is incapable of meeting this goal.6 A 2005 report by the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reiterated the longrecognized defects of TSCA.7 Among its principal shortcomings
is the high burden of proof placed on EPA to demonstrate that a
chemical poses unreasonable risks as a precondition for taking
regulatory action. This challenge is compounded by the fact that
TSCA has proven a slow and cumbersome tool for compelling
chemical manufacturers to provide key information. The federal
toxics law fails to require even basic screening level data for
most chemicals in the marketplace.8 EPA’s abilities are especially constrained for the tens of thousands of existing chemicals
that were grandfathered when TSCA entered into force. This

TSCA has proven a slow
and cumbersome tool for
compelling chemical
manufacturers to provide
key information.
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statutory distinction has a significant impact on EPA’s ability to
effectively regulate, because the vast majority of industrial chemicals in commerce today are the very same chemicals that U.S.
industry produced in the 1970s. The crowning blow to TSCA’s
effectiveness is a nearly impossible requirement that any proposed EPA action be the least burdensome of all options.
There is ample evidence that EPA has accomplished little
under TSCA, especially with regard to assessing and assuring
the safety of tens of thousands of existing chemicals. According
to GAO, EPA has issued regulations compelling toxicity testing
for less than 200 of the 62,000 substances that existed at the time
of TSCA’s passage.9 Similarly, EPA has used the regulatory
power of TSCA’s Section 6 to prohibit the manufacturing, processing, or distribution of a mere five existing chemicals in thirty
years.10 This crucial regulatory provision has not been used to
control even a single chemical since 1991, when the U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned EPA’s asbestos rule.11
Today, the law’s few enthusiasts tend to be those chemical
manufacturers with an interest in minimal regulation.12 But the
static state of current federal regulation has even some customers of the chemical industry worried. Ernie Rosenberg, President and CEO of the Soap and Detergent Association and former
head of EPA’s new chemicals review in the 1970s, has said:
“The toxics law needs to impart confidence and TSCA no longer
does.”13

The Rise of State Laws on Toxic Chemicals
Given EPA’s remarkable inability to regulate most industrial chemicals under TSCA, it is unsurprising that state governments have felt pressured to fill the gap, stepping in to protect
the health and well-being of their citizens. This trend is vividly
illustrated by a series of state bills, executive orders, and legislative enactments to control a class of commercial flame retardants called polybrominated diphenyl ethers (“PBDEs”). These
substances have been incorporated in a wide range of products,
including electronic equipment, furniture and fabrics to inhibit
fire. Unfortunately, PBDEs and other brominated flame retardants persist in the environment and can accumulate in the food
chain. PBDEs concentrations have risen sharply in human breast
milk and have been detected in people and wildlife, even in the
Arctic. Research indicates that PBDEs and closely related compounds are associated with adverse effects on neurodevelopment,
reproductive health, and endocrine function in mammals.14
In 2003 California passed the first state law to restrict the use
of two commercial PBDE mixtures, penta-BDE and octa-BDE.
Use of these chemicals in electronic equipment was already
the subject to the new Restriction on Hazardous Substances
(“RoHS”) directive in Europe, a fact that helped bolster the case
for controls in California.15 Over the next two years seven more
states followed suit and a total of eleven states enacted comparable laws by 2007.16 In addition to the speed and geographical
expansion of PBDE bans, states have broadened the scope of
restrictions. In 2007 Washington and Maine each passed legislation restricting future uses of deca-BDE, a related PBDE compound that can degrade to more hazardous forms but which so
far lacks the same clear evidence of harm. Legislation to restrict
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deca-BDE was proposed in eight other states.17
The case of brominated flame retardants is the clearest
example of how public demands, international precedents, and
market forces have fueled a flurry of state action. But other
chemicals have attracted attention as well. A class of plastic
softeners called phthalates, bisphenol A used in the manufacture
of hard plastic bottles and food can linings, pharmaceutical uses
of the pesticide lindane, and perfluorinated chemicals used in
nonstick and stain-resistant applications have all been the focus
of proposed state regulation, along with more familiar pollutants such as mercury, lead, and other heavy metals. The Safer
Alternatives bill in Massachusetts, which builds on the state’s
long experience under its pioneering Toxics Use Reduction Act,
targets ten diverse chemicals including PBDEs, lead, formaldehyde, perchloroethylene, and dioxins.18
Some of these bills go beyond chemical-specific limitations
to create new policy approaches and programs. Studies of toxic
chemicals in people—including health experts, public officials,
and ordinary Americans from newborns to grandmothers—provide a potent symbol of the failure to control industrial chemicals.19 Furthermore, so-called biomonitoring is also a feature of
some policy reforms. In 2006 California enacted the nation’s first
statewide program for sampling chemical contamination in people. Biomonitoring was also part of state bills introduced in New
York, Washington, and Indiana.20 California has also launched
one of the most ambitious efforts to explore the environmental
and economic benefits of becoming a “world leader in developing, adopting and supplying green chemistry solutions for the
21st century.”21 This builds on an important 2006 report commissioned by the state legislature that concludes that TSCA had
directly contributed to gaps in data, safety, and technology—to
the disadvantage of California businesses and citizens.22
U.S. chemical manufacturers might reasonably conclude
that efforts to regulate chemicals at the state and local level will
expand, subjecting them to a convoluted patchwork of regulation. In the past session of the California legislature, some fifty
bills were introduced relating to chemicals, pollutants, and
environmental health.23 To be sure, lobbyists for the chemical
industry and manufacturers of specific chemicals have poured
resources into fighting these state bills. They have also launched
some unsuccessful efforts in Congress to explicitly preempt
states from establishing stricter standards on individual chemicals, mandating tighter security at chemical plants or enacting
other measures affecting environmental health and safety.
But these state initiatives are not random attacks on the
chemical of the moment. In fact, they only appear surprising
in contrast with the status quo of U.S. federal inaction. When
viewed in the context of developments taking place in other
industrialized countries, the state actions can be viewed as parallel actions guided by similar goals and founded on shared principles.

International Progress on Chemicals
These state policy initiatives on chemicals are clearly necessitated by the conspicuous absence of meaningful federal action.
But international developments have also spurred state action.
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The coordinated state focus on PBDEs restrictions benefited
from the European RoHS Directive and its direct effects on
the global electronics industry.24 Such international precedents
provide state campaigners with relevant information on chemical hazards, uses, and potential alternatives. They also demonstrate the political and commercial feasibility of taking action, a
powerful counterweight to typical industry predictions of catastrophic impacts.
The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs”), an international treaty to control certain chemicals, offers another lever for state initiatives.25 Countries that are
party to the treaty commit to reduce or eliminate releases persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemicals (“PBTs”) that pose a
global threat to human health or the environment. The convention lists twelve POP chemicals and includes a mechanism for
adding additional chemicals. As of late 2007, eleven chemicals
are under review for possible addition to the Stockholm Convention, including penta-BDE and octa-BDE, lindane and a suite of
perfluorinated compounds. Since its entry into force in 2004, the
POPs treaty promises to provide a source of data, experience,
and inspiration for future policy initiatives, including initiatives
by states.26 While the United States signed the POPs treaty in
2001, Congress has yet to pass the necessary amendments to
TSCA and the federal pesticide statute to allow U.S. implementation. The 109th Congress considered but failed to adopt a proposal that would have preempted state rules on new POPs that
were stricter than future federal regulations.27 As a result, the
United States remains an observer while 148 nations work to
expand this important international environmental agreement.
While the RoHS Directive and the Stockholm POPs Convention target small numbers of chemicals, an expansive new
European Union law is beginning to cause sweeping changes
in the management of industrial chemicals. The regulation for
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals, better
known by the acronym “REACH,” is the product of an unprecedented political debate to overhaul a series of existing rules on
the manufacture, import, and use of chemicals.28 With the expansion of the European Union to twenty-seven nations, the EU is
the world’s largest producer and largest market for chemicals,
with a major impact on practices worldwide.29
In brief, REACH will require basic safety information on
chemicals made or imported in the EU above one metric ton
per year, a scope that could eventually cover as many as 30,000
industrial chemicals. Industry bears the burden of proof under
REACH, with government authorities providing evaluation and
enforcement. Chemicals deemed of “very high concern,” including carcinogens, mutagens, and PBTs, are subject to authorization, which may lead to use-specific restrictions or bans.30 As
REACH is implemented over the next decade, U.S. states and
the federal government can expect a steady influx of new data on
chemical hazards, uses, and safer alternatives. U.S. advocates for
policy reform are sure to make use of this important resource.

Principles for Reform
These international initiatives bear a striking resemblance
to many of the state actions regulating chemicals. This is no
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coincidence. These actions are driven by common concerns and
shared objectives. An understanding of these underlying motivations helps to place recent state bills in perspective and suggest
future directions. For example, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002—ten
years after the Rio Earth Summit—world leaders reaffirmed the
call to action of Agenda 21 and set a global goal for the sound
management of chemicals by the year 2020.31
This 2020 Goal figured in the timeline for the implementation of REACH. In the United States, environmental advocates
have also adopted 2020 as an important milestone for eliminating
dangerous chemicals. The Louisville Charter for Safer Chemicals represents one important public statement about accomplishing federal reform by 2020.32 The Louisville Charter has been
endorsed by dozens of environmental health advocates working
at the community, state and federal levels. More importantly, it
articulates a set of principles that are informing state and federal
thinking on chemical policy: (1) requiring safer substitutes and
solutions; (2) phasing out persistent, bioaccumulative, or highly
toxic chemicals; (3) giving the public and workers the full rightto-know and participate; (4) acting on early warnings; (5) requiring comprehensive safety data for all chemicals; and (6) taking
immediate action to protect communities and workers.
If these principles sound familiar, it may be because the
drafters drew heavily on the Copenhagen Charter for Safer
Chemicals, a public statement by European environmental and
health advocates in the early days of the REACH debate.33 It is
instructive to consider the state actions on chemicals in light of
these principles. The state bills targeting PBDEs, lindane, and
other PBTs fit squarely with the priority attention that this statement gives to persistent, bioaccumulative toxics. The emphasis
on developing safer substitutes and solutions is echoed in several
state bills that call for a proactive examination of alternatives to
avoid an inadvertent shift from bad to worse, and to facilitate a
smooth transition for downstream users of banned substances.
The calls for comprehensive safety data and greater right-toknow speak to the serious legacy problems of inadequate information. Despite many years of the voluntary EPA-industry High
Production Volume Challenge program, there is still a dearth of
information needed for assessing risk and prioritizing action on
chemicals.34 This lack of information demonstrates the value of
biomonitoring programs, which can be instrumental in identifying substances to which humans are intimately exposed rather
than relying on hypothetical predictions.
It is also important to note that several of these principles
address the process by which decisions about chemicals are
made. The references to acting on early warnings and taking prompt measure to protect workers and communities are a
reaction against a system that appears mired in a kind of risk
analysis paralysis that frequently justifies business as usual. The
statement conveys an urgency to provide environmental justice
for communities disproportionately burdened by chemicals. In
addition to the removing dangerous chemicals, the statement is
framed in positive terms, including a stated desire to spur innovation, invest in new technologies, and empower workers and
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communities to have a voice in decisions that can affect their
health.35

Conclusion: Towards a New
U.S. Policy on Chemicals
One consequence of state success in enacting stricter controls on chemicals is that it could lead to a patchwork quilt of
disparate standards and requirements. But there are many reasons why most advocates for reform of U.S. policy would not
be satisfied with scattered state progress alone. For one, such
an outcome would not guarantee the same basic protection to
all Americans. It would create structural incentives for shifting
operations involving hazardous chemical to states with weaker
laws. Furthermore, a state-based approach to chemicals management would not be able to employ the legal, technical, and
financial resources available to the federal government. States
are historically the laboratories of democracy, but it does not follow that the federal government should do nothing.
Indeed, the current upsurge of state laws on chemicals aims
not only to protect their own citizens, but also to create a political environment for long overdue national reform. This political tumult in the states will increase pressure on Congress and
future presidents to adopt a new outlook on chemicals. The Senate and the House of Representatives has yet to begin a broad
debate over the issue, and deep partisan divides make it difficult to begin the process. Given the Bush Administration’s lack
of interest in TSCA reform—and its open animosity to the EU
REACH legislation—the prospects for passing and enacting
major chemical legislation is virtually nonexistent in the 110th
Congress.
Yet, taking a longer view, there is some cause for optimism.36 Even in the dark, harshly anti-environmental climate of
the 109th Congress, with both houses and the White House in
Republican hands, some proposed legislation set out bold goals.
The Child, Worker, and Consumer-Safe Chemicals Act (“Kid
Safe Chemicals Act”), was introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg (Dem-NJ) and Jim Jeffords (Ind-VT) and in the House

by Representative Henry Waxman (Dem-CA).37 The Kid Safe
Chemicals Act proposed major amendments to the core provisions of TSCA borrowing heavily from policy elements of
REACH and U.S. experience with pesticides. In addition, it
would have included mandatory biomonitoring and provided
dedicated funding for research and development into green
chemistry. It also asserted the proper role for federal preemption as a floor, not a ceiling, for state action. Unfortunately, the
majority never allowed for a hearing on the bill and it expired at
the end of the term.
With the switch in political control in the 110th Congress,
new committee chairs and new leadership created opportunities for debating a host of environmental, health, and economic
issues that were not on the agenda for the past several years.
This is particularly notable in connection with energy policy
and climate change. In February 2007 Senator Lautenberg
announced his intention to reintroduce the Kid-Safe Chemicals Act, although this has yet to happen. In any case, Congress
has begun to consider some narrowly targeted chemical issues
including perchlorate, phthalates, asbestos, and a few broader
initiatives to strengthen environmental justice protection and
public right-to-know.
If anything, this is further justification of the crucial importance of continued state action on chemicals. It could still take
years to raise public and political awareness of the need for
change, and even longer to undertake the hard work of negotiating policy solutions. In the meantime, effective state action
provides a means for addressing specific chemical threats and
for broadening the constituency for reform. As workers, health
professionals, faith communities, businesses, and others come to
see the sense of comprehensive reform, Congress will have no
choice to but to confront the challenge. By then, thanks to steady
progress on the international and local levels, federal lawmakers
will be able to fashion a policy framework that puts the United
States on a more sustainable path for the sound management of
chemicals.
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TSCA and Engineered Nanoscale Substances
by Lynn L. Bergeson & Ira Dassa*1

N

Introduction

anotechnology is now the subject of much excitement
and attention, with applications proliferating quickly.
Thus, engineered nanoscale materials’ (“ENM”) implications for human health and the environment, and the critical
need for governments throughout the world to get the policy and
regulatory framework right has garnered much attention. Most
would agree that the ultimate goal for society is to enable nanotechnology to realize its potential while effectively addressing
the pertinent environment, health, and safety (“EHS”) issues
associated with ENM.
Domestically, the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”)
is the federal environmental law most often mentioned in connection with regulating ENM. It provides the framework for
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to manage new and existing chemical
substances throughout their production, use, and disposal.2 This
Article considers several issues
in connection with the application of TSCA to ENM. It does
not propose comprehensive resolutions, but rather seeks to raise
awareness and promote further
discussion of these issues.

Set forth below is an overview of TSCA—the statute and
EPA’s implementing regulations—followed by a discussion
of the key issues that have arisen regarding the application of
TSCA to ENM and a review of EPA’s TSCA-related nanotechnology initiatives to date.

TSCA Overview
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to protect human health
and the environment from potentially harmful chemical substances and mixtures. The statute authorizes EPA to regulate
“chemical substances,”7 defined to mean “any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity.”8 EPA has
explained that ENM “which meet the TSCA definition of ‘chemical substance[]’ are subject to TSCA.”9
TSCA Section 8(b)(1) directs EPA to “compile, keep current,
and publish a list of each chemical substance which is manufactured or processed in the United
States.”10 This list is known as
the TSCA Chemical Substance
Inventory (“Inventory”). Chemical substances included on the
Inventory are considered existing chemical substances for purposes of TSCA, while the statute
expressly defines “any chemical
substance which is not included
[on the Inventory]” as a “new chemical substance.”11 Therefore,
under TSCA, the government considers a chemical substance as
an existing chemical substance or a new chemical substance. For
ENM, this distinction is significant.
EPA published the initial Inventory in 1979 and continually updates it. EPA adds new chemical substances to the Inventory after a Premanufacture Notice (“PMN”) and subsequent
Notice of Commencement of Manufacture or Import (“NOC”)
have been submitted pursuant to TSCA Section 5.12 As of early
2007, the Inventory listed approximately 83,000 chemical substances.13

The small size of certain
nanoparticles facilitates
their biological uptake
into cells.

Background on Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology, the “understanding and control of matter
at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers, where unique
phenomena enable novel applications,”3 is expanding rapidly.
It is viewed broadly as encompassing many technologies that
over time will generate many new products and applications.
Lux Research, a nanotechnology research and advocacy firm,
predicts that by 2014, products incorporating nanotechnology
will constitute fifteen percent of global manufacturing output
and will total $2.6 trillion.4
One of the key reasons governments and inter-governmental organizations around the world are focusing on nanotechnology is the lack of understanding in all cases regarding the EHS
effects of exposure to ENM. Some believe that the information
that exists warrants caution. The small size of certain nanoparticles facilitates their biological uptake into cells and their movement in the body more readily than is the case with their macro/
bulk counterparts.5 Other factors about nanoparticles contribute
to a general sense of uncertainty regarding the health and environmental effects of exposure to ENM. ENM can have properties that do not conform to conventional physics and chemistry,
potentially increasing risk.6
31

EPA’s PMN Authority
TSCA Section 5 governs the manufacture and import into
the United States of new chemical substances, in addition to the
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manufacture, import, and processing of existing chemical substances for a use that the EPA determines to be a “significant
new use.”14 New, but not existing, chemical substances are subject to the PMN requirement set forth in TSCA Section 5(a)(1)
(A).15 Unless a PMN exemption applies, a company must submit
a completed PMN form to the EPA at least ninety days before
commencing the manufacture or import of any new chemical
substance.16 Through the PMN review process, EPA assesses the
new chemical and determines whether its manufacture, importation, processing, and/or distribution in commerce may present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.17
Exemptions from the PMN process are either “self-executing” or require prior EPA approval. Self-executing exemptions are those that take effect once an entity determines that the
exemption applies, and the company can manufacture the new
chemical substance in the United States without the need for
a PMN, provided that they comply with any recordkeeping or
other applicable requirements for the particular exemption. Selfexecuting PMN exemptions include the exemption for chemical
substances with no separate commercial purpose,18 the polymer exemption,19 and the research and development (“R&D”)
exemption.20
Other exemptions from the PMN requirement require prior
EPA approval. In those situations, entities must submit, and EPA
must approve, an exemption application before the entity can
commence manufacture of the new chemical, subject to compliance with any recordkeeping or other applicable requirements.
PMN exemptions that require prior EPA approval include the
low volume exemption (“LVE”),21 the low release and low exposure exemption (“LoREX”),22 and the test marketing exemption
(“TME”).23
The PMN exemptions of greatest importance to the emerging nanotechnology industry include the LVE, the LoREX,
and the R&D exemption,24 which appears to be uniquely wellsuited for nanotechnology R&D undertaken by start-up companies, research laboratories, universities, and others. As noted
above, the LVE and the LoREX require prior EPA review and
approval.
The EPA bases eligibility for an LVE on the manufacture
of a new chemical in quantities of 10,000 kilograms—approximately 22,000 pounds—or less per year, while it bases eligibility
for a LoREX on meeting several regulatory criteria for release
and exposure throughout the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, and disposal of the chemical.25 Once EPA notifies an
applicant that it granted the LVE or LoREX application, or if the
thirty-day review period expires without notice from EPA, manufacture or import of the chemical substance may commence,
consistent with the terms of the exemption.26
TSCA Section 5(e) authorizes EPA to issue administrative
orders controlling new chemical substances when it finds, after
review of a PMN, that insufficient information exists to permit
a reasoned evaluation of the risk, and either the chemical may
present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment, or
it will be produced in substantial quantities that will enter the
environment or to which there will be substantial or significant
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human exposure.27 In an order, the EPA may ban or limit the
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of the
chemical.28 EPA must propose a Section 5(e) order prior to the
expiration of the ninety-day PMN review period.29 As a matter of practice, rather than acting unilaterally under Section 5(e),
EPA typically enters into a consent order with a PMN submitter,
under which the latter agrees to restrict the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of the new chemical substance pending the development of data necessary to evaluate
the potential hazards.

EPA’s “Significant New Use” Authority
TSCA Section 5 authorizes EPA to review and assess the
potential risks posed by significant new uses of existing chemical substances.30 A significant new use rule (“SNUR”) determines that a use is significant and new. 31 A Significant New Use
Notice (“SNUN”) is the form an entity must submit to EPA at
least ninety days prior to any manufacture, import, or processing
for that use.32 Some have suggested that the co-location of EPA’s
SNUR authority and PMN requirement in the same statutory
section is a clear indication that Congress intended EPA to regulate new chemicals and significant new uses of existing chemicals similarly.33 In fact, the TSCA legislative history reveals that
EPA’s SNUR authority complements its PMN authority.34
A key distinction between EPA’s PMN authority and its
SNUR authority is that under the latter, EPA first must issue a
SNUR, whereas with the former, both the statute and a generic
implementing rule already mandate the submission of a PMN.35
Once EPA issues a SNUR, the two provisions operate in much
the same way, and a SNUN is submitted on the same form and
contains virtually the same information as a PMN.
In promulgating a SNUR, EPA must explain how it considered all relevant factors, including the following factors
specifically mentioned in the statute: “the projected volume
of manufacturing and processing . . . the extent to which a use
changes the type or form of exposure to human beings or the
environment . . . the extent to which a use increases the magnitude and duration of exposure of human beings or the environment . . . and . . . the reasonably anticipated manner and methods
of manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, and disposal.”36 EPA need not make a legal finding with respect to the
potential harm that the existing chemical may pose, but rather,
EPA need only consider the relevant factors.37
Importantly for present purposes, EPA is authorized to issue
SNURs for categories of chemical substances.38 The term “category of chemical substances” is defined as “a group of chemical
substances the members of which are similar in molecular structure, in physical, chemical, or biological properties, in use, or in
a mode of entrance into the human body or into the environment,
or the members of which are in some other way suitable for classification as such for purposes of [TSCA].”39 Thus, the criteria
for qualifying as a category are extremely broad.

EPA’s Authority under TSCA Section 8
TSCA Section 8 gives EPA broad information-gathering
powers. These powers include the ability to impose recordkeep32

ing and reporting requirements for production, use, and exposure-related information under Section 8(a),40 and requirements
for the submission of “health and safety study” data under Section 8(d).41 Pursuant to regulations issued by EPA under Section
8(c), manufacturers, importers, and processors of chemical substances must create and maintain records of allegations—whether
written or oral—that a particular chemical “caused a significant
adverse reaction to health or the environment.”42 A company
must make its Section 8(c) records available for inspection by
EPA at any time and submit them to EPA upon request.43
Section 8(e), the self-executing “substantial risk” reporting
provision of TSCA, obligates manufacturers, processors, and
distributors as follows:
Any person who manufactures, processes, or distributes
in commerce a chemical substance . . . and who obtains
information which reasonably supports the conclusion
that such substance . . . presents a substantial risk of
injury to health or the environment shall immediately
inform [EPA] of such information unless such person
has actual knowledge that [EPA] has been adequately
informed of such information.44
This reporting requirement is important and may have special significance for companies working with ENM. Historically,
penalties for non-compliance with the Section 8(e)’s substantial
risk reporting obligation have been severe, and the EPA collected its largest civil administrative penalty ever from alleged
Section 8(e) reporting violations.45

Applicability of TSCA to ENM
Several of the key TSCA issues raised in connection with
the application of TSCA to ENM include whether TSCA should
regulate ENM consisting of Inventory-listed chemicals as “new
chemical substances;” whether certain PMN exemptions are
appropriate when applied to ENM; and whether TSCA’s information-gathering and reporting provisions are sufficiently robust
to address issues arising in connection with ENM.

ENM Consisting of Inventory-Listed Chemicals
Several well-respected organizations, including Environmental Defense (“ED”) and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”), have questioned whether TSCA is wellsuited to manage potential EHS risks believed to be posed by
ENM. These organizations have recommended that nanoscale
versions of Inventory-listed chemicals be considered new chemical substances for purposes of TSCA Section 5.46 As stated
by ED, “engineered nanomaterials are ‘new’ substances under
TSCA (and thus subject to PMN review), even where a material
has a chemical structure that is identical to a substance already
included on the Inventory, unless the nanomaterial’s chemical
and physical properties are demonstrably identical to an existing
conventional substance with the same chemical structure.”47 In
short, the argument is that because nanoscale versions of existing macro-scaled chemicals are designed to have novel and
enhanced properties and/or characteristics that differ from the
macro-sized counterparts, it is reasonable to conclude that the
nanoscale versions may pose risks not associated with their con33

ventional counterparts, such that the nanoscale versions should
be considered new chemicals and thus subject to PMN review.
TSCA applies to ENM that meet the broad statutory definition of “chemical substance.” Conceding that ENM, which are
chemical substances, are subject to TSCA, the issue really is
which TSCA provisions apply. Proponents of the argument that
nanoscale versions of existing chemicals should be regulated
as new substances claim this interpretation of TSCA is good
public policy and could prevent any unintended adverse human
health and environmental consequences that may be associated
with ENM. They also assert that ENM are of interest precisely
because they are new and special. Because these materials are
believed to offer new features and added value, they should be
subject to TSCA’s new chemical review provisions.48 A third
argument offered is that the TSCA definition of “chemical substance” encompasses more than just a substance’s molecular
structure. ED, for example, claims nothing in TSCA expressly
precludes the definition of “chemical substance” from including
physical and chemical properties.49
The American Chemistry Council (“ACC”) Nanotechnology Panel, on the other hand, claims that nanoscale versions of
Inventory-listed substances are not new chemical substances for
TSCA purposes and cannot be considered new based on the very
definition of “chemical substance.”50 A “chemical substance” is
defined by its “particular molecular identity,” and the definition
makes no mention of a substance’s physical and chemical properties.51 In ascertaining whether a particular substance appears
on the Inventory, all that matters legally, according to the ACC
Nanotechnology Panel, is whether, based on the substance’s
molecular identity, it is or is not listed on the Inventory.52
Additionally, the Panel claims that EPA’s historic course
of conduct has been to consider only a chemical substance’s
molecular identity, not its physical or chemical properties. This
argument finds support in the ABA SEER Paper, which asserts
“EPA’s emphasis on molecular structure is reflected in the PMN
review process.”53 The ABA SEER Paper continues:
The initial steps of the PMN review process involve
EPA establishing a complete and accurate chemical
name for the substance and determining whether the
chemical is already on the Inventory. If EPA determines, based on the chemical identity of the substance,
that it is already on the Inventory, the PMN review
ceases and the submitter is notified that the chemical
can be manufactured in the U.S. This determination is
made without any reference to the physical or chemical
properties of the chemical.54
The ABA SEER Paper acknowledges that the statutory term
“particular molecular identity” is “sufficiently flexible as to take
into account physical properties or other defining characteristics
in addition to molecular structure, at least to a limited degree,”
but it concludes “molecular structure is the definitive characteristic in most instances.”55
Even if EPA announced that nanoscale versions of Inventory-listed chemicals are existing and not new chemicals for
TSCA purposes (and as will be seen below, EPA is leaning
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

strongly in this direction), EPA nonetheless has broad authority
under TSCA to consider any potential risks posed by nanoscale
substances. The ABA SEER Paper emphasizes that, beyond the
PMN requirement, EPA has broad authority under other provisions of TSCA to address potential risks posed by ENM.56
Key among the other provisions is EPA’s SNUR authority.
As indicated above, EPA can issue a SNUR, thereby triggering the need for companies to submit a SNUN.57 TSCA Sections 5(a)(1)(B) and 5(a)(2) thus enable EPA to perform the
same risk assessment and implement the same risk management
controls on existing chemical substances engineered at the nanoscale that can be applied to new chemical substances through
the PMN process.58 SNUNs and PMNs use the same submission
form, EPA Form 7710-25,59 and both notices “undergo the same
review process.”60 Notably, EPA is authorized to issue a Section
5(e) (or Section 5(f)) order for any chemical substance “with
respect to which notice is required by [Section 5(a)],” and that
notice can be either a PMN under Section 5(a)(1)(A) or a SNUN
under Section 5(a)(1)(B).61
In promulgating a SNUR, EPA must consider all relevant
factors, including the four factors listed in the statute. Of the
four statutory factors discussed
above, the latter three appear to
be especially relevant to ENM.62
EPA, however, is not restricted
to the four statutory factors, and
in fact “construes the statute to
allow consideration of any other
relevant factors.”63
The ABA SEER Paper also
points out that EPA is not limited
to issuing SNURs for individual
ENM. Given the great diversity
that reportedly characterizes
these materials, EPA’s authority
to issue a SNUR for a category or categories of existing ENM is
important, particularly as the criteria for qualifying as a category
are broad and may mean merely being “in some . . . way suitable
for classification as such for purposes of [TSCA].”64

EPA approval, EPA’s consideration of any potential risks posed
by the ENM at issue can be expected to be comprehensive. In
fact, EPA’s review of a PMN exemption for a carbon nanotube,
originally submitted as a LVE, but later converted to a LoREX,
took approximately one year and likely consumed considerable
EPA resources and generated no small amount of deliberation
and scrutiny.67
Although the LVE allows certain new chemicals, including
those falling into the category of ENM, to avoid the full panoply
of PMN review, this does not mean EPA does not consider carefully the EHS implications of the candidate substance. Indeed,
the level of scrutiny the EPA reportedly devoted to the LVE/
LoREX application likely exceeded the degree of scrutiny typically reserved for conventional new chemicals reviewed under
the PMN program.

Appropriateness of Reporting
Obligations under TSCA Section 8
Whether certain TSCA information-gathering and reporting
obligations, particularly Section 8(e), apply to ENM is another
debated issue. EPA, however, has made it clear that the Section
8(e)’s substantial risk reporting obligation applies to all
chemicals, including nanoscale
materials consisting of chemical
substances.68 Hence, if a person
learns that a nanoscale-sized
version of an existing chemical
substance poses hazards different from those associated with
its bulk counterpart, and if that
information reasonably supports the conclusion that the
nanoscale-sized version presents
a substantial risk of injury, then
TSCA Section 8(e) requires reporting.69
Similarly, TSCA Section 8(c) reporting obligations apply
to persons manufacturing, importing, processing, or distributing ENM in commerce. Such persons must maintain, and
make available to the EPA for inspection, records of significant
adverse reactions alleged to have been caused by the particular
ENM. Under EPA’s implementing regulations, this means that if
anyone, including a company’s employees, customers, or neighbors, makes a written or oral statement to the effect that an ENM
caused a significant adverse effect, the company must maintain a
record of that allegation.

EPA nonetheless has
broad authority under
TSCA to consider any
potential risks posed by
nanoscale substances.

Appropriateness of Certain PMN Exemptions
The appropriateness of several of the PMN exemptions is
also debated. ED, for example, has urged the EPA “not to apply
mass-based, or other exemptions in the PMN program, unless
the underlying scientific rationale is appropriate when applied to
nanomaterials.”65 A key issue is the relevance of mass-based and
volume-based criteria as applied to ENM, and whether these criteria could ever apply to ENM, which are in many cases unlikely
to be produced in substantial quantities.
The appropriateness of the LVE in particular has been questioned on the grounds that the threshold level of 10,000 kilograms is too high, especially considering that few companies are
expected in the near term to be producing ENM in amounts even
approaching that level.66 At first glance, the suitability of this
PMN exemption may seem questionable, but a closer review
may suggest otherwise. Because the exemption requires prior
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EPA Nanotechnology Initiatives To Date
EPA is to be commended for its leadership, vision, and
energy in exploring early and creatively the application of TSCA
to ENM. Two regulatory initiatives are worthy of discussion.
TSCA PMN Decision Logic—EPA’s Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics (“OPPT”) developed a decision logic that
its staff applies in assessing ENM submitted to EPA for PMN
review under TSCA Section 5, or as part of PMN exemption
applications. Use of the logic is resulting in EPA’s identifica34

tion of specific areas of inquiry unique to ENM. Primary among
these areas are potential routes of exposure to workers and
potential environmental releases. EPA is assessing the adequacy
of personal protective equipment to prevent potential exposures
to ENM during the manufacturing, processing, and/or distribution and use of these materials. EPA’s decision logic is believed
to distinguish between true ENM, meaning those materials that
meet the criteria set out by the NNI, and those materials that
fall within the size range of 1-100 nanometers, but are not specifically engineered with the intent to enable novel, size-dependent properties. According to published sources, EPA has, as of
August 2006, reviewed fifteen new chemicals that were deemed
to fall within the nanoscale size range, one of which, a carbon
nanotube, possessed properties deemed unique and resulted in
EPA’s approval of a LoREX application in 2005.70
Now, the Inventory includes at least two new ENM. On
June 9, 2006, and August 14, 2006, EPA issued Federal Register notices acknowledging the receipt of NOCs of siloxanecoated silica and siloxane-coated alumina nanoparticles.71
Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program—In 2005,
OPPT announced its interest in considering how best to obtain
much-needed information on existing ENM, and convened a
public meeting to discuss various options in June 2005.72 The
discussion at the public meeting yielded a consensus that a voluntary program on existing ENM would have significant value.
Shortly thereafter, EPA created an Interim Ad Hoc Work Group
on Nanoscale Materials (“Work Group”) as part of the National
Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory Committee (“NPPTAC”), a federal advisory group tasked with advising OPPT
on TSCA and pollution prevention matters.73 On November 22,
2005, after the Work Group had met several times, NPPTAC
submitted to the EPA Administrator its Overview Document on
Nanoscale Materials, which outlined a framework for an EPA
approach to a voluntary program for ENM and a complementary
approach to new chemical nanoscale requirements under TSCA,
and addressed various other issues pertinent to ENM.74
On October 18, 2006, EPA Assistant Administrator James
Gulliford sent a letter to stakeholders formally announcing the
development of the Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program
(“NMSP”) and inviting stakeholder participation in it.75 Several months later, EPA simultaneously published three Federal
Register notices related to the NMSP.76 The first notice solicited public comment on EPA’s proposed Information Collection
Request under the Paperwork Reduction Act, including a draft
form that NMSP participants could use to submit data to EPA;77
the second announced a public meeting on the NMSP; 78 and
the third solicited public comment on two draft documents: the
“Concept Paper for the Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program under TSCA” (“NMSP Concept Paper”) and the “TSCA
Inventory Status of Nanoscale Substances—General Approach”
(“TSCA Inventory Paper”).79
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The draft NMSP Concept Paper outlined EPA’s “initial
thinking on the design and development” of the NMSP and
explained that the program, in keeping with the Work Group’s
recommendations, would consist of two parts, a “Basic Program” and an “In-Depth Program.”80 The draft TSCA Inventory Paper “inform[ed] the public of the approach EPA has
historically taken under TSCA in evaluating whether chemical
substances are new, and further inform[ed] the public of EPA’s
intention to follow [the same] approach for nanomaterials that
are chemical substances.”81 In the draft TSCA Inventory Paper,
EPA explained that if a particular ENM has the same molecular
identity as a non-nanoscale (i.e., macro) substance that is listed
on the TSCA Inventory, then the ENM is an existing chemical
irrespective of its particle size and physical/chemical properties.82 Thus, the TSCA Inventory Paper runs counter to the view
expressed by ED, NRDC, and others, that nanoscale versions of
Inventory-listed chemicals should be deemed new for purposes
of TSCA Section 5.
The comment period for the NMSP documents closed on
September 10, 2007, and EPA is now reviewing the various comments submitted.83 It is clear that EPA intends to proceed with
the NMSP, and EPA hopes to launch the program by the end of
2007. EPA has indicated that regulatory efforts under TSCA are
unlikely to happen until after the NMSP is well underway, but
a TSCA Section 8(a) information-gathering rule is possible, and
perhaps even likely.

Conclusion
The debate over TSCA’s application to ENM will continue
for some time. The discussion above demonstrates that EPA has
broad authority under TSCA, and that new legislation intended
to address any potential risks that ENM might pose is unnecessary. EPA can review ENM under TSCA Section 5(a), either as
new chemicals or as significant new uses of existing chemicals.
EPA can conduct a comprehensive review of the exemptions
from the PMN requirement. EPA can also collect information
on and compel and enforce reporting obligations with respect
to ENM.
EPA’s stated commitment to issue final guidance on these
issues will greatly assist the regulated community in understanding EPA’s expectations regarding the submission of PMN and
exemption applications for ENM and thus better prepare industry to undertake its TSCA compliance obligations consistently.
In the interim, chemical manufacturers would be wise to consider carefully their TSCA compliance obligations, obtain legal
advice when necessary, and seek EPA’s thoughts early and often
regarding the regulatory status of ENM believed to consist of
Inventory-listed substances.
Endnotes: TSCA and Engineered Nanoscale Substances
continued on page 82
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Environmental Standards in U.S. Free
Trade Agreements: Lessons from Chapter 11
by Hena Schommer*

T

he U.S. bipartisan trade compromise, concluded on May
10, 2007, was the first to create enforceable labor and
environmental standards to be applied to the pending
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with Peru, Panama, Colombia,
and Korea.1 In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”), signed by the United States, Mexico, and Canada,
broke new ground with the mention of sustainable development
in its preamble.2 NAFTA was the first multilateral trade agreement to include environmental protection.3 While breaking new
ground NAFTA also included a problematic clause, Chapter 11,
which provides a “right of action to a foreign investor against
the government of the country in which it invested, for a broad
range of actions taken” by the government.4 This right of action,
included in the new FTAs, proved to be without a proper mechanism to guard against claims brought against countries for passing legislation to protect the environment, which might affect
the future profits of a company.
Many governments and environmentalists have found
Chapter 11 actions problematic in relation to governments’
attempts to pass environmental laws and regulations. Indeed, the
right of an investor claim can be important for the fair treatment
of corporations doing business in a foreign country. However,
merely allowing the actions to go forward without a mechanism to evaluate the merits of the claim can strain governmental
decision-making powers. In some cases, the threat of a claim
may deter a government from establishing environmental protections. Methanex v. United States is one example of an action
that may chill future government regulations. Methanex brought
a claim against California for banning the import of a toxic fuel
additive that leaked into groundwater and affected the health of
the population.5 Another example is Sunbelt Water v. Canada.
Sunbelt brought a claim against Canada for the loss of potential
future earnings from bottled water exports, due to a change in
Canadian government policy regarding water resource exports.6
Claims of this kind could ultimately deter a country from passing legislation to protect natural resources.
The latest wave of FTAs create new enforceable environmental standards while inheriting many of the controversial
clauses from NAFTA. There is a concern regarding the ability of
developing countries to use or manage natural resources without
fear of actions being filed against them under these clauses. The
case of Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico7 illustrates the difficult position a country may find itself in while attempting to
manage natural resources. Sixteen U.S. irrigation districts along
with twenty-eight individuals brought suit against the Mexican
government for the diversion of water into Mexican farmlands,
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claiming that this deprived claimants of their water rights.8 The
arbitration tribunal in June of this year decided that it had no
jurisdiction over these claims and thus the parties had no claim
under NAFTA Chapter 11.9 The Mexican government had to
cover the costs and expend resources for two years to defend
itself in international arbitration for which there was no jurisdiction.10 The potential expenditure of resources in international
arbitration could prove to be a burden to developing countries
and deter them from passing further environmental protections.
The emergence of environmental standards in international
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements is a decidedly positive evolution in the past fifteen years bringing environmental
issues into spheres where it was historically precluded. However, the continued inclusion of clauses in the recent FTAs similar to Chapter 11 could deter both developed and developing
countries from passing necessary environmental regulation to
protect their natural resources in the future. The discouragement
of countries to act on behalf of protecting their land could have
drastic environmental costs in developing countries, which often
lack adequate environmental protections.
Thus, a preliminary mechanism to determine the validity
of a company’s claim under Chapter 11 before litigation would
be a step to allay the concerns of countries that may hesitate to
enact protections due to a threat of litigation under trade rules.
This mechanism will potentially alleviate the excessive costs
and other burdens a developing country faces while defending
itself against a claim that is interfering with its right to protect
the environment.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, International Information Programs, Free Trade Pacts
Might Gain Congressional Support (June 28, 2007), available at http://usinfo.
state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=June&x=20
070628130953saikceinawz0.8419306 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).

1

2
See Stephen P. Mumme, NAF TA and Environment, Foreign Pol’y in Focus,
Oct. 1999, available at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n26nafta.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007).
3

Mumme, id.

Madeline Stone, NAFTA Article 1010: Environmental friend or foe?, 15 Geo.
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 763 (2003).
4

U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Methanex Corp. v. United
States, available at http ://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2007).
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Minneapolis Bridge Collapse:
Motivation to be Smarter on Infrastructure or Latest in a Trend?
by Mary Bortscheller*
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tation infrastructure that
is durable and ultimately
safer for everyone.
Prior to the collapse, the I-35W bridge
had eight lanes for motor
vehicle use only. A new
bridge constructed with
an eye towards sustainability would incorporate
a mixed use approach,
creating a transit corridor
for motor vehicles, high
occupancy vehicles, and
light rail. Carrying higher
volumes of people over a
single structure increases
I-35W bridge collapse
the general efficiency of
infrastructure, minimizing the need for future resource and time
expenditures in future expansion.
Sustainable design practices in transportation systems are
not yet widely used. Bridges are expensive, and the design that
serves the purpose at the lowest cost is the one usually chosen
in a transportation plan.7 Incorporating innovative materials and
special lanes inevitably adds to the upfront economic cost of
a conventional bridge. But if long-term usability, safety, and
environmental impact of a bridge are considered, then the
greater initial cost becomes an investment in the future. Federal
and state funds together pay for the bridges, tunnels, roads, and
transit arteries that keep people and goods moving throughout
the United States.8 The government must place a greater priority, through increased funding targeted at sustainability, on
the planning, construction, and maintenance of transportation
infrastructure.
The passage of the 1956 Highway Revenue Act provided
for the interstate highway system of which the I-35W bridge was
a part. In 2006 that Act marked its fiftieth year.9 In the wake of
the Minneapolis bridge collapse and other infrastructure failures
around the country, it is vital for the federal and state governments to take a new look at the way the United States plans and
constructs its transportation network.
Courtesy of Jalopnik at Flickr.com

T

he August 3, 2007 bridge collapse in Minneapolis, Minnesota focused the nation’s attention once more on the
grave state of aging infrastructure in the United States.
Built in 1967, the Interstate 35W (“I-35W”) bridge was ranked
“deficient” as of 2006 by the National Bridge Inspection Program.1 Nationwide nearly twenty-five percent of bridges are
deficient; in fourteen states more than thirty percent of bridges
are deficient.2 While a deficient rating does not necessarily imply
impending collapse or breakdown, it does mean that elements of
a bridge need to be monitored and/or repaired.3 Notwithstanding
this definition, the disaster and the statistics beg the question: is
the Minneapolis bridge collapse an ominous sign of problems to
come for U.S. infrastructure, or a catalyst for a refreshed governmental approach to transportation infrastructure?
Investigation is still ongoing as to the precise cause of
the summer bridge collapse in Minnesota. Whatever the final
determination comes out to be, plans are moving forward for a
replacement bridge to span the Mississippi River in downtown
Minneapolis. The new I-35W bridge will be funded by the federal and Minnesota state governments. The stated goals of the
City of Minneapolis, which is involved in planning for the new
bridge, include “improved vehicle capacity and . . . transit capacity,” that the new bridge design “incorporate options for future
transit improvements” and that it “be built to meet all current
environmental standards.”4
Within these goals, there is the potential for Minnesota
to lead by example and take infrastructure construction in a
more sustainable direction. In the same vein as the U.S. Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(“LEED”) green building criteria, sustainable bridge building
practices would incorporate heightened environmental concerns
into the usual considerations of cost and aesthetics. Although
currently no equivalent to the LEED criteria exists for sustainable bridge design, there are various elements that bridge planners in Minnesota and elsewhere could consider with an eye
towards sustainability.5
A bridge that lasts longer without needing extensive repair
or a complete overhaul is by definition more sustainable. High
performance construction materials would help to create a
bridge that remains solid and useable for generations. Aluminum and high performance concrete are two examples. Aluminum is substantially lighter than concrete, requiring fewer welds
be made during construction and less overall weight-bearing
supports. High performance concrete provides better long-term
performance and reduced life-cycle costs than traditional concrete.6 The technology exists to allow construction of transpor-

Endnotes: Minneapolis Bridge Collapse continued on page 84
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A Road Map to a Better NEPA:
Why Environmental Risk Assessments Should Be Used to Analyze
the Environmental Consequences of Complex Federal Actions
by Sonja Klopf, Nada Wolff Culver, & Pete Morton*

O

Introduction

ver thirty-five years have passed since the enactment
of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
the “basic national charter for protection of the environment,” and one of the most important environmental laws passed
by the U.S. Congress.1 The provisions of NEPA were intended
to help public officials make decisions with an “understanding
of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect,
restore, and enhance the environment.”2 NEPA also provides
the basis for Environmental Impact Statements (“EISs”), the
environmental review process
that requires agencies to take a
“hard look” at the potential environmental consequences of proposed federal actions.3
As early as the 1970s, however, NEPA began to weather
considerable criticism from
some in the scientific community. Instead of producing
environmental analyses of high
technical quality, scientists concluded that NEPA assessments
contained “massive amounts
of incomplete, descriptive, and
often, uninterpreted data.”4 The
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) more recently
found that even when there was more than enough data to make
a responsible decision, the EIS lacked analysis.5
Our first thesis is that problems with inadequate data and
science intensify when dealing with NEPA assessments of
complex federal actions: large-scale programs, policies, or
projects. We maintain that in the face of scientific uncertainty
and data limitations, the risk of harm to ecological systems
increases as the scale of proposed development increases. For
example, during the Bush Administration, the speed and scale
of oil and gas leasing and drilling on public lands throughout
the West has increased dramatically.6 Between 2001 and 2006,
more than 17,000 gas and oil wells were drilled on public land
in the Rockies. In contrast, fewer than 9,500 wells were drilled
between 1995 and 2000 during the Clinton Administration.7 A
recent analysis conducted by The Wilderness Society found that
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) is in the process of
approving more than 126,000 wells to be drilled in the Rocky

Mountain West over the next fifteen to twenty years, despite the
more than 77,000 wells already producing on the public lands.8
Studying the effects of this trend, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report in June of 2005 entitled
“Oil and Gas Development—Increased Drilling Permit Activity
Has Lessened BLM’s Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities.”9 As the title indicates, the GAO found
that the increased volume of permits to drill, and the mandates
to focus on processing them, has resulted in more BLM staff
resources devoted to issuing permits—with less attention being
paid to monitoring and enforcing compliance with environmental standards that apply to the
activities conducted under the
permits.
In the Rocky Mountain
West, the scale of oil and gas
development is larger and the
pace of decisions is faster than
in the past, but there is less
attention paid to considering or
addressing the cumulative environmental risks. The Energy
Policy Act of 2005 included five
new categorical exclusions from
NEPA analysis for oil and gas
development activities, and both
the BLM and the U.S. Forest
Service have implemented additional categorical exclusions in
the past year.10 A recent study concluded that the rapid pace and
large scale of oil and gas drilling and leasing that has occurred
greatly increases the risk to the environment as well as the uncertainty regarding the ultimate effects of this large-scale policy.11
Our second thesis is that the potential cumulative ecological impacts associated with federal efforts of large scale, such
as the Bush Administration’s national energy policy, would be
better analyzed through the use of Ecological Risk Assessments

The Energy Policy Act of
2005 included five new
categorical exclusions
from NEPA analysis for
oil and gas development
activities.
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(“ERAs”), often within a Programmatic EIS. ERAs provide a
conceptual and methodological framework to improve EISs,
and they are designed to explicitly address uncertainty and risk
when analyzing environmental impacts.12 This scientific framework could rectify some of the continuing weaknesses of EISs,
as well as better analyze the cumulative impacts and natural
increases in risk and uncertainty stemming from these large,
programmatic projects.
This Article will argue that, in order to adequately fulfill
NEPA’s requirement of taking a hard look at potential environmental impacts of national policy initiatives and large-scale projects, ERAs should be an essential component of NEPA analysis.
We begin by defining ERAs and providing background information on their use. The next section details the many common
elements of ERAs and EISs, including the similar purposes and
structures of the two processes, which make them so compatible.
The Article will next discuss how ERAs can improve the NEPA
process by improving analysis, assessing cumulative impacts,
dealing more effectively with uncertainty, and separating assessment from management decisions. We end with discussion and
recommendations, based on the information presented in the
Article, that ERAs should be
conducted for Programmatic
or large-scale EISs—such as
the Administration’s policy of
increases in oil and gas drilling,
or tar sands and oil shale development—in order to adequately
fulfill NEPA’s requirements.

Background on
Ecological Risk
Assessments

EPA Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessments
According to the EPA, ERA is “a process that evaluates
the likelihood that adverse ecological effects may occur or are
occurring as a result of exposure to one or more stressors.”21
ERAs “systematically evaluate and organize data, information,
assumptions, and uncertainties in order to help understand and
predict the relationships . . . in a way that is useful for environmental decision making.”22 Put more simply, ERAs try to answer
three basic questions: “What can go wrong? How likely is it to
happen? And, so what if it does?”23
The EPA 1998 Guidelines provide a clear framework that
includes three distinct steps for conducting ERAs. The first step
is the problem formulation phase where the scope and scale of
the ERA is decided upon and a full analysis plan is developed.
The second phase is the actual analysis where exposure to stressors and the relationship between stressor levels and ecological effects is determined. For instance, if the risk assessor were
trying to determine the effect
of road building on a watershed, one stressor could be the
increased sediment in the stream
caused by the road construction,
while the corresponding ecological effect could be reduced
salmon spawning numbers in
the river. The analysis would
include a determination of how
much sediment increases and
what effect that increase would
have on the numbers of spawning salmon. The third and final
part of the process is where assessors estimate and describe the
risk and prepare a report, which includes their overall degree of
confidence in their conclusions.24

NEPA specifically encourages adapting and changing methods of analysis
as science and knowledge
about ecosystems improve.

Risk can be simply defined
as circumstances that pose danger
to people or what they value.13 Risk is more formally expressed
as the relationship between the magnitude of an undesired effect
and the probability of the undesired effect occurring. 14 Risk
results from the existence of a hazard and uncertainty about its
expression.15 Ecological risk assessments attempt to transform
scientific data into meaningful information about the undesired
effects of human activities on the environment and combine it
with an evaluation of the consequences.16 Risk assessment identifies hazards such as the release of drilling fluids into surface
waters that support fisheries and communities, and it uses measurement, testing, and statistical methods to quantify the relationship between initiating events and the effects.17

Development of Ecological Risk Assessments
ERAs have been performed for more than twenty years and
have a long history that began with pollution investigation.18 The
EPA published its Framework for Ecological Risk Assessment in
1992, therein establishing the basic process that is widely used
today. It then added further detail in the 1998 Guidelines for
Ecological Risk Assessment. In addition, the EPA continues to
develop a “bookshelf” of documents for guidance on conducting
39

ERAs on more specific topics.19 Public lands agencies, such as
the U.S. Forest Service, have begun to develop new models for
ERAs for use in making land management decisions.20

Common Elements of ERAs and EISs
There are many common elements of ERAs and EISs,
including similar purposes and structures, which make ERAs a
useful tool for informing the NEPA process. The basic goal of
both ERAs and EISs is to provide a structure for collecting and
analyzing information without requiring a specific result, based
on the premise that better information leads to less uncertainty
in decision making. Through the NEPA process, an agency must
prepare a “coherent and comprehensive up-front environmental
analysis to ensure informed decision making to the end that ‘the
agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret
its decision after it is too late to correct.’”25 A NEPA document
is legally sufficient only if its “form, content and preparation .
. . foster both informed decision-making and informed public
participation.”26

Common Purposes of ERAs and EISs
One of the most important common elements of EISs and
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

ERAs are their purpose. The purpose of NEPA, according to
the Council for Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations,
is to “facilitate the evaluation of management decisions and
the environmental effects of proposed federal agency actions.”
ERAs have a similar purpose: “[e]cological risk assessments are
designed and conducted to provide information to risk managers about the potential adverse effects of different management
decisions.”27 These two processes not only have the same goals,
but also complement each other. ERAs provide information to
risk managers about different management decisions and EIS’s
evaluate the environmental effects of different management
decisions.

Common Structures of ERAs and EISs
These similarities continue with the general structures of the
EIS and ERA. The NEPA process begins with the scoping phase
where the agency formally announces its intention to prepare an
EIS. The agency requests comments from interested parties and
the public in order to help focus its environmental review on
potentially significant environmental issues. Likewise, the first
step in conducting an ERA is problem formulation, when risk
assessors, risk managers, and any other interested parties help
focus the assessment and identify the important issues. At this
time, risk assessors should also evaluate goals, select assessment
endpoints, prepare a conceptual model, and develop an analysis plan. Although the initial phases of the ERA and EIS have
different labels—and ERAs require more specific planning—
both processes include the input of interested parties in order to
determine the scope of the analysis. In this context, the scope of
the environmental analysis to be performed under NEPA must
be commensurate with the scope of the proposed action and its
potential impacts.28 Similarly, in order to determine the scope of
an ERA,
[r]isk managers and risk assessors consider the nature
of the decision (e.g., national policy, local impact),
available resources, opportunities for increasing the
resource base (e.g., partnering, new data collection,
alternative analytical tools), potential characteristics of
the risk assessment team, and the output that will provide the best information for the required decisions.29
The NEPA process continues with the development and
writing of the EIS, where the agency staff conducts an objective analysis of the environmental impacts that could occur as a
result of the proposed action, whether it is a policy, program, or
project. The EIS also includes analysis of possible alternatives to
the proposed project and recommendations on how to lessen or
avoid environmental consequences. The second step of the ERA
process is risk characterization, when assessors estimate the risk
through integration of exposure and stressor-response profiles.30
At the end of this phase there should be summary profiles that
describe the exposure and the stressor-response relationships.31
According to the EPA, these results should be written “clearly,
articulate major assumptions and uncertainties, identify reasonable alternative interpretations, and separate scientific conclusions from policy judgments.”32 The risk manager can then use
the risk assessment results, along with other factors such as pubFall 2007

lic opinion, economic, or legal concerns in making management
decisions.33

Common Requirements for Public Disclosure
Both processes make the information contained in the EIS
or ERA public. The EIS is published and mailed to federal, state,
and local government agencies and elected officials, as well as
environmental and public interest groups, other interested parties, affected landowners, Native American tribes, newspapers,
and local libraries. The purpose is to inform the public of the
proposed actions, show how decisions were made, make the
decision-making process clear and open to further scrutiny, and
keep the agency accountable for its actions and decisions.
The EPA recommends a number of additional public disclosures, including explicitly defined endpoints, being open about
the strengths and limitations of the conceptual model, identifying
and describing the rationale for key assumptions, and describing data limitations. The purpose of disclosing these details is
to keep the ERA process clear and open to further scrutiny and
peer review. Instead of relying on conclusory statements, these
required details allow those who were not involved in the process to independently evaluate the validity of the assessment.
Similarly, NEPA’s hard look at environmental consequences must be based on “accurate scientific information” of
“high quality.”34 Essentially, NEPA “ensures that the agency, in
reaching its decision, will have available and will carefully consider detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts.”35 The Data Quality Act and BLM’s interpreting guidance expand on this obligation, requiring that influential scientific information use the “best available science and supporting
studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices.”36 NEPA also requires agencies to disclose where
information is incomplete or unavailable.37
Once again the purposes of EISs and ERAs mirror each
other. However, because ERAs generally require disclosure of
specific information regarding the analysis, uncertainty, and data
limitations, the ERA reporting process can make the EIS more
informative and useful to a broader number of people.

How ERAs Will Improve the NEPA Process
Although ERAs cannot fulfill all NEPA requirements
by themselves, they can help agencies effectively analyze the
potential environmental impacts resulting from proposed federal
actions and their possible alternatives.38 Because the ERA process has a more defined scientific framework than the EIS and
has historically incorporated more scientific data, merging the
two processes actually facilitates better analyses when an ERA
is used as part of an EIS. ERAs can also help focus taxpayer
resources, both on what data needs to be collected and on where,
when, and to what extent federal projects should occur.

Fulfilling NEPA Requirements and
Improving Analysis
As discussed above, there have been continuing problems with inadequate NEPA documents including incomplete,
descriptive and uninterpreted data, and a lack of clear analysis. In 1997, the CEQ conducted a study of the effectiveness
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of NEPA twenty-five years after its implementation. Among a
number of conclusions, the CEQ found that “NEPA practitioners need to analyze existing information more effectively. . . ”
and “[w]hat is often lacking in EISs is. . . a comparison of the
potential impacts of choosing particular alternatives at particular
locations expressed in clear, concise language. . . ”39
The purpose of an EIS is to take a hard look at environmental effects, analyzing a number of different options in order
to better protect the environment. NEPA specifically encourages adapting and changing methods of analysis as science and
knowledge about ecosystems improve. NEPA states that, “. . .
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government. . . to use
all practicable means and measures. . . to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony.”40 ERAs provide available means and measures to
incorporate an accepted, consistent, science-based framework
that public land agencies already frequently use to focus and
improve their decisions. Completing ERAs as part of an EIS and
following the EPA’s Guidelines will address long-term weaknesses and enable federal agencies to fulfill more completely the
purposes of NEPA.

Assessing Cumulative Impacts
ERAs can help to address the difficulties in adequately
assessing cumulative impacts that can plague EIS’s. NEPA
requires that agencies assess the “direct, indirect, or cumulative” environmental impacts of a proposed action.41 Cumulative
impacts are defined as:
the impact on the environment which results from the
incremental impact of the action when added to other
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal)
or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative
impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time.42
As the scale and pace of these large-scale developments
increases, the need to examine the potential cumulative impacts
increases as well. Agencies are required by NEPA and the
courts to provide “some quantified or detailed information;
. . . [g]eneral statements about possible effects and some risk do
not constitute a hard look. . . absent a justification regarding why
more definitive information could not be provided.”43 Agencies
can fail to properly analyze these cumulative impacts, especially
when dealing with large-scale projects; the Ninth Circuit complained in Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
that the agency’s “findings about cumulative impacts were perfunctory and conclusory and d[id] not provide a helpful analysis
of past, present, and future projects.” 44 Similar concerns have
motivated courts to require programmatic EISs to ensure that
the likely environmental consequences of policy initiatives are
adequately assessed.45
The conceptual and methodological framework for ERAs
outlined by the EPA allows for a consistent and comprehensive approach for land managers to follow when making decisions. Each ERA should include—as well as document for the
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public—the stages of problem formulation, exposure analysis,
effects assessment, and risk characterization.46 Requiring each of
these components should, in turn, improve methods of sampling
and analysis, interpretations of data, and quality assurances.47 In
this way, cumulative impacts can be dealt with consistently and
comprehensively, avoiding the lack of analysis and conclusory
findings that often occur in EIS.48

Dealing Effectively With Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a constant when dealing with the effect of
land management actions upon the environment, but using
ERAs can help to consistently recognize where uncertainty lies,
how uncertainty can be reduced, and where more data may be
needed to make an effective evaluation. Unfortunately, in the
history of EIS, uncertainty has been largely “ignored, omitted,
described in qualitative terms, or merely [made] implicit in the
assessment.”49
Where there is incomplete or unavailable scientific information concerning significant adverse environmental impacts,
NEPA requires the disclosure and analysis of the costs of uncertainty and the costs of proceeding without more and better
information.50 However, agencies may not address, explain, or
satisfactorily reduce uncertainty in their decisionmaking process,
even when it is brought to their attention. For example, the Ninth
Circuit found an EIS inadequate because it “did not address in
any meaningful way the various uncertainties surrounding the
scientific evidence.”51 Courts have also concluded that agencies
“need not undertake further scientific study, [to reduce uncertainty. . . but the agency] must explain in the EIS why such an
undertaking is not necessary or feasible.”52
The ERA process helps to address this problem by calling
for an explicit determination of the impacts of uncertainty on
the overall quality and utility of the ERA. First, the EPA Guidelines prescribe better planning to eliminate as many sources of
uncertainty as possible. When uncertainty is thus reduced, the
EPA recommends that the ERA openly and explicitly describe
the strengths and limitations of the model as well as identify
and describe rationales for any assumptions made. Finally, risk
assessors should describe data limitations. In this way, if there is
missing data or uncertain results, these problems are not simply
ignored or swept aside, but they become an intricate part of the
analysis.

Separating Assessment and Management
Agencies and land managers are subject to substantial pressure from various interested parties and groups when it comes
to making land management decisions. There is pressure to
develop, pressure to keep pristine, and pressures for all different
kinds of access. In addition, there are economic and legal implications that must be taken into account. There is no question that
these pressures, as well as personal biases, can and do have an
impact on land management decisions.53 However, these reasons
and pressures are often not clearly separated from the scientific
analysis in NEPA documents, making it unclear where the science ends and where the policy-based planning begins.
The EPA framework clearly defines these different roles
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and encourages their separation in order to prevent personal or
institutional bias that typically “color” the scientific evaluation.
Therefore, ERAs begin with the risk assessment, a scientific process, which involves the evaluation of the likelihood of adverse
effects. When this process is finished, the risk characterization process involves the selection of a course of action based
on other factors including social, legal, political, economic, as
well as the risk assessment results.54 Following this framework
should help to separate the scientific conclusions from policy
decisions, leading to more clearly defined discussions with the
public about the effects of different courses of action as well as
better management decisions.

Discussion and Recommendations
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”55 Major
federal actions include: “new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted,
conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or
revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures;
and legislative proposals.”56 In addition to oil and gas drilling,
we have identified a number of major federal actions related to
energy of sufficient scale, scope,
and uncertainty to merit the use
of ERAs.
The BLM assessed the
development of wind energy
on Western public lands managed by the agency, utilizing a
programmatic EIS in order to
evaluate the cumulative impacts
of this program.57 The final programmatic EIS identifies places
that wind energy development would be appropriate on public
lands, establishes policies and best management practices concerning right-of-way authorizations, and amends fifty-two separate BLM land use plans.58
The BLM is currently conducting programmatic NEPA
analysis of the effects of oil shale and tar sands development on
public lands in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.59 The uncertainty
of this project is significant because the scale of development
is very large (and encompasses three states) and both oil shale
and tar sands energy development involve new, commercially
unproven processes with unknown risks to the environment.60
The BLM and the U.S. Forest Service are preparing a
joint programmatic EIS to analyze and expedite the leasing of
lands with high potential for renewable geothermal resources in
eleven Western states and Alaska.61 Neither agency has a robust
geothermal leasing program, as a result there is a substantial
amount of uncertainty about the effects on public lands, while at
the same time there is a desire to begin leasing at a greater speed
and scope.
The oil and gas energy policy established by the Bush
Administration is also a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. This policy has

required federal agencies to prioritize and accelerate approval of
energy development projects while reducing the amount of environmental analysis that will be conducted.62 Unlike wind and
geothermal energy development, where a programmatic EIS is
involved, no NEPA analysis of the Bush Administration oil and
gas energy policy has been conducted despite requests to do so.63
The direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the energy policy
must be considered through a comprehensive, programmatic
EIS, much as the agencies have proceeded with other large-scale
energy development initiatives.64 By completing a programmatic
EIS of the Bush Administration’s energy policy, the BLM would
be able to examine “an entire policy initiative rather than performing a piecemeal analysis.”65 Because the Bush Administration has made unmistakable and public efforts to increase oil and
gas development throughout the West, the cumulative impacts
of this regional increase are more than reasonably foreseeable
and must be taken into account in a thorough NEPA analyses.
The effects of broad program or policy initiatives include
large-scale habitat fragmentation, cumulative air quality, water
quantity and quality, human health impacts, wildlife, loss of
recreation opportunities, and damage to the habitat of sensitive, threatened and endangered species. In order to effectively
consider such impacts, the structured and scientific approach of
ERAs will be invaluable. The
environmental consequences
of these truly major federal
actions need to be analyzed at
an equally broad scale through a
programmatic EIS that includes
an ERA. For the Bush Administration’s energy policy, which
has not yet been subjected to a
programmatic NEPA analysis, a
programmatic EIS and ERA should be prepared immediately.

The purpose of an EIS is
to take a hard look at
environmental effects.
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Conclusion
Both EISs and ERAs are premised on the principle that
thorough consideration of accurate, relevant data will yield the
most responsible decisions. Both EISs and ERAs set out processes that are intended to ensure that decisions are made based
on the most complete and accurate information available and
take uncertainty into account. Both EISs and ERAs are tools
that are being used by federal agencies, but they can be used
more effectively and consistently, especially if they are used in
concert.
ERAs have already been used in public land management
decisions that range from estimating risks from wildfire and other
natural disasters, to implementation of vegetation projects. The
use of ERAs should be expanded, however, to broad land management decisions where the large scale and scope of the analyses to be completed in an EIS makes a complete analysis more
difficult. The EPA framework for ERAs outlines a consistent,
science-based framework to improve the analysis of cumulative
impacts and deal with uncertainty. ERAs can be an essential element of large, programmatic EISs and should be used in order to
more effectively fulfill NEPA’s purpose and requirements.
42

Federal agencies have recognized the importance of conducting NEPA analysis on a programmatic scale when the scope
of a federal action is a policy or program that can have wideranging impacts on resources and values. Programmatic EISs
have been or are in the process of being used to assess the development of wind energy, geothermal energy, tar sands, and oil
shale resources on public lands. NEPA’s mandate to analyze
direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental consequences,

consider measures to avoid or mitigate those impacts, and evaluate management alternatives at this scale can be effectively
fulfilled via ERAs, which provide a rigorous scientific framework. Moreover, ERAs will ensure that the analysis of risks is
completed separate from and prior to the ultimate management
decisions, which often involve different, non-scientific considerations, facilitating informed and science-based decision-making—which we believe to be better decision-making.
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Western Politics and Wildlife Policy:
The Case of the Gray Wolf
by John Shackelford*

Courtesy of Derek Bakken
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attle lines were drawn this fall when Defenders of Wildlife posted a video online about Alaska’s use of aircraft
to kill wolves. The ten-minute film features statements by biologists, hunters, and a former Lieutenant Governor
along with archival footage depicting aerial assaults on fleeing
wolves.1 The video’s release coincided with a proposal by California Congressman George Miller to prohibit such aerial hunting. Alaska Governor Sarah Palin defended her state’s practice,
insisting that Alaska’s “science-driven and abundance-based
predator management system” serves an entirely different purpose than hunting and that the Congressman’s bill “threatened
the very foundations of federalism.”2
Wildlife conservation groups contend that the real threat lies
in Alaska’s exploitation of a loophole in the federal Airborne
Hunting Act (“AHA”), which outlawed shooting or harassing
wildlife from aircraft over thirty years ago.3 The law grants an
exception to any person operating under state or federal authority in the administration or protection of natural resources.4 The
video argues that Alaska has issued permits to private individuals seeking trophies under the guise of wildlife management and
that killing predators to increase game animal populations violates Congress’ intent when it created the management exception
in the AHA. Defenders of Wildlife contends that Congressman
Miller’s Protect America’s Wildlife Act (“PAW”)5 is needed to
explicitly proscribe the use of
aerial hunting for the manipulation of predator and prey populations and restrict the use of other
variations of aerial hunting such
as the “land-and-shoot” method
to government officials only.6
The debate over lethal predator control methods is an old
one in Alaska but its effects will grow increasingly significant
as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) inches closer to
removing federal protection of the gray wolves in the Northern
Rocky Mountain Region. Wolves were eradicated from Idaho,
Montana, and Wyoming in the 1930s and their reintroduction to
Central Idaho and the Greater Yellowstone Area in 1995 ignited
a rancorous debate that stirs passions about conservation, state
sovereignty, and the heritage of the Old West.7 In February of
2007, the Department of Interior released its proposal to remove
the Rocky Mountain wolf population from the Endangered Species Act’s list of endangered wildlife.8 The proposal indicated
that, by 2006, the federal government’s recovery goals for the

Gray Wolf

“nonessential experimental” wolf population had been achieved
and surpassed for seven consecutive years and that it had already
approved Idaho and Montana’s management plans. According to
FWS, the long-awaited de-listing has been delayed only because
Wyoming’s management plan is scientifically inadequate and
legally inconsistent, and it poses a threat to the survival of the
species in that state.9
Wyoming’s reluctance to
adopt an adequate wolf management program may seem incongruent with its neighbors’ desire
to exercise sovereignty over their
natural resources, but it demonstrates the difficulty in drafting
sound wildlife policy when traditions—ranching and hunting
in this case—seem threatened.
Idaho Governor Otter personified this political climate when he proclaimed from the steps of
the State Capitol in front of a gathering of pro-hunting demonstrators that he supported a plan to reduce the Idaho wolf population to the federal minimum and that he would be the first to
bid for a $26.50 wolf-hunting permit.10
It is this kind of political bravado that preserved some form
of aerial hunting in Alaska after the passage of the AHA11 and
reinstated it as a predator control method four years ago.12 Alas-

The debate over lethal
predator control methods
is an old one in Alaska.
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kan voters passed a ballot initiative that banned “same-dayairborne” hunting13—the most conservative way to hunt with
a plane—but the State Legislature overturned the initiative and
overruled the Governor’s subsequent veto just three years later.14
After the legislature opened aerial wolf hunting to private individuals, voters responded with
Proposition 6, which restricted
its use to Department of Fish
and Game officials.15 Although
the initiative was again overturned by the legislature, the
issue has garnered enough opposition among Alaskans to make
its way onto next year’s ballot.16
Despite Governor Palin’s claims that predator control is
only necessary for “Alaskans to put healthy food on their families’ dinner tables,” many conservation advocates fear that
Alaska’s pro-ungulate program will filter down to the lower
forty-eight where wolves have only recently reestablished themselves.17 The de-listing of the gray wolf in Idaho, Montana, and
Wyoming will allow for the reduction of wolf numbers within
each state to a hundred, providing that there are at least ten

breeding pairs within each group.18 Considering that there was
a combined total of over 1,243 wolves and eighty-nine breeding pairs in 2006, it comes as little surprise that Defenders of
Wildlife President Rodger Schlickeisen described the Idaho and
Wyoming’s management plans,
which skirt the federal minimum
as “geared toward wolf eradication, not wolf conservation.”19
The debate over the aerial hunting of wolves and the
legal acrobatics that have kept
it alive present a challenge to
environmental policy-making.
Passionate opposing viewpoints
can swing the conservation pendulum wildly on the state and
local levels, and it seems likely that federal authorities are better
positioned to draft more objective, science-based policy. When
moral, cultural, and environmental concerns are at odds, it may
be difficult not to hand over responsibility to the people who
feel their lifestyles are being threatened. If maintaining healthy
ecosystems is the underlying goal, however, then science, not
politics, needs to determine U.S. policy toward wildlife.

Science, not politics, needs
to determine U.S. policy
toward wildlife.

Endnotes:
The Truth About Aerial Hunting of Wolves in Alaska (Sept. 19, 2007),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Mu_rqmFpL8 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2007).

1

Letter from Alaska Governor Sarah Palin to Congressman George Miller
(Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/news.php?id=642
(last visited Oct. 15, 2007).

2

Defenders of Wildlife, The Protect America’s Wildlife (PAW) Act,
available at http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/policy_and_
legislation/paw_act_fact_sheet.pdf?ht= (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).

3

4

Airborne Hunting Act 16 U.S.C. §742j-1 (1971).

5

H.R. 3663, 110th Cong. (2007).

6

Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 3.

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designating the Northern
Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment
and Removing This Distinct Population Segment From the Federal List of
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 6106 (Feb. 8, 2007) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).

7

8

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants id.

9

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, id.

Patrick O’Driscoll, Gray Wolf to Lose Some Protection, USA Today (Jan. 1,
2007), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-29-graywolves_x.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).

10

45

Wayne L. Regelin, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Wolf Management in Alaska With a Historic Perspective (Mar. 2002), available at http://
www.wc.adfg.state.ak.us/index.cfm?adfg=wolf.wolf_mgt (last visited Nov. 11,
2007).

11

Rocky Barker, Wolves & Elk: The Overriding Issue in Delisting, The Idaho
Statesman (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/
environment/story/80724.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
12

13

Regelin, supra note 11.

Defenders of Wildlife, Brief History of Wolf Control in Alaska, available at
http://www.defenders.org/resources/publications/ (enter search terms “Wolf
control in Alaska,” then click first result) (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Brief History of Wolf Control in Alaska].

14

15

Brief History of Wolf Control in Alaska, id.

16

Brief History of Wolf Control in Alaska, id.

17

Governor Sarah Palin, supra note 2.

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designating the Northern
Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment
and Removing This Distinct Population Segment From the Federal List of
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 6107 (Feb. 8, 2007) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).

18

Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Gray Wolf to Be Removed From
Endangered Species List (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.defenders.
org/newsroom/press_releases_folder/2007/01_29_2007_gray_wolf_to_be_
removed_from_endangered_species_list.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).

19

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

The Future of the Polar Bear Rests on
Thin Ice: Listing Under the ESA and Its Impacts
by Justin Olsson*
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atellite imagery revealed that the Arctic sea ice cover fell
to its lowest level in recorded history during the 2007
melting season, opening up the Northwest Passage.1 As
the ice cover diminishes, the long sought wish of trade is becoming a reality—a shortened global shipping route through the
northern waters. Polar bears depend on this same ice for their
habitat, access to food, and breeding sites.2 Experts predict that
two-thirds of the world’s polar bears will disappear by 2050.3
In an effort to protect the species, Greenpeace, the National
Resources Defense Council, and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a lawsuit in December 2006 after the Bush
Administration ignored a petition to list the polar bear as a
threatened species.4 In January
2007, in response to the lawsuit,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) proposed listing
the polar bear as a threatened
species under the protection of
the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”). 5 Consequently, the
U.S. Geological Survey
(“USGS”) generated new scientific data and models on polar
bears and their sea ice habitats.
The USGS issued a final report
on the status of the polar bear on
September 7, 2007.6
There are an estimated 20,000–25,000 polar bears worldwide.7 The polar bears facing the greatest risk of extirpation, or
local extinction, are the bears located in the Seasonal Ice and
Polar Basin Divergent ecoregions.8 The USGS models predict a
forty two percent loss of optimal polar bear habitat by the middle
of the century.9 Scientists characterize their findings as conservative because even they believe that the best available models
underestimate the actual decline in Arctic ice.
Scientist predict that even if stringent greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions reductions are globally put into place, the
sea ice in the Arctic will continue to rapidly decrease for the next
fifty years.10 As the ice cover thins, more open ocean patches
become exposed to sunlight, which in turn melts more ice in a
process referred to as sea ice-albedo feedback.”11 This feedback
cycle is a critical threat12 to the sea ice habitat of polar bears and
GHG emissions must be reduced to slow this cycle.
The increasing possibility of a seasonally ice-free Arctic
also opens the question of territorial jurisdictional claims for its
resources and control over its use as a shipping route. Reports

indicate the world’s militaries are lining up to protect their economic “rights” in the Arctic and sovereignty over the land is
being asserted by a number of countries.13 The influx of military
and possibly commercial activity into the Arctic region further
threatens the polar bear and its habitat. Even in a best-case scenario without an oil spill, increased traffic in the region presents
a danger to the polar bear.
The FWS decision of whether to list the polar bear as threatened is expected by the end of January 2008. Listing a species
entitles it to a host of protections. Specifically, the consultation
clause of the ESA places a procedural obligation on federal
government to evaluate its actions and policies on the species
and consult with the FWS so
that its actions avoid jeopardizing a threatened species.14 Most
importantly, listing the species
would prevent private and state
takings.15 “Taking” has been
interpreted to bar habitat modification of the species where there
is a showing of actual injury to
wildlife.16 Additionally, listing
the species would require permits for activities that result in
incidental takings, the designation of a critical habitat zone,
and the preparation of a recovery plan.17
Listing the polar bear may be an effective tool to require
the federal government to require a reduction in GHG emissions
that threaten the polar bear’s habitat. If GHG emissions are considered a “taking” of the species, it raises a legal question of
whether the government can compel U.S. companies to reduce
their emissions to prevent such takings. It is also uncertain how
such a listing would interact with international Arctic conservation treaties, such as the Polar Bear Treaty.
U.S. courts may soon face the question of whether the ESA
can be used as a mechanism to enact change in U.S. climate policy. Listing the polar bear as threatened under the ESA is only
the first of many necessary steps to slow and eventually reverse
the impacts of climate change.

USGS models predict
a forty two percent loss
of optimal polar bear
habitat by the middle
of the century.
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continued on page 85
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The EU Adopts an Integrated Maritime
Policy and Action Plan: Is the U.S. Far Behind or Ahead?
by Joan M. Bondareff*

O

Introduction

n October 10, 2007, the European Commission (“Commission”) announced that they had adopted a new Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union.1 The
announcement completes a one-year period of extensive public
consultation on a proposed policy called the Green Paper.2 The
Integrated Maritime Policy is accompanied by a detailed action
plan setting out implementation mechanisms over the next few
years. This Article reviews the key elements of the action plan
and compares it, briefly, to the present state of U.S. policy and
law on the oceans and coasts.

Purpose of the Integrated Maritime Policy
and European Context
In adopting a new integrated maritime policy, the Commission noted that “Europe is intimately linked to the seas and
oceans that surround it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries
industries and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and
ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, maritime and
coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications,
blue biotech and the protection of the marine environment.”
The Commission not only intends to pursue the development of
sea-related industries, but it recognizes that the use “needs to be
sustainable as the marine environment is the base resource for
all maritime economic activities.” In sum, the EU policy calls
for “good governance and an integrated approach…that joins
up sectoral policies for maritime activities and environmental
policy relating to Europe’s seas.”
A review and comparison of European maritime policy
and American policy should also start with a comparison of the
underlying legal regimes. For instance, the treaty that created
the EU gives explicit competence to the EU only in the policy
areas of transportation, fisheries, and the environment.3 All
other aspects of maritime policy remain within the jurisdiction
of Member States. In the case of the United States, we have a
history of over 200 years of sorting out the division of authority between the federal and state governments. This starts, of
course, with the early decision by the Supreme Court in Gibbons
v. Ogden (state regulation of steamboat licenses is preempted)4
to the more recent decision in U.S. v. Locke (state regulation of
tankering preempted by federal regulations).5 The EU will need
many more years to sort out this division of responsibility.

Summary of the Key Elements of the
EU Maritime Policy
With these objectives in mind, the Commission is proposing
the following actions, described further below:
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• A European Maritime Transport Space without barriers;
• A European Strategy for Marine Research;
• National integrated maritime policies to be developed by
EU Member States;
• An integrated network for maritime surveillance;
• A roadmap towards marine spatial planning by Member
States;
• Elimination of pirate fishing and destructive high seas bottom trawling;
• Promotion of a European network of maritime clusters;
• A review of EU labor law exemptions for the shipping and
fishing sectors;
• A European Marine Observation and Data Network; and
• A strategy to mitigate the effects of climate change on
coastal regions.

European Maritime Transport Space and
Sustainable Shipping and Port Policies
The Commission noted that maritime transportation is vital
for Europe’s trade because almost ninety percent of its external
trade and over forty percent of its internal trade goes by sea.
Internally, there are barriers to marine transport because voyages by ship from a port of one EU Member State to another are
always considered international even when the cargo transported
is comprised of internal market-cleared goods. Consequently,
the Commission will launch a consultation of stakeholders on
the concept of a European Space for Maritime Transport without
barriers and offer options for its implementation. The aim of the
consultation is to adopt a proposal before the end of 2008. The
Commission also referenced its draft guidelines on the application of EC competition rules to liner and tramp shipping conferences that had been published for comment in September 2007,
and stated that its final guidelines will be adopted before October 2008.6

Ship Dismantling
The Commission is developing a new EU strategy to be presented as a Communication for ship dismantling in mid-2008.
The Communication will possibly contain technical assistance
to developing countries to improve their ship dismantling facili-

* Joan M. Bondareff, WCL ’75, is the former Chief Counsel of the U.S. Maritime
Administration, Senior Counsel to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, and Assistant General Counsel for Coastal Zone Management of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Ms. Bondareff is currently Of
Counsel to Blank Rome LLP in Washington, DC. She may be reached at Bondareff@BlankRome.com. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author.
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ties, promoting voluntary industry action on clean ship dismantling, e.g., by distribution of information on green facilities, and
promoting research on ship dismantling. The Commission will
continue, in a parallel manner, to work with the International
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) on a Ship Recycling Convention scheduled for adoption in 2009, and in the work of the Basel
Convention on the same subject.7

Air Pollution
The Commission is closely following the IMO discussions
on the revision of MARPOL Annex VI (setting limits on air
emissions from ships)8 and, if it concludes that the results are
insufficient, it will consider alternative proposals for action.9
The Commission also plans to take action to further promote the
use of shore-side electricity by ships at berth in EU ports, including the possible revision of a directive to allow total or partial
exemptions from electricity taxes to ships using shore electricity
from the harbor so that it is competitive with untaxed bunker
fuel. Further, the Commission will evaluate various options for
EU legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from maritime transport and will consult with stakeholders on the proposed legislation.

Ports
In October 2007, the Commission also adopted a new
Communication on Ports containing a set of guidelines to
bring more transparency and
maintain a level playing field in
the ports sector.10

European Strategy for
Marine Research

Building on earlier proposals, in February 2008, the Commission will adopt a Communication on a European Border Surveillance System (“EUROSUR”). This system will link existing
surveillance systems at the Member State level and provide for
a common information sharing environment for the maritime
domain, covering initially the Mediterranean Sea and the Black
Sea. This so-called “system of systems” is intended to increase
EU security by preventing illegal immigration and trafficking of
human beings, and also reduce the death toll at sea. The European GALILEO system will provide an advanced technological platform for the development of satellite-based surveillance
applications.11
In the second half of 2008, the Commission will announce
in a Communication a detailed work plan for further steps
towards the integration of all European maritime surveillance
systems. Part of the creation of a European network for maritime
surveillance will include improved cooperation between the
coast guards of Member States. The EU may have preferred to
establish a unified coast guard, as the United States has, but this
certainly would infringe upon
the jurisdiction and sovereignty
of Member States.

EU proposes to build on
an existing system of
maritime clusters to
promote a European
network of such clusters.

To provide the basis to
underpin the EU Maritime
Policy, the Commission announced that it would take action
to develop a Maritime Research Strategy in consultation with
Member States and with stakeholders in a European Marine Science Partnership. The Strategy itself will be proposed in a Communication in 2008.

Integrated Maritime Policies
The Commission has proposed that maritime functions be
integrated across EU Member States and recommends that Member States integrate their own maritime policies. As noted above,
the EU can only make recommendations in these areas which
are left essentially to the purview of Member States. The Commission realizes that there are regulatory barriers to achieving
an integrated EU maritime function, and therefore will issue in
2008 a set of guidelines on common principles and stakeholder
involvement for maritime policies and report on the actions of
Member States by 2009. To assist Member States to unify their
maritime policies, the Commission will develop a more integrated network of surveillance systems for European waters, a
program of marine spatial planning, and an EU Marine Observation and Data Network, described below.
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Integrated Network of Maritime Surveillance

Marine Spatial
Planning and
Integrated Coastal
Zone Management

An earlier Green Paper produced by the EU on Maritime
Policy identified the increase in
competing activities on coasts
and seas as a source of potential
conflict to be managed. Therefore, in 2008, the Commission
will propose a road map to facilitate and encourage the further
development of marine spatial planning in Member States, and
examine different options, including zoning, to make different
maritime activities compatible, including the maintenance and
strengthening of biodiversity. In 2009, the Commission will set
up a system for the exchange of best practices in marine spatial
planning and integrated coastal zone management.
As EU Commissioner Joe Borg stated in a February 22,
2007 speech in Sopot, Poland, “spatial planning,” or the coordination of maritime activities in European coastal regions and
waters, can “help ensure the economically and environmentally
sustainable development of coastal regions.”12 At the same time,
the Commissioner applauded the development by some Member
States of pilot projects for implementing such spatial planning,
notably Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands.13

Increased Fishery Regulations and
Review of Labor Law Exclusions
The Commission observed that “the current situation of
European fisheries cannot be deemed as satisfactory,” and
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“efforts to achieve capacity reduction, and the conservation and
restoration of fish stocks must go hand-in-hand with improving
the social well-being of those active in the sector.”14 Consequently, the Commission announced that, in 2008, it will adopt
a Communication on the overall application of the ecosystem
approach to the Common Fisheries Policy. One of the top priorities for a Common Fisheries Policy will be the elimination of
the dumping overboard of dead, unwanted fish as by-catch. The
Commission is also preparing a draft regulation on combating
illegal, unregulated, and unreported (“IUU”) fishing. Finally,
the Commission will come forward with a legislative proposal
to regulate destructive fishing practices on the high seas by EU
fishing vessels, e.g., bottom trawling.
The Commission has agreed to undertake an assessment of
the situation concerning the exclusion of maritime professions
from EU social legislation and working conditions in a Communication to be launched later this month. Further, the Commission will work towards establishing a Certificate of Maritime
Excellence to be endorsed on a voluntary basis with the aim
of supplying highly knowledgeable personnel to the shipping
industry.

Promotion of a European Network
of Maritime Clusters
The EU proposes to build on an existing system of maritime clusters to promote a European network of such clusters.
A maritime cluster is a region within which maritime industries
and related activities may be co-located.15

A European Marine Observation
and Data Network
A new European Maritime Observation and Data Network
(“Network”) will be proposed in 2009, on the basis of a road map
to be published in 2008. According to Commissioner Borg, in an
October 19, 2007 presentation to the Conference of Peripheral
Maritime Regions of Europe, the Network will serve as a “genuine driver for the integrated governance of maritime affairs.”16
The Network also will provide opportunities for high-technology commercial companies in the maritime sector and improve
the efficiency of marine observation and the management of
marine resources and marine research. It will be integrated with
the global initiative for a Group of Earth Observation System of
Systems, called GEOSS, and the European contribution called
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, or GMES. On
a related note, the Commission, in the second half of 2008, will
propose a program for the development of mutually compatible and multi-dimensional mapping of seas in Member States’
waters.

A Strategy to Mitigate the Effects of
Climate Change on Coastal Regions
In 2008, the Commission will propose a Community strategy for disaster prevention and the development of a Strategy for
Adaptation to Climate Change, with a focus on coastal regions.
In particular, the Commission is examining the potential of new
off-shore technologies such as carbon capture and geological
storage to meet the EU’s climate change objectives. By the end
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of this year, the Commission will propose a legal framework for
carbon capture and storage, including the removal of obstacles
to storage in sub-sea formations.17 The Commission recognizes
that seabed storage will also require an international legal framework and cooperation. The transport of CO2 to sub-sea sites also
should be included, according to the Commission, in new marine
spatial planning. Finally, “the technology used must ensure that
the environmental gain from carbon storage is [not] offset by
deterioration of the local marine environment.”18

Promoting Europe’s Leadership in
International Maritime Affairs
The Commission plans to take a higher profile in international maritime organizations and to encourage Member States
to ratify international maritime conventions. On the international
front, the Commission will produce, in 2008, a report on strategic issues for the EU relating to the Arctic Ocean. Further, the
Commission, before the end of 2009, will put forward a strategy
for the protection of high seas biodiversity through the designation of marine protected areas. Finally, the Commission will
celebrate a European Maritime Day and create a European Atlas
of the Seas.

A Comparison of the EU Maritime Policy to
U.S. Oceans Policy: Review of the Reports
of Two Ocean Commissions
A starting point for comparing the work of the EU with that
of the United States is to review the recommendations of two
recent ocean policy commissions in the United States, the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission.
Both Commissions called for major reforms and restructuring of
U.S. ocean law and policy.
In the first place, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,
established by the Oceans Act of 2000, consisted of Presidential appointees.19 The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy issued
its report, entitled An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, on
September 20, 2004.20 In recognition of the fact that it has been
thirty-five years since anyone had undertaken a comprehensive
review of U.S. ocean policy, the Ocean Blueprint called for significant changes in the management of U.S. oceans, coasts and
Great Lakes, and recommended the creation of an “effective
national ocean policy that ensures sustainable use and protection
of our oceans, coasts and Great Lakes for today and far into the
future.”21
The Ocean Blueprint called for the reform of the management structure for ocean policy decision-making in the United
States and strengthening of many ocean and coastal resource
management policies. In brief, the Ocean Blueprint called for:
• A new National Ocean Policy Framework, including the
establishment of a National Ocean Council within the Executive Office of the President;
• The establishment of regional ocean councils to coordinate
ocean policy across state lines;
• Coordinated governance of offshore waters;
• An organic act for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”);
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• Increased investment in science and exploration;
• The launch of an integrated ocean observing system;
• Reauthorization and strengthening of the Coastal Zone
Management Act to enable states to incorporate a watershed
focus;
• Guarding people and property against natural hazards;
• Conserving and restoring coastal habitat;
• Supporting marine commerce and transportation through
the development of an integrated national freight transportation strategy;
• Addressing coastal water pollution and limiting pollution
from vessels;
• Preventing the spread of invasive species;
• Achieving sustainable fisheries and setting a new course for
sustainable marine aquaculture;
• Managing offshore energy and other mineral resources;
and
• Establishing a dedicated Ocean Policy Trust Fund to carry
out the Commission’s recommendations.
A set of similar recommendations was adopted by the Pew
Oceans Commission, a privately-funded commission which
issued its report, entitled America’s Living Oceans: Charting a
Course for Sea Change, in 2003.22

Reaction of the U.S.
Administration and Congress to the Commission
Reports

The United States has
yet to ratify the UN
Convention on the Law
of the Sea.

The Bush Administration
reacted to the report of the U.S.
Ocean Commission by issuing
an Executive Order on December
17, 2004, establishing an interagency Committee on Ocean
Policy.23 The Committee would
be part of the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), and
be chaired by the Chairman of CEQ. In addition, representatives
of the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, Commerce, Labor, Transportation,
Energy, and Homeland Security, among others, would serve on
the Committee.24 The purpose of the Committee would be to
coordinate the activities of departments and agencies regarding
ocean-related matters in an integrated and effective manner to
advance the environmental, economic, and security interests of
present and future generations of Americans.25
At the same time, the Bush Administration submitted to
Congress its own Ocean Action Plan, responding to the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.26 The
Action Plan committed the Bush Administration to undertake
the following priority tasks: (1) establish a new Cabinet-level
Committee on Ocean Policy (completed, see above); (2) work
with Regional Fisheries Councils to promote greater use of market-based systems for fisheries management; (3) build a Global
Earth Observation Network, including a mechanism for integrated ocean observation; (4) develop an ocean research priorities plan and implementation strategy; (5) support accession to
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the UN Convention on Law of the Sea; (6) implement coral reef
local action strategies; (6) support a regional partnership in the
Gulf of Mexico; (7) seek passage of an organic act for NOAA
within the Department of Commerce; and (8) implement the
Administration’s National Freight Action Agenda.27
The U.S. Congress conducted hearings on the Commissions’ recommendations and has begun to implement some of
the key recommendations.28 How the Congress and Administration are doing in implementing these recommendations has
become the focus of a new Joint Ocean Commission Initiative.29
Admiral James D. Watkins and Mr. Leon Panetta, chairs of the
U.S. Commission and Pew Commission, respectively, co-chair
the Initiative. The Initiative has also issued a series of report
cards on how Congress and the Administration are doing.30 For
example, in its 2006 report card, the Initiative noted that “progress on ocean policy reform has been uneven, and the modest
progress that has been made is jeopardized by a lack of funding
to support the implementation of promising initiatives and plans
at all levels of government.”31
Most of the grades issued by the Joint Task Force were
below average. However, it widely credited the work of Congress and the Administration in passing the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006.32 This Act strengthened
the role of science in CEQ
decision-making and required
an end to over-fishing.33 It also
contained new tools to eliminate
IUU fishing.
It is beyond the scope of
this Article to examine the report
cards in greater detail except
as they relate to an overall comparison of U.S. and European
maritime policies, below.

The EU’s Call for an Integrated
Maritime Policy Compared to the Policy
Recommendations of the U.S. Ocean
Commission(s) and Implementation
In a remarkably similar manner and within somewhat similar time frames, the EU and the United States have undertaken
comprehensive reviews of their maritime policies and developed
very similar recommendations. Both the EU and the U.S. Ocean
Commissions call for increased attention to maritime and coastal
issues in recognition that they have in many instances been
neglected for years and there is a need for increased attention,
resources, and new governance mechanisms.
On first examination, it appears that the EU’s call for an
Integrated Maritime Policy is far ahead of the U.S. Ocean Commission’s call for an Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century
because the latter has not been implemented to any great degree
in legislation or funding mechanisms. However, the United
States in many respects is ahead of the EU in paying attention
to coastal regions and has the advantage of a well-established
system of federal environmental legislation to work with.
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The EU is a relatively new legal body and the European Commission’s call for integrated action requires the cooperation of
its Member States especially in the critical areas of marine spatial planning, the development of maritime clusters, and the creation of a unified coast guard.
In the area of marine spatial planning, the United States
already has two important laws that call for such planning, one in
coastal regions and one in offshore waters. The first is the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972,34 which calls for a nationwide
program of integrated state coastal management programs for
state-defined coastal regions with federal oversight, policy guidance and grants for their development and implementation.35 In
exchange for federal funds, states develop what would be the
equivalent of spatial plans for their coastal regions.36 Within
these regions, the states must develop systems of conflict resolution and ensure that development will be sustainable.37 The
states also have the authority to extend their policies to offshore
development through the use of the so-called federal consistency
process.38 If a state objects to an offshore development permit
by the federal government, the project can not proceed unless
the Secretary of Commerce overrides the state’s objection.39 To
date, thirty-four coastal states have developed approved coastal
management plans.40
The United States also has an extensive system of marine
spatial planning for special marine areas within the 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), established by title III of
the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act.41 To date,
the United States has established fourteen marine sanctuaries,
including the Hawaiian Humpback Whale Sanctuary, the Channel Islands (California) Marine Sanctuary, and the Farallon
Islands (California) Marine Sanctuary.42 This is a major piece of
federal legislation that establishes a plan for conflict resolution
and protection of unique resources, such as coral reefs, fisheries habitats, and whale calving areas, within extensive offshore
marine areas.43
Given the extensive legislative framework for marine spatial plans both within coastal zones and offshore marine areas
in the EEZ, it can be said that the United States is substantially
ahead of the EU in this particular area of promoting sustainable
coastal development.
In other areas, the United States is lagging seriously behind
the EU. For example, as of this writing, the United States has
yet to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea although
it was negotiated and approved by the UN some twenty-five
years ago. As the New York Times editorialized on October 31,
2007, the debate over the Law of the Sea Treaty pits the Bush
Administration, the environmental community, the military, the
oil, shipping, and fishing industries, and the top Democratic and
Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
against a “handful of cranky right-wingers.”44 The Senate held
an important hearing on the subject, and recently, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee voted out a resolution on accession. The full Senate expects to take up the question of ratification in 2008. It is possible that before the end of 2008 the United
States could become a party to this international agreement
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which the United States itself took the lead in negotiating.45
The United States is making progress in ending destructive
fishing practices as the EU has begun to do as well. As noted
above, in the last Congress, the United States enacted significant
amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act which called for an end to over-fishing, enhanced the role of science in fishery management, and
strengthened the controls on IUU fishing.46 The work of Congress in passing this law was lauded by the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, as well.
The EU Maritime Policy calls for increased cooperation
between the coast guards of Member States. The United States
already has a unified federal Coast Guard which provides security for all waters within the EEZ, as well as further offshore as
needed, to protect U.S. port state interests.47 Moreover, if the
U.S. Coast Guard promulgates regulations in an area of maritime safety, the federal regulations will preempt conflicting state
laws and regulations.48
With respect to sustainable shipping practices, the two proposals are close to a draw. For example, the United States is
helping the IMO to negotiate a new convention on ship recycling.49 The United States, however, has yet to ratify the Basel
Convention, and it is unclear weather the United States agrees
that ship scrapping is regulated under that Convention as a matter of law. A number of EU Member States are parties to the
Basel Convention, but the practice of many States is to continue
to send their old ships to third-world countries for disposal.50
The EU has called for the development of a new integrated
maritime surveillance system. The United States has taken significant steps to create and fund a new border surveillance initiative, called the Secure Border Initiative, or SBI-Net.51 The U.S.
Coast Guard has undertaken new programs to monitor the maritime borders of the United States, too, called Maritime Domain
Awareness.52 Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security contracted with a team led by Boeing to establish SBI-Net.
SBI-Net is a comprehensive plan by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security to gain operational control of the U.S. borders through the integration of increased staffing, international
enforcement, detection, technology, and infrastructure.53
The United States already has a unified marine transport
space that allows all transportation between the fifty states to
exist without any barriers. The EU is just beginning to create
a European Transport Space without barriers. A similar system
extends to transportation between the United States and Canada,
on the one hand, and United States and Mexico, on the other,
through the North American Free Trade Agreement.54
The United States, however, like the EU, is just beginning
to examine the question of establishing a new system of marine
highways to divert trucks off highways and alleviate congestion and air pollution. The U.S. Maritime Administration has
undertaken to support this initiative, called Short Sea Shipping.55
Authority for a new Short Sea Shipping Program, to transport
goods by waterways, was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives this year and included in a larger energy bill.56 However,
it remains to be seen if Congress will enact this bill this year.
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Both the EU and the U.S. Ocean Commission called for an
integrated program of maritime research. The Joint Commission
Task Force gave the Congress and White House a failing grade
of “F” in their last report card for failing to develop an integrated
budget for federal ocean and coastal programs and a near-failing
grade of “D+” for failing to address chronic under-funding of
ocean science and education.57 At the same time, the Task Force
credited the Administration with developing an Ocean Research
Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy.58 The EU has just
begun its work on an integrated marine research program so it is
too soon to evaluate the EU on this element of its work.
A final element of comparison is in the area of climate
change. The EU Maritime Policy calls for the development of
new sustainable strategies to protect coastal regions from the
effects of global climate change and also specifically calls for
the development of an innovative system of sub-sea disposal
of carbon. The Joint Commission Initiative gave the Bush
Administration and Congress the grade of “D+” last year for
failing to recognize the ocean’s role in climate change, but has
not endorsed sub-sea disposal of carbon as an option. While
most European nations are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol,
the United States is not. Therefore, the author concludes that
the United States is lagging behind the EU in the areas of

recognizing the serious effects of global climate change and calling for specific actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.59

Conclusion
The good news is that both the EU and the United States
have finally come to recognize the importance of the sea and
coasts to their future not only as economic zones of interest
but also as zones that contain significant resources that must be
protected, restored, and maintained if we are not to lose them
and our way of living in the twenty-first century. If only it were
a race to the finish to see who could protect these regions and
resources the most, the EU or the United States, the marine
regions of both continents and the populations living therein
would all benefit. For now, I call it a draw, and as an interested
bystander, I encourage both governments to do more to live up
to their promises and commitments to create improved maritime
policies and governance structures.
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Subsidies for Corn-Derived Ethanol
May Leave Us Thirsty
by Michael W. Lore*

A

new report from the National Research Council (“NRC”)
indicates that ethanol from corn production may have a
substantial negative impact on the U.S. water supply.1
The U.S. ethanol subsidy program, $0.51 per gallon, is designed
to help wean domestic dependence on foreign oil. However,
subsidies for corn-derived ethanol may accelerate a domestic
and global water crisis2 without establishing national energy
independence. Congress should eliminate inefficient subsidies
for corn-derived ethanol in the upcoming Energy Bill because
the over-production of corn for corn-derived ethanol will likely
accelerate the depletion of U.S. water quality and quantity.
According to NASA and the World Health Organization,
severe water shortages will affect
four billion people by 2050 and
southwestern states in the U.S.
will face severe freshwater
shortages by 2025.3 U.S. corn
production has several externalities that contribute to freshwater
scarcity and environmental degradation. For instance, it creates
more soil erosion and uses more
herbicides and insecticides than
any other U.S. crop.4 These
inputs become residues in well
water. 5 These pesticides are
arguably the cause of the Gulf of Mexico “dead zone,” an everincreasing seasonal phenomenon where nutrient runoff causes
oxygen depletion in an area the size of Massachusetts, causing harmful impacts on marine and coastal fish populations. 6
Moreover, ethanol itself is likely to leak into ground water and
cause harm to our drinking supply because ethanol will mainly
be stored underground and there have been over 400,000 reports
of leaks in the last few decades.7 The NRC has taken alarm to
statistics like these and undertook an extensive study to find
answers to potential water concerns related to corn-derived
ethanol. The NRC suggests alternative subsidies to reduce
impacts of biofuels production on water use and quality, policies
to encourage best agricultural practices and policies to encourage
biofuels produced from some cellulosic alternatives rather than
from corn.8
The perfect storm of high oil prices and record-breaking
U.S. corn yields has allowed the powerful corn lobby to dictate
many policies in the renewable energy debate. The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 established the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”)
that requires the use of 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels by

2012, with most of the renewable fuel originating from subsidized corn ethanol.9 President Bush suggested a thirty-five billion gallon domestic ethanol target during his 2007 State of the
Union Address.10 Last June, the Senate voted 65-27 to expand
the production of renewable fuels to thirty-six billion gallons by
2022, with fifteen billion to come from corn-derived ethanol.11
The U.S. House of Representatives is in the process of negotiating an Energy Bill but House and Senate Democratic leaders
intend to avoid the conference committee process and instead
plan to bounce versions of their bills back and forth.12 Therefore,
critical debate over the impact of corn-derived ethanol subsidies
on water supplies must occur immediately.
The ethanol debate is
complex and it is perpetually
evolving because new environmental externalities periodically
emerge and prices of energy and
food commodities perpetually
change. Congress has the duty
to include all future costs associated with ethanol in their energy
and environmental impact
analysis when developing federal policy related to subsidies
that promote corn ethanol production. Over-farming to produce ethanol from corn will significantly erode drinkable water
quantity and overused pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers will
eventually ruin the general quality of our water. Only a diligent
analysis of all environmental factors and wise policy choices in
the Energy Bill can supply the United States with its greatest
needs while reflecting the country’s highest values.

Critical debate over the
impact of corn-derived
ethanol subsidies on
water supplies must
occur immediately.
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Defending State’s Rights Under the
Coastal Zone Management Act—
State of California v. Norton
by Linda Krop*

T

Introduction

he 2002 decision in State of California v. Norton1 provides a unique insight into the history and evolution of
the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),2 a powerful and as yet underutilized federal environmental law. This
case also reveals the respective roles of the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches in coastal protection and governance.
As this Article will discuss, the debate centers on the respective
roles of the federal government and coastal states in addressing
coastal resources and activities. In State of California v. Norton,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the broad role of states in reviewing
activities that may affect their coastal zones, even though such
activities are under the direct
authority of the federal government.3

History and Background of the CZMA

The intent of the CZMA
was to ensure proper
“coordination and
cooperation” between the
federal government and
coastal states.

The CZMA came about
as the federal government and
coastal states were engaged in
a decades-long struggle over
offshore regulatory authority,
including matters regarding offshore oil and gas development.
Both the federal government and
the states sought exclusive control over offshore areas, in order
to regulate and protect these areas, but also to ensure ownership
of (and thus economic interest in) mineral and other resources.
Beginning in the 1930s, both Congress and California
attempted to assert jurisdiction over offshore energy resources.4
In 1945, President Truman concurred with Congress and
claimed federal authority over all offshore resources.5 In 1947,
the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of federal jurisdiction
over all offshore resources.6 Thus, all three branches of the federal government agreed that areas offshore were to be regulated
at a national level. However, coastal states continued to assert
tremendous pressure in favor of shared offshore jurisdiction and,
in 1952, Congress voted to move federal jurisdiction to three
miles offshore. President Truman vetoed the bill, but his opponent in the presidential race, Dwight Eisenhower, promised to
support the bill and the expanded role of coastal states. Eisenhower was elected President and supported new legislation
in 1953 that established state jurisdiction out to three nautical
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miles offshore. This law is known as the Submerged Lands Act.7
Federal oversight of oil and gas development activities beyond
three nautical miles from shore was ensured later that same year
when Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(“OCSLA”).8
Despite Congress’s attempt to resolve these disputes,
coastal states remained dissatisfied with the compromise and
the federal assertion of jurisdiction off their borders. Activities beyond three miles from shore could still have a substantial
effect on a state’s coastline, as so prominently demonstrated by
the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.9 This spill—“the spill heard
around the world”—occurred after a blowout at Platform A, a
Union Oil Company (“Union”)
drilling platform located in federal waters approximately six
miles from the California coast.
10
The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) had waived the
requirement for casing in the
wells drilled from the platform,11
even though casing helps to prevent oil and gas from escaping
the well.12 The USGS agreed to
allow Union to install casing to
a depth of 239 feet instead of
the federal and state standard of
880 feet.13 As a result of the lack
of casing throughout the depth
of the drilling wells, a blowout occurred and over three million
gallons of oil released into coastal waters, blackening over 35
miles of pristine beaches.14 This spill heightened the concerns
of not only Californians, but other coastal states as well, which
were vulnerable to the environmental consequences of decisions
made by the federal government.15

The Coastal Zone Management Act
The CZMA represented Congress’s next attempt to address
the ongoing concerns of coastal states. Although the CZMA did
not change the jurisdictional boundaries already set forth in the
Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA, it offered states an enhanced
role in federal planning and permitting decisions that affect their

* Linda Krop is the Chief Counsel at Environmental Defense Center, a non-profit
public interest environmental law firm headquartered in Santa Barbara, California.
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coasts.16 The intent of the CZMA was to ensure proper “coordination and cooperation” between the federal government and
coastal states.17 The key to ensuring this coordination and cooperation was the requirement for consistency review. Pursuant to
this provision, activities carried out or approved by the federal
government that affect a state’s coastal zone must comply with
the state’s coastal laws and policies.18
The CZMA provides a two-step process towards securing federal-state coordination and cooperation. First, states are
encouraged to prepare coastal management programs that will
manage, protect, and conserve coastal resources.19 The CZMA
sets forth several areas of national concern that must be addressed
in a state’s coastal program. These include, for example, protection of natural resources and water quality.20 The state’s program
must be approved by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”), a branch of the U.S. Department of
Commerce.21
Once NOAA certifies a state’s program, the CZMA requires
that activities carried out or approved by the federal government
must be consistent with the state’s approval program.22 There are
three types of activities subject to state consistency review: (1)
activities proposed by federal agencies; (2) private activities that
require federal approval; and (3)
offshore oil exploration, development, and production plans
that are submitted for federal
approval under OCSLA.23
Federal agency activities
include those activities proposed and carried out by the
federal government. The CZMA
requires that such activities
“shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of
approved State management programs.”24 Under this provision
of the CZMA, the federal agency makes a “consistency determination” and submits it to the state for review.25
Private applicants seeking a license or permit from a federal agency are also subject to the consistency requirement of
the CZMA.26 The Act provides that an application for a federal
license or permit must include “a certification that the proposed
activity complies with the enforceable policies of the state’s
approved program and that such activity will be conducted in
a manner consistent with the program.”27 The state then has the
ability to review the application for consistency with its coastal
management program. A state may concur with, or object to, the
consistency certification.28
Similarly, an application for approval of an offshore oil and
gas exploration or development and production plan must also
include a certification that the activity will be carried out in a
manner consistent with the state’s approved coastal management
program.29 As with private licenses and permits, the state may
concur with, or object to, a consistency certification.30
There are two key differences between consistency review

of federal agency activities (i.e., those activities carried out by a
federal agency) and private activities that must be approved by
federal agencies. First, unlike privately proposed actions, which
must be conducted in a manner consistent with a state’s coastal
program, a federal agency activity need only be “carried out in a
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable”
with a state’s program.31 The difference in language allows the
federal government some relief from the consistency requirement; private activities, by contrast, must be found strictly consistent with a state’s coastal program. Second, the CZMA provides
that federal agencies may proceed with a proposed activity even
if a state finds the activity to be inconsistent with its approved
coastal program, whereas a state’s objection to a private application precludes the federal government from issuing a license or
permit.32 These distinctions demonstrate that although Congress
was willing to encourage federal-state coordination and cooperation, it was not willing to give states veto authority over the
actions or proposals of federal agencies.33

Interpreting CZMA
Secretary of the Interior v. California: A Narrow
Reading of the CZMA
In 1981, the State of California and several environmental groups sought consistency
review of a federal oil and gas
lease sale located in the Santa
Maria Basin offshore Santa Barbara County (Lease Sale 53).34
The sale was proposed by the
U.S. Minerals Management
Service (“MMS”), the federal
agency responsible for administering oil and gas leasing and
development under OCSLA.35 California and the other plaintiffs
were concerned that the lease sale could result in an oil spill
that would threaten the southern sea otter.36 They asserted that
this threat was inconsistent with the State’s coastal management program. The MMS, however, refused to allow the State
to review the proposed lease sale for consistency review under
the CZMA.37
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the State of California, finding that the lease
sale would affect the State’s coastal zone and therefore required
consistency review by the State.38 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.39 The Court placed great reliance on the fact that
the CZMA required a “direct” effect on a state’s coastal zone
in order to trigger the consistency requirement.40 The Supreme
Court found that because the sale of an oil lease only allows
“very limited, ‘preliminary activities,’” and does not grant the
right to “full-scale exploration, development or production,”
it therefore could not result in a “direct” effect on the State’s
coastal zone.41 Instead, the Court pointed out that under OCSLA,
only the subsequent approval of a specific exploration plan
(“EP”) or development and production plan (“DPP”) could result

In 1947, the Supreme
Court confirmed the validity of federal jurisdiction
over all offshore resources.
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in a direct effect on a state’s coastal resources. Accordingly, the
Court noted that consistency review would be appropriate later,
when specific exploration, development or production plans are
submitted for federal approval.42
This decision reinvigorated the controversy over offshore
jurisdiction, and fractured the state-federal compromise that
had been crafted in 1972. The coastal states turned to Congress
again, and when the CZMA was reauthorized in 1990, Congress
responded to Secretary of the Interior v. California by amending the Act to delete the requirement for a “direct” effect and by
clarifying the legislature’s intent for coastal states to be able to
review any activities would affect their coastal zones, whether
directly or indirectly. Congress specifically stated its intent that
states should be allowed to review offshore oil and gas leases.43

State of California v. Norton: A Broad Application
of Consistency Review Under the CZMA
There have been no further lease sales offshore California
since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Secretary of the Interior v.
California. However, in 1999, 40 undeveloped leases located
off the coast of Central California were set to expire unless
“suspended” by MMS. Under OCSLA, an oil and gas lease is
initially granted for five to ten years. If production does not
commence within that time period, the oil lessee must request
a “suspension,” otherwise the lease will expire.44 None of the
leases in question had been produced; therefore they required
suspensions to remain in existence. Because these leases were
sold between 1968 and 1984, their initial sales escaped state
consistency review.45
The forty leases had been suspended previously for a variety
of reasons, including a directed suspension from 1992 to 1999,
during which time MMS conducted a study regarding the potential environmental and socioeconomic effects of development
of the leases on the adjacent coastal communities of Santa Barbara, Ventura and San Luis Obispo Counties.46 When the study
was completed in 1999, MMS notified the lessees that the leases
must be suspended or they would expire.
In response to MMS’s notice, California Governor Gray
Davis asked for a report from the California Coastal Commission
(“Coastal Commission”), the agency responsible for consistency
review under the CZMA, regarding the State’s ability to respond
to the proposed lease suspensions. The Coastal Commission
staff scheduled a public hearing on the matter. In its report, the
Commission staff explained that under Secretary of the Interior
v. California, the state would have to wait for submittal of new
proposed seismic surveys, EPs and DPPs before being allowed
to review the leases for consistency with the State’s coastal management plan.47
In anticipation of the Coastal Commission hearing, a coalition of environmental groups hired the Environmental Defense
Center (“EDC”) to evaluate the State’s role in responding to the
proposed lease suspensions.48 The EDC argued that the 1990
amendments to the CZMA should apply to the lease suspensions, and that the Coastal Commission should be allowed to
review the suspensions for consistency with the State’s coastal
management program.
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At the hearing in June 1999, the Coastal Commission agreed
with the EDC and voted to send a letter to MMS, demanding the
right to review the suspensions. The Commission noted a number of concerns with the leases, including the close proximity
of the leases to the Monterey Bay and Channel Islands National
Marine Sanctuaries, and changed environmental circumstances,
including the expanded range of the southern sea otter, as well as
more stringent air and water quality standards.49
MMS rejected the Coastal Commission’s request, and
instead suspended the leases on November 12, 1999.50 EDC urged
the Commission to challenge the suspensions in court, under the
CZMA. On November 18, 1999, the State of California, through
the Governor, Attorney General and Coastal Commission, filed
a lawsuit challenging not only the failure of MMS to allow the
State to review the lease suspensions under the CZMA, but also
the failure of MMS to conduct environmental review prior to
suspending the leases.51 The oil lessees intervened on behalf of
the federal government, and the three adjacent counties and ten
environmental groups intervened on behalf of the State.52
In their briefs, the state, environmentalists and counties
argued that the lease suspensions should be reviewed by the
state either under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA as a federal
agency action, or under section 1456(c)(3)(A) as private licenses
or permits requiring federal agency approval. The plaintiffs also
argued that section 1456(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA, which pertained
to EPs and DPPs, clearly did not apply to the lease suspensions.
MMS claimed that CZMA and National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) review would happen later, when the oil companies submitted EPs and DPPs. MMS even made the “post hoc”
argument that lease suspensions are categorically excluded from
NEPA review.
The district court rejected MMS’s arguments, ruling that
(1) MMS had failed to explain during the environmental review
process why lease suspensions are excluded from environmental
review, and (2) the 1990 CZMA amendments gave the State the
right to review the lease suspensions as a federal agency action
under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA.53 The decision placed
significant reliance on the 1990 amendments to the CZMA,
pointing out that the purpose of the 1990 amendments was to
“to overrule Secretary of the Interior.”54 Judge Wilken noted
that “Section 1456(c)(1)(A) was amended to delete the word
‘directly’ modifying ‘affects,’” and that “Congress indicated in
the legislative history that ‘the term “affects” is to be construed
broadly, including direct effects which are caused by the activity and occur at the same time and place, and indirect effects
which may be caused by the activity and are later in time or farther removed in distance but are still reasonably foreseeable.’”55
Finally, the decision cited Congress’ statement that the 1990
amendments were intended “‘to make clear’ that the sale of oil
and gas leases is subject to the CZMA;” and noted that all of the
parties agreed that the 1990 amendment of the CZMA stated oil
and gas lease sales constitute federal agency activities subject to
state consistency review.56 Therefore, the only question left was
whether lease suspensions were also subject to state review.
Judge Wilken answered this question in the affirmative,
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explaining that “MMS’s grant of the suspensions is a federal activity which it carries out in the exercise of its statutory
duties.”57 She concluded:
Therefore, because of Congress’s intent to require a federal agency to give the State consistency determinations
at the time of the sale of the leases, which did not occur
in this case, and because the MMS’s grant of these suspensions requires activities that affect the coastal zone,
the Court finds that the MMS must provide the State
with a determination that the lease suspensions are consistent with the State’s coastal management program,
pursuant to CZMA § 1456(c)(1).58
MMS and the oil companies appealed. In December 2002,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s ruling.59 In an unusually descriptive opinion, the court reviewed
the background of oil and gas development offshore California,
including a discussion of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. The
court recognized that “[s]ome would trace the current framework
of environmental protections in substantial measure directly to
the Santa Barbara spill.”60 Moreover, the court noted that “[o]f
particular relevance here, the federal Coastal Zone Management
Act and California’s Coastal Act
followed in the wake of the spill
and both provided California
substantial oversight authority
for offshore oil drilling in federally controlled areas.”61
The court followed with an
overview of the CZMA, OCSLA,
and NEPA. The Court reiterated that Congress amended the
CZMA in 1990 with the specific
intent of overturning Secretary
of the Interior v. California.62
The court then concluded that
the CZMA required full review
at the lease suspension stage.63
As the court noted, the lease suspensions “represent a significant
decision to extend the life of oil exploration and production off
of California’s coast, with all of the far reaching effect and perils
that go along with offshore oil production.”64 The court rejected
MMS’s argument that the State could wait until submittal of EPs
and DPPs, pointing out that “[a]lthough a lease suspension is
not identical to a lease sale, the very broad and long term effects
of these suspensions more closely resemble the effects of a sale
than they do the highly specific activities reviewed under section (c)(3).”65 Therefore, “section (c)(1) review is available now
for the broader effects implicated in suspending the leases. This
phasing of review fits closely the expressed intent of Congress
in subjecting the analogously broad implications of lease sales to
(c)(1) review and specific plans to (c)(3) review.”66

tal Assessments and “Findings of No Significant Impact” under
NEPA, again deferring review of future exploration and development activities until submittal of EPs and DPPs.67 In March
2005, EDC and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed a
lawsuit under NEPA on behalf of several environmental organizations.68 In April 2005, MMS submitted proposed “consistency determinations” to the Coastal Commission pursuant to
the CZMA. Although MMS claimed to address future activities
that may occur on the leases, when the Coastal Commission
requested more specific information and analysis of the effects
of such activities, MMS again stated its refusal to conduct such
an evaluation at this stage in the process.
The court hearing on the NEPA claim and the Coastal Commission hearing on the CZMA issue were scheduled one day
apart in August 2005. In each case, the environmental groups
argued that MMS should not be allowed to defer review of future
activities that may occur on the leases. EDC pointed out that
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider not just the “direct
effects” of an action, but also the “indirect effects, which are
caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in
distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”69 Similarly, the
legislative history of the 1990
CZMA amendments supported
the same standard for assuring
timely review of activities that
may affect the State’s coastal
resources. The environmental
groups noted that without the
suspensions, the leases would
expire. Therefore, they argued,
the State should be allowed
to consider the full range of
impacts that may flow from such
a decision.
On August 11, 2005, the
Coastal Commission agreed that
the scope of its review encompassed all future activities on the leases.70 Accordingly, the Commission unanimously objected to the consistency determinations
submitted by MMS. The next day Judge Wilken ruled from the
bench that MMS “violated NEPA by failing to prepare environmental analyses of future exploration and development activities sunder the leases.”71 The Judge found not only that future
development activities on the leases are reasonably foreseeable,
but that the very purpose of the lease suspensions is to allow
such activities. Accordingly, the Judge remanded the matter to
MMS, ruling that the agency must complete adequate NEPA
analyses of the lease suspensions. MMS appealed this decision
and the case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
These decisions reflect the shared opinions of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government that coastal
states should be granted the right to review any federal agency
activities that may have a direct or indirect effect on the State’s
coastal zone. This perspective—so integral to Congress’s amend-

States should be granted
the right to review any
federal agency activities
that may have a direct
or indirect effect on the
state’s coastal zone.

Aftermath of State of California v. Norton
As a result of these rulings, the leases were placed under a
“directed suspension,” meaning that all activities on the leases
were halted. In February 2005, MMS issued final Environmen57
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ments of the CZMA in 1990, and confirmed by the court’s decision in State of California v. Norton—was further endorsed by
the executive branch, under the Clinton Administration, when it
published final revisions to the CZMA regulations.72 Although
the purpose of the update was to allow a comprehensive review
of the CZMA regulations, a critical component of the new
regulations was focused on the need to comply with the 1990
amendments to the Act.
Thus, the three branches of government subscribed to the
broad right of coastal states to review activities that may affect
their coastal resources. Despite this unanimity, a change in the
executive branch muddied the waters in 2002. Under the Bush
Administration, the federal government proposed to revise the
CZMA regulations again, less than two years after the comprehensive revisions were made in December 2000. The new
regulations, which were finalized on January 5, 2006, appear to
undermine both the Congressional intent in 1990 as well as the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 2002.73 For example, the Federal Register notice announcing the new regulations characterizes OCS
lease suspensions as “interim or preliminary” and states that “in
all foreseeable instances, lease suspensions would not be subject to federal consistency review since (1) in general, they do
not authorize activities with coastal effects; and (2) if they did

contain activities with coastal effects, the activities and coastal
effects would be covered in a State’s review of a previous lease
sale, an EP or a DPP.”74 This language appears to conflict with
the 1990 CZMA amendments, which provide for early review,
similar to NEPA, so that even future, indirect effects shall be
considered in the context of a proposed federal activity.

Conclusion
As the courts have stated, the CZMA must be applied on a
case-by-case basis. There are no exclusions from state consistency review; if the facts of a particular case indicate that the proposed activity may result in a direct or indirect effect on a state’s
coastal zone, a consistency determination or certification must
be submitted to the state for review. Any limitations set forth in
the CZMA regulations must be implemented consistent with the
intent of the Act itself. Thus, if the current or any future administration attempts to rely on the 2006 regulations to limit state
review, the judicial branch may be brought into the fray again to
determine whether Congress’s intent is being undermined. In the
meantime, California and other coastal states should follow the
1990 amendments to the CZMA and the court’s interpretation of
such amendments, as set forth in State of California v. Norton.
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Category 3 Wake-Up Call:
Recognizing the Importance of Mississippi Delta Restoration
by Matt Irwin*

L

ouisiana is losing its coastal wetlands and barrier islands
at the fastest rate of any U.S. state: the Gulf of Mexico
has claimed an area roughly the size of Delaware since
the 1930s.1 The main cause of wetland loss is human activity,
specifically isolating the Mississippi River from the Mississippi
Deltaic Plain (“MDP”) by building levees to control natural
flooding and canals.2 Congress and the Louisiana legislature
have increased efforts to restore the MDP in the wake of the
destruction caused to the Gulf Coast by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.3
MDP restoration can have both indirect and direct positive
effects in dampening flooding caused by future storms. Indirectly, the main cause of sediment loss to the MDP and flooding
after Hurricane Katrina was the
15,000 km of canals dredged in
the MDP.4 The canals, built since
the 1950s, have “sliced the wetlands into a giant jigsaw puzzle,
increasing erosion and allowing lethal doses of salt water to
infiltrate brackish and freshwater marshes.”5 Computer models
suggest that these same canals,
mostly the Mississippi River
Gulf Outlet canal (“MRGO”),
helped channel the storm surge
from Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita into the sub-sea level parishes in the New Orleans area.6
Thus, it would seem that proposed efforts to reconstruct the
MDP wetlands by reconnecting the Mississippi River to the
MDP through backfilling canals and the MRGO would cut off
the very channels that brought flood waters into New Orleans
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.7
Restoration of the MDP can also have a more direct effect
on decreasing the volume of flood waters that threaten the Louisiana coast during hurricanes and other tropical storms. There
is no exact measurement of the amount of protection that wetlands provide against a hurricane’s storm surge.8 Data collected
after Hurricane Andrew demonstrates that a kilometer of coastal
wetland decreases storm surge by 5 cm.9 Computer models simulating a Category 3 hurricane hitting south-central Louisiana
estimate that the past 40 years of wetlands decline results in a
2.5 to 3 meter increase in the height of storm surge.10 Although
wetland restoration alone will not provide much protection from
Gulf Coast hurricanes,11 the buffer effect of wetlands combined

with restoration efforts that close sediment robbing canals might
provide an environmentally sustainable complement to levees
that can protect New Orleans and the surrounding parishes from
flood damage on the level seen after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.12
Perhaps the most important reason for Louisiana’s wetlands
restoration is the abundance of natural resources provided by
the MDP wetlands. Louisiana’s wetlands provide a third of the
nation’s oil and a quarter of its natural gas,13 and the MDP provides habitats for $3 billion worth of oysters, shrimp, and fish.14
This same area is also a priceless wildlife habitat.15 Congressional and state spending on wetlands restoration after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita also furthers other national priorities.
Congress first recognized
the need to restore the MDP in
1990 with the Coastal Wetlands,
Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act (“CWPPRA”). The
CWPPRA provided $50 million
per year to the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers to implement
projects to restore the MDP.16
In 1998 Congress recognized
that restoration efforts must be
increased and commissioned the
Coast 2050—Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana Plan and
the associated U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers Louisiana Coastal
Area Ecosystem Restoration Study (“LCA Study”).17 The LCA
Study stated that various restoration efforts to achieve ecosystem benefits would cost from $5 billion to $17 billion.18 The
Office of Management and Budget instructed the Army Corps of
Engineers to scale back this plan. However, the Army requested
only $1.12 billion from Congress in the Water Resources Development Act (“WRDA”) in 2005.19 The WRDA has recently been
the subject of the first override of a President G.W. Bush veto.
On November 6, 2007 Congress overrode President Bush’s veto
of the WRDA, appropriating $23 billion for over 900 water supply, flood control, navigation, and environmental restoration
projects. 20 The WRDA includes billions of dollars to restore the
Louisiana coast.21

Perhaps the most important reason for Louisiana’s
wetlands restoration is
the abundance of natural
resources provided by the
MDP wetland.
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State level efforts to prepare the Louisiana Gulf Coast after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will have a mixed effect on MDP
restoration. The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Project (“LCPRP”), directed by
both Congress and the state of
Louisiana, has thus far only dealt
with manmade hurricane protection barriers, such as levees and
floodgates, which could pose a
threat to the sustainability of the
MDP.22 At the same time, however, Louisiana has dedicated its
share of newly opened oil and
gas tracts provided by the federal Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act (“GMESA”) to coastal restoration and protection.23 It
therefore remains to be seen how the money appropriated under
the GMESA will coexist with the hurricane protection efforts
proposed under the LCPRP.

There are several factors that justify restoration of the MDP,
including storm protection, natural resource extraction, and natural habitat. Whatever motivation exists for MDP restoration,
the monetary cost will be one so
large that it will require a resolute federal government to provide funding. One can only hope
that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
brought enough awareness to the
issue of MDP restoration that
politics will subside to sound
scientific analysis and action.
The recent efforts by Congress
to override a presidential veto and pass the WRDA is only a first
step to a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to MDP
restoration and development.

Science, not politics, needs
to determine U.S. policy
toward wildlife.
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Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow:
Frameworks for Climate Change Adaptation
by Ira R. Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan*

T

Introduction

o date, the international community has dealt with climate change, the quintessential sustainability issue of
our time, principally by promoting the mitigation of
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The rationale for such mitigation
efforts, simply stated, is that if GHG concentrations are stabilized or reduced, ultimately the severity of climate change can be
alleviated. While there is no doubt that mitigation activities are
necessary to the long-term well-being and stability of the global
environment, the level of attention paid to mitigation-oriented
science, technology, methodology, and policy serves to obscure
the pressing need to seriously address the inevitable question of
adaptation to climate change.
The overwhelming focus on GHG mitigation overshadows
the adaptation half of the climate change equation. The reality
is that, even if the most optimistic mitigation plans are adopted
and all GHGs are stabilized immediately, residual GHG concentrations within the atmosphere will continue to create adverse
consequences well into the future. The challenge is not successfully “managing a transition from one equilibrium to another,”
as mitigation does, “but rather, adapting to a far more uncertain
climatic future.”1 At best, mitigation of anthropogenic sources
of GHGs can attempt to minimize long-term climate change
impacts, but cannot halt or avoid all impacts. Therefore, adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change is a reality, and in
some instances the need is immediate.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)
defines climate change adaptation as “an adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts.”2 Adaptive measures are needed because adverse consequences are
expected to occur globally on unprecedented levels. The IPCC
states with high confidence3 that many natural systems are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature
increases. Global data assessments show that it is likely4 that
anthropogenic warming impacts many physical and biological
systems, and other effects of regional climate change on natural
and human environments are emerging.5 The current knowledge
of climate change associated impacts has led the global community to the conclusion that “adaptation will be necessary to
address impacts from the warming which is already unavoidable
due to past emissions.”6
Because climate change is an immediate threat it is imperative to develop and implement strategies for climate change
adaptation. This Article explores the concepts behind climate
change adaptation, discusses accomplishments to date and
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addresses the next step of how to implement adaptation strategies in an effective and sustainable manner. This Article outlines
the international commitment to address climate change adaptation, introduces the concepts central to an adaptation framework,
and details recent domestic developments in adaptation policy
and planning.

Climate Change Adaptation in IPCC
and Kyoto Processes
UNFCCC/ Kyoto Processes
Although the Kyoto Protocol is largely directed towards
mitigation, adaptation is recognized as part of the Kyoto framework. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”)7 makes direct reference to adaptation
measures in a number of key Articles.8 In all, ten provisions discuss climate change adaptation, “with particular attention having
been given to issues relating to Article 4.89 and Article 4.910, and
to scientific and technical aspects under the relevant Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice agenda item on
adaptation.”11
The Kyoto process recognizes that adaptation is integral
through the Adaptation Fund. While this fund is not currently
operational, it “will fund concrete adaptation measures, to be
financed from a share of proceeds from the clean development
mechanism and other voluntary sources.”12 The Adaptation
Fund will support and promote measures such as vulnerability
and adaptation assessment, capacity building, technical training
and technology transfer, pilot programs, and strengthening and
developing early warning systems for extreme weather events.13
At the UNFCCC Third Conference of the Parties held in
Kyoto, Japan, it was requested that the Convention Secretariat
“continue its work on the synthesis and dissemination of information on environmentally sound technologies and know-how
conducive to mitigating, and adapting to, climate change.”14 In
response, the UNFCCC Secretariat in 1999 released a report
organizing the technical and theoretical knowledge on adaptation based on the sector model approach to vulnerability and
discussing the options and tools available to evaluate and imple* Ira R. Feldman is president and senior counsel of Greentrack Strategies, an
independent think tank and consultancy focusing on strategic environmental
management and sustainability policy issues. Mr. Feldman is past chair of the
ABA/SEER Sustainable Development, Ecosystems and Climate Change Committee
and is adjunct professor at Washington College of Law where he teaches environmental regulatory innovation. Joshua Kahan is an environmental consultant
and researcher with an expertise in ecosystem services. Mr. Kahan is a recent
graduate of the Masters in Environmental Studies program at the University of
Pennsylvania.
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ment adaptation schemes.15 In 2005, the UNFCCC released the
revised final draft report retaining the primary goal of conveying available adaptation tools and methods without the use of
a sector-based approach for data organization.16 The data was
reorganized in a more efficient manner without recommending
any specific tools or methods.

IPCC and Adaptation
The IPCC also is active in basic adaptation research and discussions. The IPCC published a series of reports that includes
discussions on adaptation.17 The most recent IPCC report, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability reemphasizes that climate change and adverse impacts are likely,
and discusses the urgency and need to enhance the consideration
of adaptive measures. The report notes that adaptation will be
necessary to address impacts resulting from warming unavoidable from banked GHG concentrations and that a portfolio of
adaptation and mitigation measures can diminish the risks associated with climate change.18 The IPCC details a wide array of
adaptation options (see Table 1), however, the IPCC noted that
more adaptation is necessary to reduce vulnerability of future
climate change.
Table 1
Potential adaptation responses and examples19
Utilizing known technologies
Behavioral modifications
		
Managerial modifications
Policy development

i.e. Sea defenses
i.e. Altered food and
recreational choices
i.e. Altered farm practices
i.e. Planning regulations

Basic Adaptation Concepts:
Vulnerability and Sustainability
Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability is a central concept for climate change adaptation policy and planning, and can be seen as the connecting
thread that links all the adaptation modalities. Climate change
vulnerability can be defined as “the degree to which a system is
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate
variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and adaptive capacity.”20 Vulnerability is multi-disciplinary in nature,
because social, economic, and environmental systems can all be
vulnerable to climate change.
Vulnerability is associated both with the state of a system
prior to a hazardous event, and the system’s ability to effectively
handle the hazardous event.21 Vulnerability analysis is defined
in terms of impact, with a focus on physical hazard, exposure,
and a system’s sensitivity to hazard.22 Climate change vulnerability is distinguished through hazard exposure, represented in
biophysical vulnerability, and coping with a hazard, represented
in social vulnerability.23 Climate change vulnerability occurs at
the intersection of social and biophysical vulnerability, where
one is a function of the other.
Although vulnerability is site-specific, there are certain charFall 2007

acteristics that can generally influence vulnerability, regardless
of geographical and socio-political contexts. Such characteristics are called “generic determinants of vulnerability” and are
primarily developmental focused, including: poverty, health status, economic inequality and elements of governance, technology, education, infrastructure, and dependence on agriculture.24
Generic determinants of vulnerability are associated with adaptive capacity, which refers to “the ability or capacity of a system
to modify or change its characteristics or behavior so as to cope
better with existing or anticipated external stresses.”25 Adaptive
capacity is a determining factor of vulnerability because, given
the generic determinants of vulnerability in addition to site-specific vulnerabilities, adaptive capacity is represented in terms of
a system’s ability and/or capacity to potentially adapt.
Generic determinants of vulnerability can be found globally in both developed and developing nations, however, due
to developing nations’ circumstances of transition, all developing nations possess some form of generic vulnerabilities.26 The
acknowledgment that developing nations are substantially more
vulnerable raises issues of equity and fairness on a number of
levels.27 While issues and questions continue to accumulate and
answers are slow to surface due to a recent sense of urgency,
interest, and concern, the relationship of vulnerability, adaptation, and developing nations generates considerable attention.
The global community has begun to recognize how vulnerability
and adaptation are closely linked, and vulnerability is becoming
the focus of research, analysis, and discussion for future adaptation considerations.

Aligning Adaptation and Sustainability
Due to the varying scope and scale at which adaptive measures will be required, effective policy implementation presents the challenge of “linking climate change policy to policy
normally seen as outside the scope of climate change, including livelihood enhancement, poverty alleviation, education, and
improved institutional arrangements.”28 Fortunately, integrating
the goals of sustainability and climate change adaptation presents an effective avenue of integrating diverse policy goals.
Adaptation and sustainability are complementary and “can yield
synergistic efficiencies and benefits that advance the goals of
both agendas . . . for a society that is made more climate resilient
through proactive adaptation to climate variations, extremes and
changes is one in which development achievements and prospects are less threatened by climate hazards and therefore more
sustainable.”29 For the integration to occur, adaptation must be
included and considered in the process of “policy formulation,
planning, program management, project design, and project
implementation.”30 Aligning adaptation with sustainability is a
policy option that could be used in both developed and developing nations to create win-win scenarios that foster sustainable
development and strengthen climate resilience.
Policy decision-makers at varying scales face the challenge
of pursuing and achieving multiple goals with limited resources
requiring tradeoffs to achieve priority goals. However, by integrating sustainable development and adaptation, a tradeoff does
not have to occur, for development will achieve its policy goals
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while reinforcing the adaptation infrastructure. More so, several
goals of sustainable development are complementary to adaptation, including: development that targets highly vulnerable
populations, diversifies economic activities, provides for livelihoods that are less climate sensitive, improves natural resource
management, directs development away from highly hazardous
locations towards less hazardous ones, and invests in expanding
knowledge and creating technology that is relevant to reducing
climate risks.31
The integrated process can foster a top-down and a bottomup strategy. A top-down strategy implies action taken at larger
scales, such as national and regional levels, to foster sustainable
development and adaptation at the smaller scales, such as the
community and local levels. For instance, national, regional, and
state governments can “create incentives, enforce regulations,
assist with capital financing and implement large projects that
go beyond the means of the local authorities to create a climate
proof society.”32 National, regional, and state level support would
create a number of beneficial outcomes, such as fostering development away from at-risk locations, constructing homes that can
withstand climate variabilities, provide insurance, encourage and
implement better land use, and
construct infrastructure to help
adapt to climate variability.33

Developments in
Adaptation

Climate Change Adaptation Initiatives at the
International Level
Adaptation in the
USCSP Program
Prior to the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the
United States announced the
formation of the U.S. Country
Studies Program (“USCSP”).
This program, no longer in existence, was coordinated with the
Global Environment Facility
(“GEF”), IPCC, the Subsidiary
Bodies to the FCCC, and other
international organizations,
to expand upon initial IPCC
reports published in the early 1990’s.40 The goal of the program
was to assist developing countries and economies in transition in
assessing their climate change sensitive sector vulnerability and
explore opportunities for adaptation.41 Participating nations were
required to develop and list adaptation needs and vulnerabilities,
take inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, formulate climate
change action plans, and assess technological capabilities. The
USCSP was intended to support the goals of the UNFCCC by
compiling general baseline data to initiate discussion and potential action within the international community.
The USCSP’s primary contribution was capacity building in developing countries to assess potential climate impacts.42
However, there is a need for caution in drawing sweeping conclusions about the vulnerability of developing and transition
countries to climate change.43 Consistent with first generation
projects, the USCSP studies tended to focus on identifying system sensitivities and adaptability was assessed mainly for coastal
resources.44 However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
without also thoroughly considering underlying socioeconomic
changes, integrated impacts, and adaptability in all sensitive
sectors.45

Vulnerability is
becoming the focus of
research, analysis, and
discussion for future
adaptation considerations.

Because GHG mitigation
has been the focal point of most
climate change research and
discussions, early adaptation
research was geared towards
informing mitigation policy.34
Such considerations are viewed
as first generation adaptation
assessments and attempted “to
understand how climate might change and what would be the
likely impacts based on models and climate scenario methods.”35
In contrast, second generation assessments examine the relationship of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and climate change
to identify where and what adaptive measures are needed, and
ultimately integrate such considerations into associated decision
making processes and policy goals.
The first generation assessments typically followed a seven
step approach: (1) define the problem; (2) select the method of
assessments most appropriate to the problems; (3) test methods/
conduct sensitivity analysis; (4) select and apply climate change
scenarios; (5) assess biophysical and socioeconomic impacts;
(6) assess autonomous adjustments; and (7) evaluate adaptation
strategies.36 This approach proved largely ineffective because it
analyzed climate change from a big picture perspective. However adaptation is site specific and each location has different
needs and situations. First generation assessments assume adaptation can be implemented with a broad stroke and paid little
attention to implementation challenges, including social, behavioral, or cultural obstacles.37 Moreover, stakeholders were typi63

cally not involved and a top-down approach was used. Since
adaptation needs are site specific, local knowledge and customs
are invaluable tools in developing effective and sustainable
adaptation projects.38 The shortfalls of first generation adaptation assessments prompted the global community to re-evaluate
the adaptation approach.
While the second generation adaptation assessments are
works in progress, certain parameters can already be discerned.
New assessment methods present a restructured approach that
is solely focused on adaptation, places vulnerability and adaptation in the center of the assessment, engages stakeholders in
the process, and attempts to strengthen country-level information and data to promote informed policy decisions. Such assessments attempt to determine the relationship of vulnerability
and climate change by posing certain research questions: “how
and why vulnerabilities differ for different populations within a
region, and how vulnerabilities may change over time as a result
of climate changes and other factors.”39

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

National Adaptation Programs of Action
The guidelines for National Adaptation Programs of Action
(“NAPA”) strategies were set forth by the UNFCCC at the seventh Conference of the Parties held in Marrakech, Morocco in
2001. The principal goal of the program is to assist the least
developed countries (“LDCs”) in identifying activities to
respond to urgent climate change adaptation needs and fund
them through the LDC Fund, in the order of priority while considering urgency and cost-effectiveness. The program is not a
structured framework of assessment or implementation. Instead,
the NAPA process creates a document that identifies priority
adaptation actions.46
For instance, Tuvalu, a small island nation confronting
rising sea levels, submitted a NAPA in May 2007 identifying
key adaptation areas. These areas include inter alia, coastal
zones, which are vulnerable to sea level rise and sea temperature change; soils, which are vulnerable to saltwater intrusion
and salinization; water resources, which are impacted by sea
level rise and salinization; agriculture, which is impacted by sea
level rise and intrusion; and public health.47 The report identifies seven priority projects, with desired outcomes and activities within each key adaptation area. One project will seek to
increase the resilience of coastal areas and settlement to climate
change through activities such as training local Kaupule people
and government personnel on constructing coastal defenses such
as channel breakers, planting a green belt, and increasing public awareness.48 Another project in Tuvalu would introduce a
salt-tolerant pulaka species, thus increasing the production of a
native locally-grown nutritious root that has been damaged by
salinity intrusion into local soil.49
Generally, the NAPA strategies prepared to date utilize a
bottom-up approach relying on grassroots, local knowledge to
lay the groundwork for site-specific adaptation priorities and
solutions.50 Such a process is fostered through community-level
support, recognizing that grassroots communities are the main
stakeholders. A majority of the data used and analyzed is extrapolated from established local social and environmental systems
to ultimately identify gaps in adaptive capacity. This approach
represents a change in methodology utilizing local knowledge,
moving away from a reliance on scenario based modeling51 to
assess future vulnerability and long term policy at the state level.
For instance, the Sudanese NAPA utilized stakeholder consultations to reveal a number of actions and decisions that should
be undertaken by relevant authorities, along with some policy
reform suggestions.52
The overall effectiveness of NAPAs has yet to be determined, however a new report discusses the lessons learned in
preparing NAPAs in Eastern and Southern Africa and concludes
that there is a need for increased funding sources.53 The same
study suggested that the momentum generated from the NAPA
process must be used to make the transition to implementing
substantive adaptation projects.54
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Assessments of Impacts and
Adaptations to Climate Change
The Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate
Change (“AIACC”) program was developed in collaboration with the IPCC as an assessment tool designed to build an
information base for developing countries adapting to climate
change. The program had three specific mandates: (1)advancing
scientific understanding of climate change impacts, adaptations
and vulnerabilities in developing country regions; (2) building
and enhancing scientific and technical capacity in developing
countries; and (3) generating and communicating information
useful for adaptation planning and action.55
The AIACC approach was largely research driven and produced numerous country and regional reports. AIACC took the
stakeholder engagement process a step further by encouraging
scientists, academics, and students within the host countries to
participate in, and continue, the research and conclusions generated by the country reports. In total, 235 developing country
scientists and more than 60 graduate and undergraduate students
participated in the studies.56

UNDPs Adaptation Policy Framework
The Adaptation Policy Framework (“APF”) is intended
to integrate climate change adaptation into developing countries policies. The United Nations Development Programme
(“UNDP”) and the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) developed the APF with support from the Swiss, Canadian, and Dutch
governments.
APF is a structured approach to creating strategies, policies,
and measures for climate change adaptation.57 The APF framework is considered a roadmap to assess, plan, and implement climate change adaptation supporting sustainable development.58
This framework is consistent with other second generation projects and assessments, in that APF places adaptation in the center
of the framework, strengthens local knowledge, and promotes
a local, bottom-up information gathering and use. Importantly,
APF focuses on practice rather than theory to more effectively
inform the policy making process. This framework makes use
of the vulnerability information that countries have to initiate
a shift in the way risk, vulnerability and climate change are
viewed. By utilizing synergies and intersecting themes, the APF
approach can ultimately lead to a more informed policy-making
process.59

Linking Climate Adaptation Project
The Linking Climate Adaptation (“LCA”) project was
intended to “ensure that poor people benefit from adaptation
processes, rather than bearing burdens by, for example, having
the risks caused by climate change shift in their direction.”60
The research focused on policy and institutional frameworks
that could help support community-led adaptation, in addition
to laying out the long-term research agenda and questions for
community-led adaptation. The research drew upon a variety of
sources including the Fourth Assessment of the IPCC and the
UNFCCC Conference of Parties meetings and ‘side events,’
in addition to the views of the stakeholders from various sec64

tors. Thus far, the project has resulted in “the establishment of
the LCA Network which aims to link geographically dispersed
communities undertaking adaptation at the local level with each
other as well as with those engaged in formal scientific and policy responses to climate change.”61
The project has generated useful research questions, including: (1) Who is vulnerable and how do sources of vulnerability
change over time in response to multiple stressors? (2) What
are the costs and benefits of adaptation to climate change? (3)
How can climate change adaptation be integrated into development/disaster risk reduction at multiple levels of governance?62
Nonetheless, the LCA laments the lack of a “coherent body
of policy-relevant knowledge about the changing dimensions
and sources of vulnerability and the effectiveness of systemic
approaches to vulnerability reduction.63

United Kingdom Climate Impacts Programme
The United Kingdom Climate Impacts Program (“UKCIP”)
was established in 1997 and published the report titled Climate
adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making64 in conjunction with the UK Climate Impacts Program, Department
for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, and the Environment
Agency. The report focuses on
guiding, managing, and improving the decision-makers ability to
judge associated climate change
risks, when compared to other
risks, to make informed adaptive
choices. However, the UKCIP
differs from previously discussed
assessment tools in that it is not
solely intended for developing
countries. It is a framework that
can be utilized by any governing
body facing a myriad of choices and uncertainty, regardless of
scale or focus.

Washington. Only a handful of states have developed plans,
commissions, and/or reports to specifically address adaptation
considerations, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington.67

U.S. Local Initiatives
At the U.S. local level, climate change adaptation activities
have received a boost from recent initiatives by International
Council on Local Environmental Initiatives -Local Governments
for Sustainability (“ICLEI”). In 2005, ICLEI initiated the adaptation-focused Climate Resilient Communities Program, with
funding from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), to assist local governments throughout the
United States in identifying and assessing vulnerabilities, while
improving their resiliency to associated climate change impacts.
Early partners in this program included localities as diverse as
Keene, New Hampshire; Fort Collins, Colorado; Anchorage,
Alaska; and Miami-Dade County, Florida.
In 2007, ICLEI in conjunction with King County, Washington, published Preparing for Climate Change: A Guidebook for
Local, Regional, and State Governments, a guidebook offering
a detailed description of the methods and concepts needed to
assist localities in implementing, updating, and evaluating
climate change preparedness
measures. 68 The guidebook
offers a useful five-part checklist for governments to better
prepare for climate change. The
checklist is divided into milestones involving: (1) conducting a climate resiliency study
and securing political and institutional support to prepare for
climate change and building a climate preparedness team; (2)
identifying and prioritizing planning areas for action through
conducting and interpreting a climate resiliency study, climate
change vulnerability assessment, and climate change risk assessment; (3) setting preparedness goals and plan, establishing a
vision and guiding principles for a climate resilient community,
and developing, selecting and prioritizing preparedness actions;
(4) implementing the preparedness plan, and ensuring the right
implementation tools; and (5) measuring progress and updating
the plan.69
Regional adaptation activities—with concomitant transboundary legal, regulatory, and economic implications—will
likely grow in importance since ecosystems rather than political boundaries will define the scope of such initiatives. Early
evidence of this regional orientation is emerging. For instance, a
conference entitled Climate Change in the Great Lakes Region:
Decision Making Under Uncertainty was convened by Michigan State University in March 2007 to explore the relationship
of climate change, the Great Lakes region, decision making
under uncertainty, and adaptation. The conference recognized
that dealing with climate change presents complex challenges
and instills a sense of uncertainty when dealing with the vari-

Historically, policy choices
tended to lean towards
reactive adaptation to
climatic events.

Climate Change Adaptation Action
in the United States
Adaptation at the State Level
Until recently GHG mitigation has dominated climate
change discussions and planning considerations at the state level
in the United States mirroring national and international developments. However, several U.S. state governments are expressing an awareness of adaptation and are in the early phases of
identifying vulnerabilities. Specifically, states are creating adaptation commissions or committees with the intent to complement
mitigation efforts and integrating adaptation into state climate
action plans, which largely address the reducing and eliminating
GHG emissions.65 Presently, thirty five states have or are in the
process of creating climate action plans and fourteen additional
plans are anticipated in late-2007 or 2008.66 Of those thirty five
states, a number incorporate adaptation considerations into the
scope of their climate action plan including Alaska, Arkansas,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and
65
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ous effects of climate change on vital elements of ecosystems,
infrastructure and economy in the Great Lakes region. In
response, Michigan State’s Environmental Science and Policy
Program and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) will initiate “a process that will help identify the kinds of research that
needs to be done and the best ways to provide the results so they
are as useful as possible to decision makers.”70

U.S. Federal Government Adaptation Action
While the states have led the way in climate change adaptation considerations, adaptation has begun to appear on the U.S.
federal government’s radar in a substantive manner. Federallevel discussions and considerations are preliminary, however,
collectively they do represent a much needed first step in implementing adaptation on the national scale. For instance, in May
2007, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior,
Environment, and Related Agencies approved increasing EPA’s
fiscal year budget to $8.1 billion for a temporary commission
on adaptation and mitigation to review scientific questions on
how to best adapt to a “warming planet” and identify the scientific investment needed to address this reality.71 The commission would include officials from EPA, NOAA, the NSF, the
Department of Energy, and the
Forest Service, and would be
responsible for the allocation of
funds to governmental agencies
to conduct adaptation research.
Depending on the temporary
commission’s findings, the EPA
would allocate $45 million to
itself and other agencies over
the next two years.72
The commission has yet to
be officially created however
the bill’s framework has two potential far reaching implications:
(1) “the call for significant funding on adaptation could represent a new direction for EPA and other agencies to address
the impacts of climate change, by going beyond the science of
global warming or studies on policies to control [GHGs];”73
and (2) The commission’s ability to “direct specific amounts of
money toward a problem, rather than only making general recommendations” enables research “to begin immediately without
having to wait for another appropriations cycle.”74
While the formation of the commission and its potential
implications on adaptation research is promising, more consistent and widespread action is required. A 2007 Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) report confirms this: the report
concludes that
federal agencies that manage the nation’s parks, forests,
oceans, and monuments are unprepared to deal with
climate change. . . resource managers within the Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce departments have limited guidance about whether or how to address climate
change-without such guidance, their ability to address
climate change and effectively manage resources is
constrained.75

The report elaborates on the evidence that climate change
impacts “600 million acres of public lands and 150,000 square
miles of waters managed by federal agencies—ranging from
melting glaciers in Glacier National Park to rising sea levels in
the Florida Keys.”76
The GAO report as issued includes responses from several
federal departments as appendices; the Agriculture, Interior, and
Commerce departments submitted comments on the GAO conclusions and recommendations. The federal agencies “generally
agreed with the [GAO] recommendations,” noted the importance
of climate change consideration and additionally highlighted
climate change programs, initiatives, plans, and/or policies that
the GAO report omitted.77 The comments from all three agencies indirectly reaffirm the GAO conclusions: although climate
change considerations may be an identified priority, there is an
overall lack of consistent site-specific implementation guidance.
For instance, the Department of Agriculture agrees that
the adaptation plan for Chugach National Forest, discussed in
the GAO report, does not specifically address the effects of
climate change on programs and resources, but noted that the
GAO report did not accurately
represent the activities that are
being pursued. The department
notes that the “examination of
one national forest. . . is inadequate as a proxy for an agency
that manages diverse ecosystem
across 193 million acres for
multiple objectives. . . where
a broader evaluation would
have revealed [twelve] National
Forest Plans specifically consider
the effects of climate change on existing programs and local
resource values.”78 However, the comments do not address if,
or the extent to which, the National Forest Plans discuss sitespecific adaptation concerns.
The Department of Interior recently initiated a task force to
take “affirmative steps to assess the effects on our public lands
arising from climate change and develop a process for anticipating and addressing these effects.”79 However, as noted in
the comments, the department is currently exploring how new
science can be focused to provide targeted information that its
resource managers need.
The Department of Commerce noted their involvement
in the effort to “expand both observation systems and modeling capabilities” within ocean and coastal monitoring systems,
integrated drought systems, and regional ecosystem planning. In
addition, the department is expecting to release a Preliminary
Review of Adaptation Options for Climate Sensitive Ecosystems
and Resources by the end of 2007.80

Early adaptation
research was geared
towards informing
mitigation policy.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
In 2004 the EPA, in collaboration with other federal agencies,81 initiated a process for the Preliminary Review of Adapta66

tion Options for Climate-Sensitive Ecosystems and Resources to
“review management options for adapting to climate variability
and change in the United States, and to identify characteristics
of ecosystems and adaptation responses that promote successful implementation and meet resource managers’ needs.”82
The report is being completed in response to SAP 4.483 of The
Strategic Plan of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program
(“CCSP”), which calls for the completion of “21 synthesis and
assessment products to support policy making and adaptation
decisions across the range of issues addressed by the CCSP,” to
ultimately provide NGOs, individuals, federal, state, and local
governments and agencies with adaptation options and information.84 The assessment will focus primarily on climate sensitive
ecosystem and resources located within federally protected and
managed areas, including: national parks, national wildlife refuges, wild and scenic rivers, marine protected areas, national
forest systems, and the national estuary program.
Consistent with the second generation assessments being
conducted globally, the EPA project is implementing a process
that is open to the public and engages stakeholders to provide
valuable information about local systems. With diverse, multidisciplinary participation, the
assessment is posing the following questions: (1) What are the
management goals in the selected
systems, upon what ecosystem
characteristics do these goals
depend, what are the stressors of
concern, what are the management methods currently being
used to address those stresses,
and how could climate variability and change affect attainment
of management goals? (2) For selected case studies, what is the
current state of knowledge about management options that could
be used to adapt to the potential impacts of climate variability
and change? (3) Looking across the case studies, what are the
factors that affect the successful implementation of management
actions to address impacts from climate variability and change?
(4) For each case study, how should we define and measure
the environmental outcomes of management actions and their
effect on the resilience of ecosystems to climate variability and
change?85 The report is expected in December 2007, and has
the potential to lay the groundwork for future action by federal
agencies, and will perhaps address concerns raised by the 2007
GAO report.
In March 2007, the EPA launched “an effort to assess and
respond to the effects of global warming on water resources
and regulators’ ability to meet requirements of numerous water
related laws,” while specifically focusing on “development
strategies to adapt to climate change, rather than on plans for
limiting resources.”86 This new effort will be primarily adaptation—focused within the context of water resources and the
ability to meet Clean Water Act Requirements “in a changing
environment.” Implementation will be fostered through a Cli-

mate Change Workgroup and plan, expected to be released by
the end of 2007.87 The plan will emphasize that “despite uncertainty on the scope and timing of climate change effects, EPA’s
water program and its partners should take prudent steps now
to assess emerging information, evaluate potential impacts of
climate change on water programs, and to identify appropriate
response actions.”88

Next Steps: Implementing Adaptation
Thus far, climate change adaptation efforts have been primarily focused on gathering and synthesizing data to lay the
groundwork for further studies and future implementation. Most
initiatives are serving in a catalyst capacity—they are attempting
to stimulate research, collaboration, discussion, and awareness.
While excellent work has been done to identify vulnerabilities
along with research and adaptive capacity gaps, little action has
been taken based on the results of the reports. It is now imperative
to move to the next step of the transition, an operational phase to
implement adaptation considerations as a policy response.

A Balance of Reactive and Proactive Adaptation
The various vulnerability assessments conducted are
intended to locate vulnerabilities to implement action. Such
actions represent sound political will and good intentions.
However, transitioning from the
research and information gathering phase to the implementation
phase presents complex political
and economic dilemmas that are
familiar to climate change discussions. Particularly, the idea
of allocating present resources
to long term contextual conditions to anticipate and prevent
potential future impacts versus waiting for impacts to occur and
reacting to the situation.
Conceptually, the difference between the two policy
responses is represented in reactive and proactive adaptation.
Reactive adaptation is the “ability to react to and deal with climate change” after an event and impacts have occurred, and is
represented in the act of coping.89 Proactive adaptation is represented in the act of anticipation, taking action to prevent and/
or reduce future impacts. Choosing between the two in terms
of policy responses presents complex challenges; however, we
believe that elements of both proactive and reactive adaptation
responses are necessary to effectively address adaptation to climate change.
Historically, policy choices tended to lean towards reactive
adaptation to climatic events, for in practice, “policy decisions
are often easier to implement once a crisis has occurred than
in anticipation of a crisis.”90 Reactive adaptation uses present
resources to cope with events at the time they occur, however,
such “coping may not be sufficient to fully restore the status
quo because of irreversibilities.”91 For instance, “losses that are
technically impossible to restore (such as sceneries, irrevers-
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ible biodiversity losses or disappearance of unique cultural artifacts) or economically too costly to restore…can be referred to
as ‘remaining ultimate damages.’”92 In addition, it is noted that
reactive responses, when used without proactive measures, tend
to have higher long term costs because the low costs of preventive action, or anticipative adaptation, are likely to dominate the
higher costs of deferred action, or reactive adaptation, appropriately discounted.93
Although it is known that climate change impacts will happen and studies have estimated and located vulnerabilities, the
details of future scenarios, in terms of timing, scale, and severity, cannot be known with certainty. The “degree of uncertainty” argument has typically been used as a barrier to proactive
adaptation, emphasizing the need to delay action until more
certain data can be developed. However, even without precise
knowledge of future events, proactive policy planning for climate change adaptation improves the overall preparedness by
integrating adaptation considerations into the decision making
process. More so, “experience suggests that, typically, proactive
adaptation requires a greater initial investment but is more effective at reducing future risk and cost.”94
Proactive and reactive adaptation should be viewed as complements and not conflicting
options. For example, “rapid
response teams need to be constituted, trained, and set up in
advance (proactive adaptation)
so that they can be deployed
when an extreme weather event
occurs (reactive adaptation).”95
In other contexts, proactive
adaptation can occur through
the construction of dikes and
levees, irrigation systems, the building of more resilient homes
in ‘at risk’ locations, and the construction of buffer zones, with
reactive adaptation dealing with the remaining variabilities that
proactive action did not effectively manage.
The key here is that proactive and reactive actions will not
eliminate all associated impacts, but rather an optimal mix will
attempt to minimize impacts wherever possible. It is necessary
to implement the most educated proactive action, and to react
and adapt to the variabilities. Decision makers must realize
that adaptation to climate change is a manifestation of systems
thinking and a process of active learning; we need to appreciate
both proactive and reactive responses as we learn the new rules
of game.

able populations is unprecedented, and traditional methods of
adaptation lack the necessary scale and capacity. In many developed countries, stakeholder participation is a common practice
where the lines of communication are open for local communities to voice their opinions across governmental scales, and be
somewhat included in the decision process. On the other hand,
many developing countries lack the political infrastructure to
implement such a process; in the absence of developed political regimes, many second generation projects and programs are
providing the means for local communities to be included in the
adaptation and development process by sharing their knowledge
and revealing their developmental and adaptation gaps.
Adaptation to climate change is not only a concern for
developing countries. Developed economies and societies are
hardly immune to the anticipated impacts of climate change.
While adaptation to climate change in developed countries will
be facilitated because some of the infrastructure and basic tools
are in place to deal with climate variabilities and associated
hazards, there will clearly be a need to expand and build upon
the preexisting management tools to deal with new hazards on
varying scales. Such expanded considerations include: (1) with
the threat of new disease and health risks, greater investment in
health care systems; (2) enhancement of hazard forecasting systems; (3) creation of networks to
facilitate participation of local
organizations in the development
of plans to identify and manage
the impacts of climate change
on communities; (4) worse case
contingency planning by businesses and municipalities; and
(5) improving communications
between communities and government regarding the impacts of
climate change on livelihoods.96 Pervasive adjustments in policy
and regulation, as well as the emergence of new processes and
institutions for governance, should be anticipated as we adapt to
climate change.

Another project in Tuvalu
would introduce a salttolerant pulaka species.

Utilize and Expand Existing Methods
Adaptation considerations do not need to be developed from
scratch. A large body of management procedures, processes, and
applications exist in many different capacities and scales, both
in developed and developing nations. It is necessary to evaluate how populations currently manage climate risks and hazards,
and build and expand upon existing measures where possible.
The need for action is especially acute in developing nations,
since the scale at which climate change will impact the vulnerFall 2007

Conclusion
It is clearly necessary to continue to pursue GHG mitigation strategies as aggressively as possible, but we must begin to
implement adaptation strategies as a complement to mitigation
efforts. Fortunately a dialogue on an adaptation and mitigation
mix or “portfolio” has begun. For example, the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report-Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability suggests “a portfolio of adaptation and migration can diminish the risks associated with climate change.”97
The report recommends that a portfolio of strategies should
include mitigation, adaptation, technological development, and
research. This portfolio could combine policies with incentive-based approaches, and actions at multiple scales, from the
individual to national governments and international organizations.98
Researchers and scholars are beginning to explore, given
the limited resources in terms of funding, time, and manpower,
68

the contents of an adaptation portfolio “that is justifiable from
a social, environmental, and economic perspective.”99 But this
is no longer an academic question. More enlightened business
leaders already understand that the climate change equation
includes both mitigation and adaptation components. As James
E. Rogers, Duke Energy’s CEO and Chairman, stated in August

2007, “mitigation of climate change is not going to happen fast
enough. That is the reality. We need to think in a broad sense
about both adaptation [to climate change] and mitigation [of
it].”100 Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and ought
to be inextricably linked as we plan for a carbon-constrained
future.

Table 2
States pursuing separate adaptation plans
Alaska

The Climate Impact Assessment Commission is responsible for developing adaptation considerations. The commission is a legislative body that is “tackling adaptation issues, specifically
associated with the protection or relocation of villages in the state at risk from coastal erosion
and wave surges or flooding.”101 The commission is currently analyzing the relationship of climate change and adaptation to a variety of multi-disciplinary issues, including communities,
infrastructure, fish, wildlife, forests, agriculture, disease, pests, and financing. A rural relocation
report is expected to be completed by the end of 2007.

Arizona

Arizona developed a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, which recommends that the Governor
“appoint a task force or advisory group to develop recommendations for the state climate change
adaptation strategy. Moreover, the Governor should direct state agencies and other appropriate
institutions to identify and characterize potential current and future risks in Arizona to human,
natural, and economic systems, including potential risks to water resources, temperature sensitive populations and systems, energy systems, transportation systems, vital infrastructure and
public facilities, and natural lands (e.g., forests, rangelands, and farmland).”102

California

The California Energy Commission published a statewide assessment of climate change impacts
and adaptation measures in the 2005 report Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in California. In addition, the California Climate Change Center has been conducting ongoing impact
and adaptation studies within three main areas: (1) agriculture and forestry- including identification and analysis of vulnerable species; (2) Water resources- with particular attention
placed upon stressors such as growing population and development; and (3) Public healthwith the acknowledgment that increased frequency of extreme weather events will impact
human health.103

Maryland

The Maryland Commission on Climate Change formed the Adaptation and Response Working
Group, which will recommend strategies for reducing Maryland’s climate change vulnerability,
with attention paid to public health and the most vulnerable population segments.104 An updated
plan of action, preliminary recommendations, implementation time tables, and draft legislation
is expected in November 2007.

Washington

The Washington State Department of Ecology formed the Preparation/Adaptation Working
Groups with a primary task to make recommendations to the Governor on how Washington can
prepare and adapt to climate change impacts with respect to five sectors: Agriculture, Forestry
Resources, Human Health, Water Resources & Quality, and Coastal Infrastructure. Additionally, the working groups will identify vulnerabilities, recommend adaptive strategies, and note
areas requiring additional research.105

Oregon

The Climate Change Integration Group will prepare a preliminary report on adaptation to the
impacts of climate change with initial recommendations to the Governor by the end of the year
2007.106
Endnotes: Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow
continued on page 87
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Solar Power in the Southwest:
From Chile Ristras to Solar Roofs
by Matthew Padilla*

F

or hundreds of years the people of the southwestern
United States have hung chile ristras, bunches of red
chile, from their homes and used the power of the sun to
dry the chiles for cooking during the winter months. While the
traditions of the past still hold sway, solar panels have found
their way to the homes of native southwesterners. State governments are encouraging harnessing the sun a method of energy
production in New Mexico, Arizona, and California.1
The southwestern United States may not be nutrient or water
rich, but it does have latent solar resources that have only begun
to be exploited.2 Satellite measurements have confirmed that the
solar energy available for exploitation in the U.S. southwest is
second to none in the world.3 As the threats of energy security4
and global warming5 have become more prescient, the appeal
of solar energy has increased. The federal, state, and local governments are reacting by promoting solar technologies through
incentives and partnerships for both individuals and corporations.6
At the federal level, however, the amount of incentives
available to individuals and corporations that use solar energy
has been relatively small. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established a tax incentive of up to two thousand dollars for individual residents who install a solar electric system or water heating
system.7 The goal of this program is to encourage consumers to
install their own solar systems, but it is set to expire in 2008.8
New Mexico, Arizona, and California have passed legislation to supplement the two thousand dollar federal tax incentive
and have added their own incentives and programs in addition to
the federal tax incentive. State programs vary from greater tax
incentives for individual homeowners in New Mexico to the creation of a multi-million dollar state-wide solar home program in
California to tax breaks to businesses for installation and development of solar infrastructure in Arizona.9
In New Mexico, Governor Bill Richardson declared that the
state “must move our economy from limited oil resources to the
unlimited resources of wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar.”10
In response, the New Mexico legislature recently passed legislation which added $9,000 dollars of potential tax credits for
individual residents in addition to the federal credit.11 Arizona
enacted a thousand dollar tax credit,12 while in California incentives are given on a performance based formula which rewards
high output renewable energy systems.13
New Mexico and California have also been strong proponents of making access to solar power a right for homeowners.
California made access to latent solar energy a right for homeowners in the Solar Rights Act of 1978. It was originally written
Fall 2007

to bar homeowners associations from enacting rules that would
prevent owners from installing solar power units. It was subsequently amended in 2003 and 2004 to prevent public entities
from doing the same.14 The New Mexico Solar Rights Act of
1978 was also amended in 2007 to clarify the definitions of solar
collectors and to prohibit homeowners associations and public
entities from restricting use of solar collectors, with the exception of historical districts.15
Governor Richardson of New Mexico and Governor
Schwarzenegger of California both pledged to increase clean
energy by 30,000 megawatts, and to increase energy efficiency
in their states by twenty percent.16 Governor Schwarzenegger
has also made it a stated goal to have a “million solar roofs” in
the state of California and has matched this rhetoric by spearheading the creation of a $400 million dollar program within
the California Energy Commission called the New Solar Homes
Partnership.17 The New Solar Homes Partnership systemizes and
creates a process for how energy efficiency is measured, breaking
available efficiency levels into two different tiers and rewarding
those who create the most energy efficient buildings.18
While Arizona has arguably not promoted residential solar
energy to the extent of New Mexico and California, it has created a roadmap towards promoting growth in the private sector
specifically in regards to solar energy plants.19 One of the four
largest “central station solar power” companies, Stirling Energy
has been a benefactor of Arizona’s roadmap.20 Stirling seeks to
create large solar plants in the desert southwest and is an example of cross state growth in the solar industry. For example, New
Mexico’s Sandia National Labs recently teamed with Stirling to
create and expand new solar technologies.21
Despite solar power’s current marginal status as a source of
energy, the future of it is bright if the political leadership at the
state level continue to promote it. Although the federal government lags behind the promotion of solar energy in comparison to
the southwestern states, the arrival of new solar technology and
the growing individual interest in its use creates hope that solar
energy can be capitalized to fruition in the solar rich southwest.
It may, one day, become common to see both chile ristras and
solar panels adorning the homes of southwesterners and if companies are able to create large solar plants in this region, they
may soon join the large chile fields in harvesting the power of
the sun.
Endnotes: Solar Power in the Southwest continued on page 89
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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The U.S. Federal Green Building Policy
by Eunjung Park*

O

n January 24th, 2007, President George W. Bush signed
Executive Order 13,423, “Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management.”1
The Executive Order requires federal agencies to meet the standards of green buildings, and “lead by example” in promoting
green buildings in the United States.2 The U.S. federal government, however, seems to have been “led by examples” of the
states, industry, and the consumers.
In 2005, the State of Washington became the first state to
adopt legislation requiring all state-funded buildings over 5,000
square feet to obtain the silver standard required by the Leadership Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) Green Building Rating System. LEED is the nationally accepted certificate
for the design, construction, and operation of high performance
green buildings. Many other states and cities have adopted similar legislation to require or encourage state-funded buildings to
meet green building standards.3
In 2006, Washington D.C.
became the first major U.S. city
to require LEED compliance
for private projects with D.C.’s
Green Building Act of 2006.4
Despite LEED’s growth,
the standard is not without its
limitations. One current limitation is the LEED program’s
inability to address whether the
building is located in sustainable
surroundings in rating the building. This phenomenon of having
green buildings in an unsustainable context is called “green
sprawl.”5 Green sprawl permits individual buildings to be certified as green buildings, yet overlooks the adjacent development
pattern. In order to address the problem, the American Society
of Landscape Architects recently announced its development of
the Sustainable Sites Initiative, which will measure the sustainability of designed landscapes of public, commercial and residential projects. The U.S. Green Building Council is supporting
the project and plans to incorporate the Sustainable Sites metrics
into its LEED system.6
Given that many states are already enforcing green building
requirements for federal and private buildings, the federal policy
should take an affirmative step to require every state to adopt
building standards for federal buildings. Also, the federal policy
should equally promote certification programs other than the
LEED, such as the Green Globe, for the purpose of fair competition. For example, even though Energy Star does not provide

certification system that encompasses all aspects of green buildings, Energy Star should be utilized to strengthen the energy
conservation factor of green buildings.
The High Performance Buildings Act of 2007, introduced in
February 2007, is yet to be passed.7 The Act would be one step
forward for the federal green building policy, as it would create
the Office of High Performance Green Buildings and require the
Office to identify federal facility procedures that inhibit existing
and new federal facilities from becoming green by meeting the
LEED standard. Along with improving certification programs
and technology, the federal government’s “lead by example”
approach should be reinforced by affirmative implementation of
green building policies and effective use of green certification
programs.

Endnotes:

Green sprawl permits
individual buildings to
be certified as green
buildings, yet overlooks
the adjacent
development pattern.
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Litigation Update
Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie
by Addie Haughey*
Introduction
On September 12, 2007 the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont upheld a Vermont plan to adopt greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emission regulations for new motor vehicles sold in the
state. Several motor vehicle industry parties filed the suit against
George Crombie, Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources, to challenge the validity of Vermont’s regulations,
which are based on the California’s GHG emission standards.1

Legal Background and Arguments
At the trial in April and May of 2007, plaintiffs argued that
Vermont could not adopt California’s GHG standards because
the federal government’s right to regulate GHG emission preempted Vermont regulations. Plaintiffs alleged three types of
preemption: (1) preemption under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”);
(2) preemption under the Environmental Protection and Conservation Act (“EPCA”); and (3) foreign policy preemption.2
Section 209(a) of the CAA prevents states from preemptively establishing their own motor vehicle emission standards,
delegating that responsibility to the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”).3 Section 209(b), however, does give California the opportunity to develop its own standards so long as it is
given a waiver by EPA. California was given this exception so
the state could better manage their unique severe air pollution
problems.4 The CAA further allows for another state to adopt
Californian, instead of federal, standards as long as an EPA
waiver has been issued to California and that state notifies the
administrator.5
California passed its own set of GHG emission standards
in 2004. Vermont, in the action that prompted this litigation,
adopted those standards in 2005.6 EPA has yet to give California the necessary waiver and California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger has threatened to file suit if they do not answer
the waiver request before October 2007.7
Section 509(a) of EPCA prevents states from making laws
related to fuel economy standards for new vehicles and delegates that responsibility to the Department of Transportation
(“DOT”). The corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standards are determined by considering technological feasibility,
Fall 2007

economic practicability, the need to conserve energy, and other
federal motor vehicle standards.8
In Massachusetts v. EPA, earlier this year, the Supreme
Court held that the EPA is responsible for regulating GHG
emissions because the broad definition of “air pollutant” in the
CAA includes GHGs—an idea EPA previously rejected.9 The
court also reasoned that though fuel economy regulations are
the responsibility of DOT and such regulations are a key part of
GHG emission control, the overlap of fuel economy and pollution prevention does not diminish EPA’s duty to control pollution.10
While the Massachusetts case dealt with whether the EPA
must regulate GHGs, the Vermont case dealt with a state’s right
to adopt its own GHG standards under the California exemption of the CAA. The Massachusetts case was vital in the Green
Mountain Chrysler decision because factual findings regarding
the reality of global warming and the legitimacy of deeming
GHGs as pollutants under the CAA—the same act under which
Vermont’s new regulations were developed—bolstered Vermont’s defense in this case.11
Plaintiffs also alleged that Vermont’s GHG regulation
“intrude[d] upon the foreign policy of the United States and the
foreign affairs prerogatives of the President and Congress of the
United States.”12 Specifically, the authority to pursue multilateral GHG agreements. The regulations would also, according to
the Plaintiffs, “interfere[ ] with the ability of the United States to
speak with one voice upon matters of global climate change.”13

Holdings
Assuming that EPA will grant California’s waiver request
and providing that, if EPA does not grant the waiver, its decision would become moot,14 the Court dismissed all three arguments of preemption. The California exemption and the ability
for other states to qualify for that exemption extinguished any
violation of the CAA preemption clause.

*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Separation of EPCA responsibilities for fuel economy from
the CAA pollution regulation under the Massachusetts decision
made the EPCA preemption clause irrelevant in this case. California CAA standards, as soon as they are sanctioned by EPA,
are to be considered “other Federal motor vehicle standards”
under EPCA criteria for fuel economy.15
The argument of foreign policy preemption was denied
because Vermont’s GHG regulations do not “impair the effective
exercise of the Nations foreign policy,” the necessary threshold
for preemption when federal policy does not expressly prohibit a
state’s actions.16 Though GHG emissions represent a wide body
of foreign policy initiatives, those initiatives actually encourage
action to curb GHG emissions, even on the state level, making
Vermont’s regulations complementary, not conflicting, to foreign policy.17
The court found the auto industries’ scientific expert testimony unconvincing, calling their baseline assumptions “unsupported by the evidence.”18 Because that testimony served as the
basis for many of the industries’ arguments, those arguments
were equally unconvincing. Multiple motions throughout the
trial attempted to discredit Vermont’s expert witnesses, but the
court accepted their testimony as “simply more credible” regarding climate change and its impacts on the state of Vermont, the
ability of Vermont’s regulations to curb impacts, and the feasibility for the auto industry to meet regulatory requirements.19

Conclusion
The court was “unconvinced [that] automakers [could] not
meet the challenges of Vermont and California’s GHG regulations.”20 While time will prove the accuracy of this statement,
this case may serve as a powerful legal tool in the growing body
of case law on global warming. California’s waiver from EPA
depends on the feasibility of the regulations—something this
case clearly supports. David Doniger of the Natural Resources
Defense Council said the ruling in this case will “put a lot more
pressure on EPA to grant the waiver.”21
The eleven other states that joined Vermont in adopting the
California standards now have a strongly persuasive precedent
that legitimizes their regulations and protects them from similar
suits by automakers. Richard J. Lazarus of Georgetown University proclaimed that “[t]he district court’s opinion is a sweeping
rejection of the auto industry’s claim that California and other
states” lack authority to regulate GHGs.22
On October 6, 2007, automakers appealed the Green Mountain Chrysler decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.23 “I would have been shocked if they had not
appealed,” said Vermont Attorney General William H. Sorrell,
“I’d rather be arguing our side than theirs.”24
Certainly, other states will face similar aggressive challenges
to their GHG regulations. In fact, a case like Green Mountain
Chrysler is pending in Rhode Island. Another suit in California
began on October 22nd of this year.25 Nonetheless, Sorrell called
this “a big win” and a cause for celebration “for those concerned
about a healthier environment and . . . global warming.”26
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Book Review
Global Climate Change and U.S. Law
Michael B. Gerrard, Ed.
Reviewed by Erin Overturf*

B

ecause the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, many
may see the title Global Climate Change and U.S. Law
as an oxymoron. Yet, despite the political stubbornness
of the U.S. in the international arena, the law of climate change
in the U.S. is vast and fast-changing. This diverse body of law is
thoroughly catalogued in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law,
edited by Michael B. Gerrard on behalf of the American Bar
Association’s Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources.
This book provides an overview of all legal regimes and instruments which directly regulate or can be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
This volume serves as a
comprehensive desk reference
of legal issues related to climate
change, which any lawyer or
policymaker in the environmental field would find useful and
informative. The book provides
an outstanding overview of the
field, particularly helpful for
individuals seeking an introduction to climate change law.
Kyle W. Danish’s chapter The
International Regime offers a
concise, approachable, nutsand-bolts introduction to the
U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol, while John C. Dernbach’s chapter U.S. Policy and
Johnathan S. Martel and Kerry L. Stelcen’s chapter Clean Air
Regulation detail the directly relevant national climate change
regulation.
Recognizing that the U.S. federal policy has largely been
centered around inaction, the volume takes a broad look at the
regional, state and local laws that have emerged to fill the void.
Both David Hodas in State Initiatives and J. Kevin Healy in
Local Initiatives discuss the types of approaches governments
have taken and their relative benefits and drawbacks. The volume also contains an invaluable survey of State actions responding to climate change compiled by the Pace Law School Center

for Environmental Studies. This section of the book would be
extremely helpful for state and local government officials and
environmentalists working to address greenhouse gas emissions
at the local level.
Gary S. Guzy’s chapter Insurance and Climate Change
would also be of particular interest to policymakers. This chapter examines the structure of the insurance industry and its
response to the increased risk of natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, caused by climate change. The scope and nature
of coverage offered by the industry will necessarily define the
responsibilities of the public sector for responding to the financial and human costs of climate
change, making insurance law
an increasingly important field
of study for public servants
involved in emergency response
and prevention.
Dennis Hirsch, Andrew
Bergman, and Michael Heintz
provide an accessible analysis of
carbon trading schemes in their
chapter Emissions Trading—
Practical Aspects. Carbon trading has succeeded in capturing
the public imagination more
than nearly any other aspect of
the field and this chapter clearly
explores these technical and,
oftentimes, dauntingly complex programs from a lawyer’s perspective.
While this meticulous overview is helpful in orienting readers, the volume’s real contribution is its thorough, creative compilation of U.S. laws which, although not specifically related
to greenhouse gas emissions, may be somehow implicated by
climate change. Bradford C. Mank’s chapter Civil Remedies
examines issues that may arise when a private party brings
suit against a government or private entity for climate change

Ultimately this volume
serves as a clear and
comprehensive overview
of the intersection between
issues of climate change
and the U.S. legal
system as a whole.
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related injuries. Mank examines difficulties plaintiffs may face
in establishing Article III standing and goes on to discuss various case theories for addressing climate change injures, such as
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species
Act, international human rights instruments, and the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
However, this volume goes
beyond litigation logistics in
assessing the potential applicability of other U.S. laws. One
particularly interesting example
is a discussion by Jeffrey A.
Smith and Matthew Morreale of
the potential for Federal Trade
Regulation oversight of “green”
claims made by notoriously
environmentally unfriendly
industries in the chapter Disclosure Issues. While commercial
speech may not immediately spring to mind when assessing
legal aspects of climate change, it will certainly be interesting to

see how these two fast-changing areas of law will intersect in an
age of social marketing.
Ultimately this volume serves as a clear and comprehensive
overview of the intersection between issues of climate change
and the U.S. legal system as a whole. But, as with any attempt
to pinpoint a fast-changing area
of law, it is difficult for this kind
of volume to be fully up-to-date.
It is notable that this volume
went to press before the groundbreaking Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.
However, the ABA is compiling updates to the volume which
are available online and extend
the volume’s usefulness. This
publication would be useful for
environmental lawyers, corporate counsel, government officials,
policymakers, and anyone else interested in incorporating climate change issues into their existing practice.

This volume serves as a
comprehensive desk reference of legal issues related
to climate change.
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World News
by Addie Haughey, Sarah Melikian &
Marcel De Armas*

Africa

The South African government recently announced legislation that will end canned hunting, the practice of breeding
animals in captivity and then releasing them into an enclosed
area to be hunted, virtually guaranteeing a successful hunt. 1
Over 50,000 animals were hunted by nearly 7,000 tourists in
the 2003–04 season.2 In South Africa, the industry generates an
estimated half a billion dollars annually.3 While environmentalists allege the legislation does not do enough, breeders say the
law will destroy the hunting industry and they will be forced to
slaughter many of the 5,000 captive lions in South Africa, as
they can’t afford to feed the lions and there is not enough room
for them in the wild.4
The South African Environment Minister Marthinus van
Shalkwyk characterized the legislation as “putting an end, once
and for all, to the reprehensible practice of canned hunting.”5
The legislation was initially to take effect June 1, 2007, but is
now postponed until February 1, 2008.6 The new laws require
that lions roam free for a minimum of two years before they are
hunted, bans hunting from vehicles, and prohibit using a bow
and arrow to kill thick skinned animals and big predators.7

Americas

U.S. environmental organizations have petitioned the government to raise the status of the loggerhead sea turtle from
“threatened” to “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”). The ESA requires National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service to examine
the scientific evidence presented by the petitioners and decide
if it is compelling enough to take action.8 Loggerhead populations in Florida have declined by fifty percent in a decade, and
experts cite a barrage of causes for sea turtle declines occurring
all over the country.9 The turtles get caught in commercial fishing gear, like lines, nets, and dredges, and coastal development
impedes on loggerhead breeding grounds.10 Climate change may
also stress turtle populations due to rising sea levels, which can
damage beaches and change ocean temperatures, impacting the
ratio of male to female hatchlings.11
The Center for Biological Diversity and Oceana are two
groups petitioning on behalf of the loggerhead sea turtles that
live on the east coast, which are behaviorally and genetically distinct from loggerheads on the west coast, where the Turtle Island
Restoration Network is pushing for an ESA status change.12 The
Fall 2007

groups are petitioning simultaneously, though the government
could decide on the western and eastern subspecies of loggerhead sea turtles separately.13 If the sea turtles ESA listing is
heightened to endangered, increased protections of the species
and its habitat will be put into place.14
Representatives of the fishing industry claim that they are
taking steps to decrease turtle deaths through their fishing practices, and also argue that many loggerheads are killed off the
coasts of other countries, like Mexico, where the ESA will have
no impact.15 Government officials have ninety days from the filing of the petition to make their decision.16

Asia

The use of unregulated chemicals in Punjab, India’s most
intensively farmed state, are causing health problems, including cancer.17 According to an environmental report by the small
state’s government, the people, water, animals, and agriculture
are all afflicted.18 The report points to sources of the problem,
such as improper chemical applications due to disregarding
instructions and the success of the agricultural green revolution
of the 1960s and 1970s, which increased dependency on fertilizers and pesticides.19 In Punjab, food grain production has grown
almost ten-fold in the last forty years.20 However, growth rates
are now slowing, and the report attributes an overall reduction in
the soil’s fertility and soil erosion to the overuse of nitrogenous
fertilizers.21
In China, a different kind of toxin is causing health and
environmental problems: used electronics sent to China for dismantling.22 Skin rashes and respiratory problems are blamed on
chemicals like mercury, barium, and cobalt that are either in
the waste or used in processing the waste.23 The environmental
group Basel Action Network reports that in one e-waste town,
the lead in the river sediment is double European safety levels.24
According Greenpeace in Beijing, China produces more than a
million tons of e-waste each year, including five million television sets, five million computers, and ten million cell phones.25
Although many U.S. states require that disposed electronics
be sent to recycling centers, because Congress has yet to ratify
the Basel Convention, those recycling centers can send their
waste abroad.26 However, while most of the Chinese e-waste is
imported, domestic e-waste is on the rise.27

*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law. Sarah Melikian is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law. Marcel De Armas is a J.D. candidate,
May 2008, at American University, Washington College of Law.
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Europe

With concerns over declining fish stocks environmentalists, fishermen, and politicians are realizing and seeking out the
benefits of marine reserves.28 Surprisingly, fishermen, such as
those from the Northwestern Spanish town of Lira, are requesting
marine reserves in order to protect their livelihood.29
Marine reserves usually set aside a part of the ocean and
prohibit fishing for all or part of the year, in order to allow a
sanctuary for fish to grow, reproduce, and spill over into areas
where fishing is allowed.30 Marine reserves in other parts of the
globe have proven successful in in recovering strained fisheries. For example, in St. Lucia and Florida, marine reserves have
increased adjacent fish catches by fifty percent, while a reserve
in Sicily, Italy increased the fish catch “by a factor of 27 in only
five years.”31

Polar Regions

A team of scientists monitoring the Arctic Ocean’s circulation detected a change in the circulation from 2002 to 2006.32
The Arctic Ocean’s circulation reverted to the clockwise pattern
exhibited prior to 1990, from the counterclockwise pattern that
dominated the 1990s.33 This finding suggests that some of the
recent dramatic changes in the Arctic’s climate are not solely
caused by climate change.34
The scientists attributed the change in circulation to “weakened Arctic Oscillation, a major atmospheric circulation pattern
in the northern hemisphere.”35 Prior to 1970, the Arctic Oscilla-

tion was reasonably stable, and since then it has varied approximately on a ten year scale.36 This variation seemed to have ended
in the late 1990s, a time when the Arctic environment noticeably
changed.37 However, the recent reversal may be short lived as
the scientists predict the Arctic Ocean is ready to swing back the
circulation pattern of the 1990s.38 While the shifts in the Arctic
Ocean’s circulation do not appear to be directly connected to
climate change, “the events of the 1990s may well be a preview
of how the Arctic will respond over longer periods of time in a
warming world.”39

South Pacific

The ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”) came together at its thirteenth ASEAN Summit in
Singapore, joined by six other Asian countries, including China
and Japan.40 While the crisis in Myanmar and the passage of an
ASEAN legal charter topped the summit agenda, climate change
was also addressed by a pact that sets the stage for a series of UN
meetings on climate change to begin in December.41 While the
pact fell short of setting numerical goals for emission cuts due to
objection from poorer Asian countries, Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said “there has been a turning of the tide
in China and India’s position—they’re saying ‘yes, we need to
do something to stabilize emissions.’”42
Despite the lack of clear numbers on emissions in the pact,
Japan did offer $1.8 billion in loans to fund environmental projects in Asia, and the group pledged to plant 37.5 million acres of
trees by 2020.43
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